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 ABSTRACT  
 
This study investigates the extent to which corporate governance practices 
impact on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting in Mauritius. It is 
mandatory for all profitable businesses in Mauritius to contribute 2% of their profit 
towards CSR activities (CSR levy). It is also mandatory for all Public Interest Entities 
to report their CSR activities in their annual report. The practice of CSR is the norm 
rather than the exception in Mauritius and the responsibility of ‘what’ and ‘how much’ 
to report on is the Board’s responsibility. This study, therefore, aims to answer the 
following primary question: To what extent do corporate governance practices 
influence the extent of CSR reporting in Mauritius? In seeking the answer to the 
overarching research question, the following sub-questions are asked: (1) To what 
extent are Mauritian companies disclosing CSR? (2) What themes of disclosure are 
favoured by Mauritian companies? (3) Which corporate governance practices/other 
factors determine the extent of CSR reporting? (4) To what extent does legislation 
affect CSR reporting? (5) Do companies undertake more than the minimum required 
on CSR? (6) What are the determinants of voluntary CSR practices? 
The study is conducted using a sample of listed firms on the Stock Exchange 
of Mauritius (SEM) over a period of eight years (2007-2014). A checklist comprising 
of 41 items was developed based on four themes: environment, human resource, 
products and consumers and community. A dichotomous procedure was used whereby 
an item appearing on the checklist and disclosed in the annual report was given a score 
of ‘1’ else ‘0’. The disclosure score for each company based on the checklist was 
converted into an index (Corporate Social Responsibility Index) which is the 
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disclosure score divided by the maximum allowable score (41). This index (CSRI) is 
used as proxy for the extent of CSR reporting. Empirical results show a pattern of 
reporting different from other countries with the ‘environment’ being the most 
disclosed theme. Regarding the determinants of CSR reporting, it was found that board 
size, board gender diversity, firms which are involved in employee volunteering and 
firms which contribute funds to a CSR foundation, report more often. Results also 
show that director ownership, government ownership and board independence have a 
negative influence on the level of reporting. The study also examines the 
characteristics of those firms which go beyond the 2% threshold. Results show that 
firms with a female board presence, firms with the presence of a director with a social 
qualification, larger firms, manufacturing firms and those firms which channel their 
funds to a CSR foundation are more likely to over-invest. Conversely, as director 
ownership increases a firm is less likely to over-invest. 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, the study is 
carried out using a number of theories and thus contributes to legitimacy, stakeholder 
and neo-institutional theories showing the suitability of these theories in a period of 
pure voluntarism as well as in during a period of mandatory CSR. Second, it 
contributes to the scant number of studies on CSR practices and reporting in Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) and from an ‘emerging governance’ perspective. 
Third, the study throws light on the contribution of two new determinants of CSR 
reporting: foundations and employee volunteering. Finally, this is one of the rare 
studies which investigates the determinants of voluntary CSR in a mandatory CSR 
setting. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In recent times Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged from being 
an ‘irrelevant and doubtful idea’ to a highly researched topic (Moura-Leite and 
Padgett, 2011). This growing interest can be attributed to a general agreement that the 
role of business has widened from just maximising profits for their owners (Friedman, 
1962) to also being accountable to other stakeholders. Although maximising 
investment returns remains the main objective of business, in pursuit of this goal, 
business has to consider the impact of their actions on the environment and society 
(Cormier et al. 2011).  
Global warming and climate change have contributed to bringing 
environmental issues into the limelight (Yip et al. 2011). Businesses are seen as the 
main contributors to environmental harms. This creates valid expectations for 
companies to act responsibly (Adams and Zutshi, 2004). Companies are also 
responsible for environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and 
the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 which had serious environmental 
consequences. Such events have drawn the attention of the public and media to their 
activities. Now companies worldwide are under public scrutiny to provide an account 
of the impact of their activities on societies and environment. Financial scandals such 
as Enron in the United States and HIH in Australia have eroded public confidence in 
companies. Investors can no longer pay attention solely to the bottom-line figure of 
profits when making investment decisions. 
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Investing in developing countries presents further challenges as it is difficult 
to assess firm-level and country-level risk (Henisz and Zelner, 2010). Furthermore, the 
evolution of corporate governance arrangements in developing countries is unclear due 
to the ‘co-habitation of different institutional, legal, and ownership traditions and 
assumptions from more established governance models, brought about by design, 
colonial heritage, and/or economic and political circumstances’ (Mahadeo and 
Soobaroyen, 2016). Bhasa (2004) contends that an ‘emerging governance’ model is 
developing which contains both features of a market-centric governance model (e.g. 
USA and UK) and a relationship based governance model (e.g. Japan, France and 
Germany).  
Financial statements cannot capture information of a non-financial nature 
which stakeholders require for decision making. Consequently, companies have 
increasingly adopted an integrated sustainability reporting approach and are now 
disclosing social and environmental information in their annual reports in addition to 
the traditional financial reports. Various terms are used to describe reporting in this 
area; such as Social Reporting, Environmental Reporting (together these two are 
known as CSR reporting), Triple Bottom Line Reporting or Sustainability Reporting. 
Corporate disclosure practices play a major role in reducing information 
asymmetry between the firm and stakeholders. It has the power to influence the 
perception of external stakeholders by providing relevant information to them 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008) and also helps to supervise and control managerial 
activities (Jizi et al. 2014).  
A variety of reasons explain managerial motivations to disclose CSR despite 
its mainly voluntary nature. Some of them are: to counteract negative media attention 
(Deegan et al. 2002); to manage a particular stakeholder group (Roberts, 1992); to 
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improve financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003); to attract talented staff 
(Adams and Zutshi, 2004) and to improve corporate image (KPMG, 2005). Several 
reasons might simultaneously motivate a firm’s decision to disclose CSR and it would 
be inappropriate to assume that one motivation dominates others. These motivations 
are in fact interrelated (Deegan, 2002). Therefore a strong business case to report CSR 
practices exists. However, companies use CSR reporting mainly to manage favourable 
impressions of their aims and intentions rather than actions and performances 
(Hopwood, 2009). Consequently, a number of countries have taken initiatives to move 
from voluntary CSR reporting to mandatory CSR reporting. For example, France, 
Denmark, Norway and South Africa have passed legislation which requires firms to 
disclose their environmental performance (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). While the 
debate was initially centred on CSR reporting, three countries  (Mauritius, India and 
Indonesia) have gone further and imposed a mandatory CSR contribution by firms 
(CSR levy). This decision attracted much criticism especially in Indonesia where the 
legality of mandatory CSR was challenged in the Constitutional Court (Waagstein, 
2011). 
This study aims at investigating the CSR practices and reporting in a small 
island developing state (SIDS) in the Indian Ocean, namely, Mauritius. While 
Indonesia requires companies conducting their business activities in the field of natural 
resources to implement CSR (Waagstein, 2011), the Mauritian government requires 
from 2009 onwards that all profitable companies must be engaged in CSR through the 
imposition of a levy of 2% of a company’s preceding year profit to be spent in the 
following year. 
A number of studies have linked corporate governance practices with different 
types of disclosure; such as financial disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), voluntary 
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disclosure (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), and disclosure via public announcements 
(Laidroo, 2009). Although results of the aforementioned studies are inconclusive, they 
indicate a possible link between corporate governance practices and disclosure of 
information. Corporate governance encourages fairness, transparency, ethics and 
accountability in their dealings while pursuing their objective to maximise profits for 
shareholders (Jamali et al. 2008). Taking into account the aspirations of society falls 
under the sphere of CSR. It is the duty of senior management to ensure that the 
company is conforming to the expectations of the society by undertaking social actions 
and to account for them accordingly to avoid the risk of a legitimacy gap (Khan et al. 
2013a). The board of directors is responsible for the contents of the annual report. 
Effective governance improves accountability and transparency leading to increased 
disclosures (Rao et al. 2012).  Thus, it is important to examine how the internal 
governance structure of a firm can impact on CSR practices and disclosure.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
The study of the link between corporate governance and CSR has attracted 
huge interest from researchers. Despite their unique and localised characteristics, 
developing countries have adopted an Anglo-American style of corporate governance 
due to institutional pressures, which may not best suit their context (Khan et al. 2013a). 
Examining the CG and CSR link in developing countries presents further challenges 
as family ownership, corruption and political interference are prevalent (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). Similarly, the Mauritian corporate governance model follows the 
Anglo-American model meaning that the determinants of CSR reporting may be 
different from developed countries. The institutionalisation of CSR in Mauritius means 
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that the determinants of CSR reporting may differ from other developing countries. 
The central research question of this thesis is: 
‘To what extent do corporate governance practices influence the extent of CSR 
reporting in Mauritius?’ 
To answer the main research question, the following questions are set: 
 (1) To what extent are Mauritian companies disclosing CSR? 
(2) What themes of disclosure are favoured by Mauritian companies? 
(3) Which corporate governance practices/other factors determine the extent of 
CSR reporting? 
 (4) To what extent does legislation affect CSR reporting? 
(5) Do companies undertake more than the minimum required on CSR?  
(6) What are the determinants of voluntary CSR practices? 
 
1.3 Research Hypotheses 
The above research questions are converted into testable hypotheses. These 
hypotheses can be categorised into: ownership structure, board practices and other 
factors which include foundations, employee volunteering and control variables. A 
summary of these hypotheses is shown in chapter 5. 
 
1.4 Motivations 
Mauritius provides an interesting setting to study CSR. With the recent 
introduction of the CSR levy, firms have the choice of either paying the levy in the 
form of a tax or using the funds on CSR activities. It remains to be assessed whether 
firms have increased their engagement with CSR as a result of the levy.  The 
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government has provided guidelines for the spending of CSR funds. It is also 
mandatory as per the Financial Reporting Act (2004) for Public Interest Entities (PIE) 
to abide by the National Code of Corporate Governance (2004). The NCCG (2004) 
requires companies to adopt integrated sustainability reporting but fails to provide 
guidelines to this effect.  
Since companies no longer have the flexibility to spend funds on CSR freely, 
but rather following government’s guidelines, it is expected that CSR practices will 
differ significantly as a result. An analysis of CSR disclosures in the chosen period 
(2007-2014) will provide evidence as to whether changing CSR practices have been 
translated into increased disclosures.   
In Anglo-American countries, ownership of firms is widely dispersed and CSR 
is quasi-mandatory. The prevalence of owner-managed firms in Mauritius implies that 
firms are less inclined towards CSR (Ghazali, 2007). However, the existence of the 
CSR levy and mandatory CSR disclosure requirements makes CSR more explicit to 
business and stakeholders. This brings an up-to-date description of CSR practices and 
trends in Mauritius. 
A review of the CSR reporting literature shows that most empirical studies 
have been conducted in Europe, Australia and the USA. Even after four decades of 
research in the field of CSR reporting, researchers have not been able to devise a 
universal framework or model for explaining the determinants of CSR disclosure. 
Possible reasons for this situation are mainly the voluntary nature of CSR disclosures 
and the lack of a comprehensive theory to explain why firms engage in CSR reporting 
(Gray et al. 1995; Deegan, 2002). It would be dangerous to generalise the findings 
from developed countries to developing ones as the level of economic development 
influences CSR practices (Tsang, 1998). Furthermore, cultural and national 
  
7 
 
differences also influence CSR (Adnan, 2012). In the same vein, Belal and Momin 
(2009) argue that local economic, social and political factors contribute to shaping 
corporate attitudes towards CSR reporting practices. It can, therefore, be argued that 
the context under which CSR reporting takes place is specific for each country and has 
to be studied within that particular context.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
This study devises a framework of determinants which examines the corporate 
characteristics, ownership structure and board practices which are expected to be 
significant in explaining the extent of observed CSR reporting. The findings will be of 
interest to regulators who have an agenda for making disclosure of CG information 
mandatory in annual reports. No previous Mauritian studies are available as to whether 
firms are disclosing CSR and what type of information is being disclosed. The findings 
will show whether the target of legislators has been met. For instance, an overall low 
level of disclosure could prompt legislators/regulators to issue guidelines for CSR 
reporting.  
The spirit of the legislation requiring a contribution towards CSR for 
companies is to make them more socially responsible by engaging in activities which 
will benefit the community. This study will show whether market forces are sufficient 
to encourage firms to adopt CSR or whether regulation is necessary to induce firms to 
become more socially responsible. This will contribute to the debate of whether 
voluntary or mandatory CSR induces better company behaviour. No significant 
changes from 2009 to other years affected by CSR legislation will imply that firms 
were already practising CSR and it is business as usual, which highlights that market 
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forces are sufficient to induce firms to be socially and environmentally responsible. A 
significant increase in CSR post-2009 onwards will show the importance of regulation 
for firms to practise and disclose CSR.  
Regulators can also benefit from this study when drafting new board 
governance requirements. The code of corporate governance requires companies to 
have a minimum of two independent directors. Findings could show whether 
independent directors play a significant role in enabling a company to discharge its 
social and environmental obligations. The findings could also help regulators to decide 
whether the actual minimum requirement is sufficient to engage companies to report 
on their social responsibilities. The results of this study can guide legislators as to 
whether the current requirement which makes it mandatory to follow the National 
Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG, 2004) needs fine tuning.  
Turner (2004) argues that a country’s poor reputation of CSR disclosures can 
negatively impact on a country’s international competitiveness both in attracting 
foreign capital and for local companies seeking to invest abroad. Mauritius relies 
heavily on FDI and foreign investors are increasingly attentive to Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI). For instance, more than 10% of assets under management in the 
USA follow the SRI criteria (Cormier et al. 2011). This study provides information on 
the extent and trends of disclosures which will be of interest to potential investors. The 
results can be compared to countries having similar characteristics, like Malaysia, to 
identify similarities and differences in disclosure practices and determinants of CSR 
disclosure. Legislators can judge the CSR performance of Mauritian firms compared 
to their overseas counterparts and take further action if required. 
Businesses must operate according to society’s norms to avoid the risk of a 
legitimacy gap. Involvement in CSR is seen as a legitimising tool. It is the duty of top 
  
9 
 
management to undertake social and environmental actions and to account for them 
accordingly to avoid a legitimacy gap (Khan et al. 2013). The findings could help 
companies to plan appropriate board sizes and decide on other board characteristics 
which will enable the company to discharge its social responsibilities. 
 
1.6 Contributions of the Study 
This study contributes to the CSR and corporate governance literature in an 
‘emerging corporate governance’ model. The common characteristics of emerging 
governance models as explained by Bhasa (2004), fit the Mauritian context such as: 
domination of the market by a few business groups; families with ancestral property 
having established themselves as business leaders; transitioning from state ownership 
to private ownership. Research into emergence governance models is scant (Bhasa, 
2004). Therefore, this study provides the opportunity to compare the determinants of 
CSR reporting of an emerging governance model with other governance models. 
This research also contributes to the literature by investigating CSR practices 
in a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), which has received limited attention from 
researchers so far. SIDS have special characteristics which make them different from 
other countries. In general SIDS are very small and as a result, most SIDS are excluded 
from the global economy and many are not represented at the WTO (UN-OHRLLS, 
2013). Many of the SIDS are especially prone to natural disasters such as cyclones, 
volcanic eruptions or earthquakes. While most countries are more prone than others to 
being hit by disasters, the associated costs of these disasters are relatively higher due 
to the small size of the country. These natural disasters lead to higher damage per unit 
of area and higher per capita costs (Briguglio, 1995). An alarming issue relating to 
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SIDS is the rise of sea levels, which threatens the survival of low-lying islands 
(UNOHRLLS, 2013). The environment and natural resources are of vital importance 
to these countries due to their small size. In several instances SIDS have experienced 
a total or near depletion of their natural resources. Examples include the depletion of 
gold for Fiji and manganese for Vanuatu (Briguglio, 1995).  
The social responsibility of business is therefore of critical importance to 
enable SIDS to achieve sustainable development. Furthermore, CSR plays a 
fundamental role in alleviating poverty in Mauritius (Ragodoo, 2009).  An analysis of 
CSR reporting in Mauritius will show whether firms play their ‘social role’. No study 
has been conducted in such a unique environment whereby a CSR levy exists for all 
profitable firms and CSR reporting is mandatory for all Public Interest Entities. From 
a theoretical perspective, this study is carried out using a number of theories. Chen and 
Roberts (2010) state that using more than one theoretical perspective of CSR reporting 
enables a better understanding of the relationship between the organisation and society. 
Using various theories can provide a richer explanation of CSR practices and 
reporting. This study, therefore, contributes to a number of theories used to explain 
CSR reporting. The novelty of this study lies in explaining whether in a compulsory 
context firms are willing to go beyond the mandatory threshold. The CSR levy exists 
only in a couple of countries. This is probably one of the first studies to investigate the 
characteristics of firms which exceed the mandatory CSR threshold and also to 
examine the CSR activities on which these firms spend their discretionary CSR funds. 
Two new potential determinants of CSR reporting and voluntary CSR practices are 
also examined, namely foundations which have become increasingly popular since the 
introduction of the CSR levy and employee volunteering. 
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1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 covers the 
institutional background of Mauritius. It starts with a brief description of the Mauritian 
social, economic and political environment. A description of the Mauritian legal 
system then follows. The financial reporting requirements for various types of firms 
based on the relevant legislation are discussed. It also includes an explanation of the 
role of key institutions in the business arena. An overview of corporate governance 
practices is provided for a better understanding of the Mauritian context. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theories underpinning CSR practice and reporting. 
Similarities and differences between various theories are discussed. The justification 
for using more than one theoretical approach to explain CSR practices and reporting 
is explained. 
Chapter 4 provides an extensive literature review of CSR reporting studies. It 
reports empirical findings on themes of CSR disclosure and also findings of prior 
studies on corporate governance characteristics and their link to CSR reporting. The 
weaknesses of prior studies are discussed and more importantly, how this study intends 
to fill a gap in the literature is identified. 
Chapter 5 develops hypotheses based on research questions set in chapter 1. 
These hypotheses are grouped under regulation, corporate governance practices/ other 
factors and voluntary CSR. 
Chapter 6 describes the research methodology which includes sample selection 
process, data collection and measurement of the dependent and independent variables. 
It also shows the analytical models to be tested. 
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Chapter 7 presents the results of the study. The chapter starts with a descriptive 
analysis of the results of the content analysis. It provides a discussion of CSR practices, 
trends and patterns over time. The chapter then reports the results of multivariate 
analysis. This consists of two parts; determinants of CSR reporting and determinants 
of voluntary CSR practices in a mandatory CSR environment. The main findings are 
discussed in detail. 
Finally, chapter 8 provides the implications of the study, its limitations and 
scope for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background of Mauritius 
 
2.1 Introduction 
To further understand the context of this study, this chapter provides an 
explanation of the institutional background, laws and major events influencing CSR 
disclosures in Mauritius. This chapter is important due to the unique Mauritian context 
of CSR practices and disclosures. Mauritius is a developing small island state. Its 
economic success stands out in Africa. It is also a well-cited example of the 
cohabitation of people from various cultures, ethnicities and religions in a peaceful 
environment.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the Mauritian social, economic and 
political environment. This section helps the reader to understand the reasons for the 
introduction of the CSR levy. This is followed by a quick overview of the Mauritian 
legal environment in Section 2.3. In the same section statutory requirements for the 
preparation and auditing of financial statements are covered. Section 2.4 gives an 
overview of the CSR levy in Mauritius and other countries. Section 2.5 explains the 
role of key institutional bodies responsible for accounting and financial regulation in 
Mauritius. Section 2.6 explains corporate governance practices in Mauritius. Finally, 
section 2.7 provides a summary of the whole chapter. 
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2.2 Social, Economic and Political Environment  
The Republic of Mauritius is an island located in the Indian Ocean to the east 
of Madagascar. The land area is 714 square miles with a population of around 1.3 
million people (Statistics Mauritius, 2012). There is no record of an indigenous 
population. The island was first inhabited by the Dutch in 1698 who introduced sugar 
cane to the island. The French occupied the island between 1721 and 1810, bringing 
slaves from Africa to cultivate the sugar cane (Meisenhelder, 1997).  In 1810 the 
British took control of the island. Following the abolition of slavery in 1835, 
indentured labourers from India were brought to work in the sugar cane fields. 
Mauritius gained independence from England in 1968 and became a republic in 1992.  
Hindus (Indian descendant) make up the majority of the population followed 
by Creole descendants of African slaves (28%) and Muslims (Indian descendant) 
(17%). Other components of the Mauritian population include the Chinese who came 
to the country as traders and descendants of European settlers which both account for 
around 3 to 4% of the population (Carroll, 1994). In 1961 Professor Meade, a Nobel 
Prize winner predicted a dismal future for Mauritius. The country was heavily 
dependent on sugar cane which accounted for 93% of the country’s exports at the time 
of independence. In the 1970’s the country embarked on a process of economic 
diversification which was made possible from bumper cane harvests. During these 
years employment in the manufacturing sector increased from 5% to 20% 
(Meisenhelder, 1997). However, worsening economic conditions from 1978 caused 
GDP to decrease by 10% between the years 1980-1982. Inflation reached up to 42% 
and unemployment rose to 23%.  
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Several measures were taken to bring the country back on the track of 
economic progress. Tax rates were reduced, interest rates were liberalised, moderate 
wage policies were adopted and trade reforms were set in place to promote export-
oriented industries and the tourism sector (Joseph and Troester, 2013). These measures 
were successful. The tourism sector boosted the economy with gross tourism receipts 
increasing from $42 million to $244 million between the years 1980-1990 (Sacerdoti 
et al. 2005). The manufacturing sector continued to flourish which helped to reduce 
unemployment to 2.7% by 1992. The country continued to economically diversify and 
in the early 1990’s an offshore banking sector and a stock exchange were established. 
In 2000 there was the end of two trade agreements which guaranteed preferential 
access of Mauritian products to the USA and Europe. Several textile firms closed their 
doors or relocated to other parts of Sub Saharan Africa to take advantage of AGOA 
(African Growth and Opportunity Act) opportunities and cheap labour which caused 
the unemployment rate to increase. Meanwhile, other sectors like financial 
intermediation and tourism prospered to mitigate the downturn in the sugar and textile 
sectors. Progressing in its phase of economic diversification, two new pillars emerged; 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Sea Food production. 
Sobhee (2009) attributes the country’s resilience against external shocks to successful 
economic diversification. 
Mauritius has a Gross National Income per capita of USD 8,240 and ranks 19th 
in ‘Doing Business’ out of 185 economies (Doing Business, 2013). The economy is 
well diversified and more service-oriented. The sugar sector contributed only a meagre 
1.5% to the country’s GDP in 2012 (Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
2013). 
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2.3 Legal Environment  
The Mauritian legal system is a unique hybrid system merging both civil and 
common law practices. Being a former colony of the French and subsequently the 
British, the legal system has been influenced by both and is a combination of the 
French Napoleonic Code and English common law. The substantive private law is 
French-inspired, except for company law and bankruptcy law while public and 
administrative law is based on English common law. This results in instances of 
confusion when applying and interpreting laws (World Bank, 2004). The next sub-
section provides an overview of the financial reporting requirements for major entities 
in Mauritius based on the Companies Act (2001) and Financial Reporting Act (2004). 
This study sources data from annual reports of companies and therefore an 
understanding of the financial reporting requirements as per the Companies Act 2001 
and Financial Reporting Act (FRA) 2004 is informative to the reader and is helpful in 
determining the sample frame for this study.  
 
2.3.1 Companies Act 2001 and Financial Reporting Act 2004. 
The Companies Act 2001 and the Financial Reporting Act 2004 provide the 
financial reporting frameworks for companies. The Companies Act requires all 
companies with a turnover in excess of Rs50 million (USD 1.7 million) to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS. Companies having a turnover of less 
than Rs50m have no obligation to prepare financial statements but have to prepare a 
financial summary which comprises of an income statement and a balance sheet, 
without notes. The format for preparing a financial summary is laid out in the Ninth 
Schedule of the Companies Act. The Companies Act requires two directors to sign the 
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financial statements on behalf of the board not later than 6 months after year-end. With 
the exception of small private companies, all companies must file audited financial 
statements with the Registrar of Companies within 28 days of signing. The Financial 
Reporting Act requires all public interest entities (entities having an annual turnover 
of greater than Rs200m) to prepare financial statements in full compliance with IFRS. 
Companies having a turnover of more than Rs50 million must have their accounts 
examined by an auditor who is registered with the Mauritius Institute of Professional 
Accountants (MIPA) and approved by the FRC.  
Banking and financial institutions face additional financial reporting 
requirements as prescribed in the Banking Act 2004 and guidelines issued by the Bank 
of Mauritius. The Guidelines on Public Disclosure of Information sets the minimum 
disclosure standard banks are required to adopt in their audited financial statements. 
For instance, they must prepare quarterly financial reports in accordance to IAS 34, 
Interim Financial Reporting. The Banking Act 2004 requires all banking financial 
institutions to file IFRS compliant audited annual financial statements with the Bank 
of Mauritius and publish them within three months of their year-end. In addition to 
being registered with the MIPA and approved by the FRC, the auditor requires the 
approval of the Bank of Mauritius. In the approval process, the Bank of Mauritius takes 
into consideration; experience in audit of financial institutions, independence, 
resources and quality control. Audit partners must be rotated every five years. In the 
event an auditor’s services are terminated prior to the end of the term, the approval of 
the Bank of Mauritius must be sought following justification for the termination.  
The reporting requirements of non-banking financial institutions are governed 
by the Financial Reporting Act 2004, Financial Services Act 2007 and the Companies 
Act 2001. Financial statements complying with IFRS of these institutions have to be 
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filed with the Financial Services Commission (FSC) within 6 months of year-end and 
within 28 days of approval by the board. The financial statements must be audited by 
an auditor registered with the Mauritius Institute of Professional Accountants (MIPA) 
and licensed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The FSC reviews the financial 
statements of non-banking financial institutions and has the power to request 
clarifications on the financial statements.  
The Insurance Act, Financial Services Act, Companies Act 2001 and Financial 
Reporting Act 2004 provide the financial reporting framework for insurance 
companies. They are required to file audited financial statements based on IFRS to the 
FSC within 3 months of the year-end. The auditor has to be registered with the FRC 
and the FSC uses guidelines to establish whether the auditor is ‘fit and proper’. On 
termination of an audit appointment other than the expiry of term or resignation of the 
auditor, the FSC must be informed in writing within 15 days. Both FSC and FRC 
monitor compliance with financial reporting requirements.  
The financial reporting requirements of listed companies are contained in the 
Financial Reporting Act 2004, Companies Act 2001, Financial Services Act 2007, the 
Securities Act 2005 and listing rules. Financial statements of listed companies must be 
IFRS compliant and audited based on ISA by a registered and licensed auditor.  Interim 
quarterly reports must be filed with the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) and the 
FSC not later than 45 days after the end of the quarter. The quarterly interim reports 
must also be published in two local newspapers with wide coverage. Where the interim 
report has not been audited, a statement to that effect must be included and if audited, 
the audit report must accompany the interim report. Abridged annual financial reports 
must be filed with the SEM not later than 90 days of the year-end. Annual reports must 
be filed with the SEM within 90 days. 
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2.3.2 Background to CSR Legislation 
CSR activities of Mauritian firms can be traced back to the days where sugar 
production used to be the main economic activity.  
Table 2.1: Financial Reporting Requirements for Major Entities in Mauritius 
Company Law and 
regulation 
1.Accountin
g standards 
2.Reporting 
framework 
3.Regulator
s 
Audit 
requirements 
1.Publication 
2.Filing 
3.Timing 
 
 
Listed 
Companies 
and companies 
(turnover > 
200m rupee) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Securities 
Act, 
Companies 
Act, 
Financial 
Reporting 
Act 
1. Full IFRS 
2. For those 
that are 
public 
interest 
entities, FRC 
monitors 
financial 
reporting 
3. FSC 
 
Qualified 
statutory 
auditor 
 
 ISA 
1. Publish 
financial 
statements, 
(Consolidated) 
if group 
2. File entity 
financial 
statements with 
registrar of 
companies 
3. Publish 
quarterly 
financial 
Reports 
Companies 
(turnover>50m 
< 
200m rupee) 
Companies 
Act 
1. Full IFRS 
 
3. No 
regulator 
Qualified 
statutory auditor 
 
ISA 
2. File financial 
statements with 
registrar of 
companies 
 
Banking 
institutions 
Banking 
Act 
BoM act 
Companies 
Act 
1. Full IFRS 
3. BoM 
Qualified 
statutory auditor 
approved by 
BoM 
 
ISA 
2. Financial 
statements filed 
with the BoM 
and the 
registrar of 
companies.   
1. Published in 
Gazette & 
website of 
institution 
3. Quarterly 
financial 
reports may be 
unaudited 
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Insurance 
Companies 
Insurance 
Act 
 
Financial 
Services 
Act 
 
Companies 
Act 
1. Full IFRS 
3. FSC 
Qualified 
statutory auditor 
approved by 
BoM 
 
ISA 
2. Financial 
statements filed 
with the FSC 
and the 
registrar of 
companies 
 
 
 
State Owned 
Enterprise 
(SOE) (First 
schedule 
Financial 
Reporting Act) 
Financial 
Reporting 
Act 
 
Statutory 
Bodies Act 
1. Full IFRS 
2. FRC 
monitors 
financial 
reporting 
Qualified 
statutory auditor  
 
Approved by the 
board 
 
Approved by the 
minister 
ISA 
1. Financial 
statements 
presented to 
assembly by 
minister 
 
 
 
 
Some SOE 
(Part 1: 2nd 
Schedule 
Statutory 
Bodies Act) 
Statutory 
Bodies Act 
1. IPSAS 
3. No 
regulator 
Qualified 
statutory auditor  
 
Approved by the 
board 
 
Approved by the 
minister 
1. Financial 
statements 
presented to 
assembly by 
minister 
 
 
 
Some SOE 
(Part II: 2nd 
Schedule 
Statutory 
Bodies Act) 
Statutory 
Bodies Act 
1. FRS 
issued by 
FRC 
2. Financial 
Reporting 
Framework 
issued by 
FRC 
Qualified 
statutory auditor  
 
Approved by the 
board 
 
Approved by the 
minister 
 
1. Financial 
statements 
presented to 
assembly by 
minister 
 
 
 
IFRS- International Financial Reporting Standards 
IPSAS- International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
FRS- Financial Reporting Standards 
FRC- Financial Reporting Council 
ISA- International Standards on Auditing 
SOE- State Owned Enterprise 
 [Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2011]   
Sugar estates and factories being the main employer in the country used to provide 
support to activities in their ‘factory-area’. These support activities termed as 
philanthropic CSR could range from helping schools to religious donations. These 
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were made on an ad-hoc basis and could be termed as philanthropic CSR (Soobaroyen 
and Mahadeo, 2010). A study by the MEF in 2007 found that the majority of 
businesses are of the view that pursuing economic interest should be balanced with 
social and environmental responsibility. The study also found that firms were involved 
in CSR activities on an ad-hoc basis which were not linked to their business operations 
and strategy. A report by the Joint Economic Council (JEC) in 2007 pointed out the 
lack of coordination and systematic approach of local firms while engaging in CSR 
activities which was mainly due to the ad-hoc response (Pineda Escobar, 2010).  
Already suffering from the end of two preferential trade agreements at the start 
of the twenty-first century, the rising price of oil and falling price of sugar made 
matters worse which undermined the economic situation. Unemployment was on the 
increase causing those who are disadvantaged to drop further down the social ladder. 
In its 2007 budget, the government made an appeal by requesting (all) companies to 
contribute more towards CSR activities.  
‘Most companies, though sensitive to the issue of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) do not have structured programmes of support. With 
the exception of a few companies, CSR is being carried out on an “ad hoc” 
basis … it is our conviction that there should be a concrete show of 
solidarity with the weak, the vulnerable and the poor. To this end, a 
number of firms in the corporate sector have agreed to voluntarily 
contribute at least 1% of their profits to CSR activities run by them. I make 
an appeal to companies that can afford it to contribute more.’ (Ministry of 
Finance, 2007). 
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In its 2008 budget, the finance minister raised the alarm regarding the 
increasing number of families living in poverty. Changing economic conditions were 
compelling people living in villages, especially in coastal areas, to return to 
agriculture. Farming and fishing are the two main activities in which people in coastal 
communities are involved. Moreover, marine resources can no longer assure a living 
to those people who depend on them as the lagoon catch is decreasing. Consequently, 
those who rely on agriculture are facing difficulties to subsist. As such, there is a 
widening economic gap between those who can take advantage of growing areas of 
the economy and those who cannot do so for various reasons. Pockets of poverty are 
mainly found in the northern and eastern parts of the island (IFAD, 2013).  
It seems that the request of the government for businesses to contribute more 
towards CSR was not met. In 2009 the government mandated CSR. Several reasons 
could explain this step. A lack of coordination in the CSR activities of firms might 
have resulted in certain areas of CSR being neglected or too many firms focusing on 
the same areas of CSR. MEF (2007) showed that firms were mainly involved in 
internal CSR catering for employees while the community received a meagre part of 
allocated CSR funds. Firms were also blamed for setting CSR departments that 
employed relatives of owners and thus consumed an important part of their CSR 
budget.  
After the announcement of the CSR levy, the Joint Economic Council (JEC) 
formed a working group comprising of around 20 CSR managers and other trade 
associations such as the MEF and AHRIM (Association des Hoteliers et Restaurateurs 
de L’ile Maurice) to present the private sector’s position on mandatory CSR. A joint 
public-private consultative committee was set up by the Minister of Finance to finalise 
the guidelines (Pinoda Escobar, 2010). The guidelines for spending CSR funds were 
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aimed at synchronising CSR activities and at the same time ensuring that the CSR 
funds benefit the society and more particularly the needy. 
In 2009, the government amended Sec 75 of the Financial Reporting Act 2004 
requiring all Public Interest Entities (entities having an annual turnover of Rs200 
million and above) to adopt the Code of Corporate Governance. Public Interest Entities 
(PIEs) must also lodge a statement of compliance with the code to the FRC. In the 
event of non-compliance, the reasons must be stated. Section 8.4 of the Code states 
that there must be a corporate governance section in the annual report and Section 7 of 
the code which deals with integrated sustainability reporting requires companies to 
report (within the annual report) to stakeholders on issues linked to: environment, 
ethics, health and safety and social issues.  This implies that CSR reporting is 
mandatory for PIEs. However, no reporting guidelines are available in the code. This 
is admitted in the NCCG (2004): ‘While it may not be possible at this stage to have 
triple bottom line reporting as part of the code, it should certainly be one of the 
aspirations.’ 
 
2.3.3 Income Tax Act 1995 and Guidelines on CSR Spending 
From July 2009 companies have a legal obligation to contribute 2% of their 
book profits (changed to 2% of chargeable income as from 1 January 2012) towards 
CSR activities through the creation of a CSR fund (Income Tax act 1995, Sec 50). 
Annex 1 of guidelines on CSR states that the objectives of the fund are to: 
 Encourage companies to manage their own programmes, impacting the  
intersection of economic with social and environmental development  
  Facilitate  the  contribution  of  companies  to  support  existing  Approved 
National  Programmes  implemented  by  Companies,  national  agencies  or NGOs  
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  Promote a functional community on NGOs with complementary work plans that 
are relevant to the national development programme.       
Annex II of CSR guidelines details activities authorised for the purpose of 
utilising CSR funds which include: Socioeconomic Development, Health, Leisure and 
Sports, Environment, Education and Training, and Catastrophe. From 1 January 2012, 
companies are required to spend half of the funds in priority areas comprising of the 
following: social housing, absolute poverty and community empowerment, the welfare 
of children from vulnerable groups and prevention of non-communicable diseases. 
Section 4 of Annex I states that companies may use their CSR funds in the following 
ways: (i) Implement an approved programme by the company; (ii)  Finance the project 
of an approved NGO; (iii)  Implement an approved programme under the National 
Empowerment Foundation; or (iv) Implement projects in collaboration with public 
sector organisations. 
Programmes require the approval of the National CSR committee. The 
members of the committee are appointed by the Minister and not more than six 
members drawn from the public sector, private sector and the community. Companies 
or group of companies having CSR funds totalling more than Rs2 million can create a 
special purpose vehicle (foundation) to channel their CSR funds (NEF, 2009).  
In 2015 changes to the use of CSR funds were announced. The finance minister 
declared in its budget speech that the previous guidelines for the use of CSR funds 
were not effective in reducing poverty and the life of those living in poverty. He 
proposed a direct approach to help those needy families living in ‘cites’ (areas of 
concentrated low-cost housing built for poor people). Thirty-seven areas were 
identified and companies were requested to sponsor a particular area. Under the 
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concept referred to as ‘parrainage’ (sponsor) a company will be involved in the short, 
medium and long-term development of a ‘cite’. 
The ‘Parrainage’ will attempt to achieve the following: improving living 
conditions generally; raising the level of employment; curbing social ills; ensuring that 
all children attend school and develop fully their talents; creating sports and leisure 
facilities; and improving quality of life generally. 
Consequently, all guidelines for spending CSR funds were removed. 
Companies are now free to determine their priorities to spend their CSR funds to fulfil 
their social responsibility (Ministry of Finance, 2015). A summary of changes in the 
calculation of the CSR levy and its spending is provided in Table 2.2. 
 
2.4 CSR Levy  
2.4.1 Mauritius 
The introduction of the CSR levy did not attract much criticism, because of the 
general feeling that businesses were not contributing enough towards society 
(Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2015). However, the Mauritius Employers Federation 
(MEF) expressed concerns about the legislation. The MEF claimed that CSR should 
be voluntary and cannot be governed by legislation; the law is more prone towards 
community development rather than CSR, which is an all-encompassing concept. 
The new law focused solely on external CSR and failed to cater for employees. 
The MEF believed that enterprises should be free to engage in CSR based on their own 
priorities and believed the CSR levy is tantamount to a tax. The MEF also criticised 
the management of projects which were under the responsibility of the governments’ 
National Corporate Social Responsibility Committee (NCSR). The MEF claimed that 
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guidelines for approving projects were unclear and questioned the ability of the NCSR 
to properly coordinate CSR activities. Recipients of CSR funds (e.g. NGOs) were 
required to be registered which it was claimed would increase their administrative 
burden (MEF, 2011).  
Table 2.2: Changes in Calculation of CSR Levy and Spending 
2009  Every company shall, in every year, set up a CSR Fund 
equivalent to 2 % of its book profit derived during the 
preceding year to – implement an approved programme by 
the company; implement an approved programme under 
the National Empowerment Foundation; or finance an 
approved NGO. 
 A programme shall fall within the guidelines, approved by 
the committee  
 The committee appointed by the Minister and shall consist 
of a Chairperson and not more than 6 other members 
comprising of representatives from the public sector, 
private sector and civil society.  
 If the amount paid out of the CSR Fund is less than the 
amount provided under the Fund, the difference shall be 
remitted to the Director-General at the time the company 
submits its return of income. 
2010  Companies that have set up a CSR Fund exceeding 
Rs500,000 for the year of assessment 2010 are required to 
support their claim for the amount spent on approved CSR 
activities by a certificate from the CSR Committee. 
  Companies with a CSR fund below the threshold of 
Rs500,000, will only be required to produce a certificate 
from the CSR Committee on the amount they have spent 
on approved CSR activities as and when their case will be 
audited by the MRA.  
 Any amount claimed to have been spent on approved CSR 
activities out of CSR Fund but not duly supported by a 
certificate from the CSR Committee will be disallowed 
and claimed by MRA as income tax. 
2011  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) should now be 
computed on 2% of chargeable income 
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 The amendment is effective in respect of income year 
commencing 1 January 2012 and in respect of every 
subsequent year. 
2012  The amount paid out of CSR Fund < amount provided 
under the Fund, a company is not required to remit the 
whole amount of the difference to the MRA. It can, with 
the approval of the CSR Committee, carry forward the 
difference, limited to 20% of the amount provided under 
the Fund, to the following year to form part of the CSR 
Fund for that year.  
 Amount paid out of CSR Fund> amount provided under 
the Fund, the excess amount, to the extent of 20% of the 
amount provided under the Fund, may be carried forward 
and offset in equal instalments against any amount to be 
remitted to the MRA in respect of the 5 succeeding years. 
Any excess arising in the year will be carried forward to 
the following year and offset against any amount provided 
to be spent under the Fund. 
 Any excess carried forward will not apply to any excess 
of > 2 consecutive years 
(Source: Adapted from Sannassee et al. 2017) 
There are merits in mandatory CSR. Businesses have used CSR to paint a 
glossy picture of their activities which may not reflect reality. A large part of CSR 
reporting contains policies and plans which are not put into practice. The CSR levy is, 
however, a guarantee of action. 
The Mauritian CSR levy has set a precedent which other countries can follow 
to institutionalise CSR. For instance, the Indian and Mauritian CSR levy and 
guidelines have several similarities. India has used the Mauritian CSR levy model and 
customised it to apply there. While CSR practices originated from developed countries 
and were quickly adopted by less developed countries (LDCs), the trend on mandatory 
CSR has been set by LDCs.  
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Mandatory CSR supports the role of the government in protecting the 
environment and raising the living standards of people (Japhet et al. 2015). The 
government on its own is unable to meet all of the needs and expectations of society. 
Allowing firms to manage CSR projects allows them to innovate in meeting society’s 
needs. With several parties involved, the needs of society are met faster compared to 
a centralised body keeping custody of funds. Based on the findings of MEF (2007) 
whereby only a minority of companies were found to allocate funds to CSR, it can be 
argued that the CSR levy will enable firms to respond spontaneously if the need arises, 
for example in the case of a catastrophe. The CSR levy with guidelines for spending 
is perhaps the best mix between the two extremes of keeping full control by 
government or in the hands of companies. The situation is therefore ideal for both 
companies and the government. Pillay (2015) describes the Mauritian CSR system as 
a hybrid regulatory system of CSR in which the state sets a framework for self-
regulatory CSR measures which ‘comprehensively links development, law and social 
policy’. 
India and Indonesia also impose a CSR levy. The limited liability corporation 
law number 40/2007 in Indonesia requires companies operating in the field of natural 
resources to implement CSR. The law provides for an ‘obligatory’ amount to be spent 
on CSR (Waagstein, 2011). The law was introduced due to the negative impact of 
deforestation and pollution caused by companies. Companies are required to report 
annually on CSR activities undertaken (Islam et al. 2008). CSR became mandatory in 
India through the Companies Act 2013 which requires companies to spend 2% of their 
average net profit of the immediately preceding three years on CSR activities in the 
next year (Kansal et al. 2014). The legislation affects ‘capable companies’ i.e. any 
company incorporated in India which has (1) a net worth of Rs5 billion (USD 167 
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million) or more, (2) turnover of Rs10 billion or more, or (3) net profit of Rs50 million 
or more in any of the three preceding financial years. The CSR funds are managed by 
a committee one of whom must be an independent director. The committee has to 
provide a report of CSR initiatives undertaken by the company prior to each annual 
general meeting. Activities recommended for the use of CSR funds include: 
eradicating extreme hunger and poverty, promotion of education, promotion of gender 
equality and empowerment of women, combating HIV and AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, employment-enhancing vocational 
skills, social business projects, contribution to the Prime Minister’s National Relief 
Fund or any other fund set up by the Central government (Jain, 2014). 
 
2.5 Key Institutional Bodies in Mauritius 
Mauritius aspires to become a leading financial centre. Institutions play a 
crucial role in maintaining the credibility of a country to attract investors. In line with 
the recommendations of the World Bank, two institutions, namely the Mauritius 
Institute of Public Accountants and the Financial Reporting Council were created. This 
section reviews the role of main institutional bodies responsible for accounting and 
financial regulation in Mauritius. 
 
2.5.1 Mauritius Institute of Public Accountants (MIPA) 
The MIPA was created under the Financial Reporting Act 2004. Its functions 
include the registration of professional accountants and establishing a code of ethics 
for professional accountants which is in line with IFAC’s code of ethics for 
professional accountants. The MIPA has the power to take sanctions against its 
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members. To become a member of the MIPA an individual must be a member of one 
of the following professional bodies: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Ireland; Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of India; South African Institute of Chartered Accountants; and 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. 
A person who is a member of an accounting body other than the above-
mentioned bodies can still become a member of the MIPA. He/she needs to satisfy the 
requirements relating to qualifications in the field of accountancy and have at least 
three years of experience in the field of accountancy. For firms to become registered 
members, at least half of the partners need to be members of the MIPA. These firms 
are required to hold professional indemnity insurance or offer a financial guarantee as 
determined by the MIPA (FRA, 2004). 
 
2.5.2 Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
The FRC is the regulator of the accounting profession. One of its objectives is 
to promote high-quality financial reporting by entities (FRA, 2004). To achieve this 
objective the FRC has the authority to set accounting and auditing standards to be 
followed by PIEs (companies having an annual turnover of Rs200 million and over). 
The FRC fulfils its duties through the operation of several panels: Standards Review 
Panel, Financial Reporting and Monitoring Panel, Audit Practice and Review Panel 
and Enforcement panel. The panels comprise of employees of the FRC and 
independent qualified persons appointed by the council. The FRC is the body 
responsible for licensing auditors. To be eligible for an audit licence, a person must 
meet the following requirements: (a) a practicing certificate issued by MIPA, (b) 
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documentary evidence of passing a professional accountancy examination with 
auditing as one of the subjects, (c) at least 48 weeks (240) days of audit work 
performed before or after becoming a member of a professional accountancy body, 
provided at least 12 weeks there from were spent on statutory audit or similar work, 
(d) 2 years’ work experience after becoming a member of a professional accountancy 
body, with at least 24 weeks spent on statutory audit work, (e) Satisfactory experience 
in (i) practice management, (ii) audit quality control and control of audit work, and 
(iii) documentation and maintaining quality assurance (Financial Reporting Council, 
2015). Mauritius has adopted all IFRS regulations without amendment.  
 
2.5.3 Financial Services Commission 
The Financial Services Commission (FSC) was established under the Financial 
Services Development Act 2001 as the regulator of non-banking financial services in 
Mauritius. The FSC has taken over the role of the Stock Exchange Commission, the 
insurance division of the Ministry of Economic Development, Financial Services and 
Corporate Affairs, the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority which were 
the regulatory bodies for securities, insurance and global business respectively. The 
FSC is mandated under the Financial Services Act 2007 to license, regulate, monitor 
and supervise businesses operating in the areas which are governed by the following 
pieces of legislation: the Securities Act 2005, the Insurance Act 2005 and Private 
Pensions Schemes Act 2012. 
The FSC is responsible for the supervision and regulation of entities carrying 
out business under its enabling laws. The FSC monitors compliance of licensees in 
relation to its legislative framework and also has the power to enforce the laws under 
its responsibility. The combat of financial frauds, money laundering and the prevention 
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of investment business abuse is also part of the core functions of the FSC. Other 
functions of the FSC include the protection of consumers and investors through its 
legislative framework, the promotion and development of the financial services sector 
to achieve economic stability and the elaboration of policies with the aim to ensure 
fairness, efficiency, transparency and stability of the financial system (Financial 
Services Commission, 2015). 
 
2.6 Corporate Governance Practices in Mauritius 
In the wake of several financial scandals affecting developed countries at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and high profile cases of corruption in the local 
context, the Mauritian government-initiated actions for the drafting of a code of 
corporate governance. The outcome of the King Committee was a report on corporate 
governance and a code of corporate governance. The code which was released in 2004 
applies to listed companies, banks and non-financial institutions, large public 
companies, large private companies, state-owned enterprises including statutory 
bodies and parastatal organisations. The code is meant to be applied to a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis. Moreover, regulatory bodies e.g. Stock Exchange of Mauritius through 
listing rules may impose additional governance requirements. The code comprises of 
the following sections: compliance and enforcement; boards and directors; board 
committees; role and function of the company secretary; risk management, internal 
control and internal audit; accounting and auditing; integrated sustainability reporting 
and finally communication and disclosure. 
The Code devotes one section to integrated sustainability reporting and 
encourages companies to disclose their policies and practices as regards to social, 
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ethical, health and safety and environmental in the annual report. The code stresses the 
adoption of a code of ethics by companies partly to attenuate the perception of 
inequality prevailing in the country regarding employment and also in the aftermath 
of high profile cases of corruption. To this end, the code states that a company’s code 
of ethics: 
‘…should make clear what acceptable and unacceptable practice is and 
should be easy to communicate to all stakeholders, especially the 
company’s officers and employees who will rely on it to guide them in 
their dealings’.  
Stressing on the particular importance of the environment for Mauritius, the 
code states: 
‘… companies need not only be aware of the importance of these issues 
but should also be actively involved in managing their activities so as to 
minimise any negative impact on the environment’. 
 
2.6.1 Ownership Structure 
The concentration of economic power and wealth among a small proportion of 
the population especially successors of colonial masters remains a topical issue. Those 
who held economic power since independence have been prospering by maintaining 
close ties with politicians. This inequality in income and wealth distribution is visible 
in Mauritius (Mahadeo et al. 2011b). It is no surprise that ownership of firms remains 
concentrated. Cross-shareholding and cross-directorship are common features among 
firms in Mauritius. Many successful firms are not listed on the stock exchange as major 
shareholders do not want to relinquish control. At the time when the EPZ sector was 
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the major sector boosting the economy, none of the textile firms was listed on the SEM 
(Manos and Ah-Hen, 2003).  
A few large companies and conglomerates hold a significant share of the 
market in Mauritius. In addition to market concentration, another important feature of 
these companies is concentrated ownership structure with a majority of them being 
family owned and controlled (Manos and Ah-hen, 2003). Consequently, external 
control mechanisms such as takeovers which can be an important market disciplining 
tool are rare in Mauritius. The stock market plays a limited role in providing finance 
to firms. Though the stock market has moved from an equity-based market to offer a 
variety of products such as corporate bonds, this remains less preferred than bank 
loans. Similar to Anglo-American countries the relationship between the bank and the 
business is that of lender and borrower. Banks are not involved in the management of 
companies as it is the case in continental European countries. 
The corporate control mechanism in Mauritius is mainly insider oriented. It is 
similar to Asian countries like Bangladesh where there is a high concentration of 
ownership among few owners known as ownership control (Rashid, 2011). The main 
shareholders exercise a major role in disciplining the firm. These shareholders would 
be part of the board of directors and have the duty to act in good faith and in the best 
interest of the company. 
The Code states that ownership concentration is common in many countries 
and not always bad for economic growth. However, it calls for wider ownership of 
companies which is desirable to allow people of all communities to be shareholders of 
companies. Pension funds can play a major role to have wider ownership. 
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2.6.2 Family Ownership 
The Mauritian business environment is characterised by family owned and 
managed firms with a concentration of ownership among a small percentage of the 
population. Even listed companies have a high level of influence by family driven 
management with the same people having a stake in several areas of business activities. 
This results in a ‘high level of opacity’ in running such enterprises (Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo, 2008). The smallness of the island and the ‘tight-knit’ nature of the business 
community often results in instances of conflict of interest arising from 
family/personal relationships among directors/managers and suppliers. Over the last 
20 years, successive governments have been providing assistance for the creation and 
expansion of small and medium sized enterprises. Trust is the essential element in any 
business venture and it is no surprise that entrepreneurs turn to family members to 
invest in their enterprise. Many of these enterprises have been successful over the years 
and some are even listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius. Nearly 50% of the most 
successful businesses in Mauritius are family owned.  
 
2.6.3 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors consisting of mutual funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies are very active on the stock exchange and account for 75% of the daily 
turnover. However, institutional investors do not hold majority shareholding in listed 
companies. Foreign pension funds are also active on the SEM. Given that 
concentration of ownership is common among Mauritian firms, pension funds can play 
a key role to achieve wider ownership (NCCG, 2004). 
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2.6.4 Board Structure 
Two leading approaches have emerged with regard to the organisation of board 
structure; one-tier and two-tier boards. In Anglo-American countries such as the UK, 
US and Canada a one-tier structure is adopted where the board comprises of both 
executive and non-executive directors. Two-tier boards are common in continental 
Europe in countries such as Finland, Germany and Netherlands. In a two-tier structure, 
the executive and supervisory functions are separated. The supervisory board (higher 
level) is composed exclusively of non-executive supervisory directors who may 
represent the government, workers and institutional directors. The management board 
comprises executive directors (Maassen and Van Den Bosch, 1999). Mauritius follows 
the Anglo-Saxon style of board structure. The board of directors are comprised of a 
mixture of executive and non-executive directors on a single board. There is a trend 
towards a majority of members being non-executive directors. The board is normally 
headed by a non-executive chairman.  
The chief executive officer (CEO) who is responsible for the day to day 
operations of the firm is a member of the board. Listing rules prevent the combination 
of the role of the chairman and the CEO referred to as role duality. Role duality is 
common in family-owned businesses in Mauritius. In theory, shareholders elect 
members of the board to oversee the CEO on their behalf but in practice, the CEO 
could encourage shareholders to choose individuals who are close to him to form part 
of the board so that his authority is unopposed (Latham, 1998). To safeguard against 
the possibility of such abuses, in the US and likewise in Mauritius control mechanisms 
such as disclosures and financial audits are required. Other control measures similar 
to the Anglo-American style, include nominating independent directors on the board 
and an audit committee to oversee the audit function. 
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2.6.5 Board Practices 
The code recognises the special characteristics of Mauritius. As the country is 
small, finding the right skills and competence for the appointment of independent 
directors might be difficult. True independence which is a pillar of corporate 
governance might be difficult to achieve due to Mauritius’ remoteness. Most business 
enterprises are small and as corporate governance involves a cost, achieving full 
compliance compared to firms in larger countries will only be possible for a few 
companies. The code states that an appropriate balance of executive, non-executive 
and independent directors is necessary to ensure satisfactory performance while at the 
same time operate within the bounds of good governance. To this effect, the Code 
states that each board must have at least two executive directors to ensure a strong 
management presence and two independent directors to safeguard the interest of 
minority shareholders (NCCG, 2004). There is a tendency for boards in Mauritian 
companies to be male-dominated and board members to have a long tenure (Mahadeo 
et al. 2012). While it was not possible to confirm the tenure of board members, data 
collected for this study confirms that male directors make up, on average 96% of board 
membership.   
 
2.6.6 Equal Opportunities  
At the time of independence, the sugar economy was controlled by a few 
French families leading to economic power concentration while the Hindu-Mauritian 
majority enjoyed political power (Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011). Even today 
descendants of European settlers largely control the private sector. Some of the charges 
often levelled against the Mauritian private sector are ‘unfair employment practices, 
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opaque management policies and quasi-monopolies in certain sectors’ (Mahadeo et al. 
2011a). To this effect, the code notes that 
 ‘A common public perception is that employment and promotion within 
the private and public sectors are linked to the “community” of the 
employee and that of the company’s shareholders. This perception could 
be redressed by the application of a code of ethics in the Code of 
Corporate Governance, which commits the company to merit in 
recruitment and promotion’.  
The Labour party made democratisation of the economy its motto since coming 
into power in 2005. A commission for the democratisation of the economy was 
nominated to look into ways to reduce the disparity in income and wealth prevailing 
between those who have economic power and the remainder of the population. The 
much awaited ‘Equal Opportunities Act’ became a reality in 2011. An Equal 
Opportunities Commission was nominated in 2013 to investigate matters of 
discrimination relating to employment, training, selection and other activities falling 
under the purview of the commission. 
 
2.6.7 Corporate Governance and CSR 
The term corporate governance has been defined by various authors. The 
Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate governance as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’. The control aspect of CG embraces 
compliance, accountability and transparency and how managers discharge their 
responsibility in accordance with rules, regulations and code of conducts (Jamali et al. 
2008). Widely publicised cases of corporate failures such as Enron, Tyco and 
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WorldCom have increased attention towards corporate governance practices. In this 
vein, Page (2005) contends that the importance of corporate governance lies in 
continuously refining laws, regulations and code of conducts as ‘they cannot foresee 
every eventuality’. 
From an agency perspective, CG relates to the control mechanism and 
procedures which ensures that management acts in the best interest of shareholders. At 
the same time, it reduces the likelihood that managers acting in their self-interest, take 
actions which are not congruent with maximisation of shareholder value 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). Though there is no doubt that shareholder supremacy 
should prevail (Page, 2005), a broader conception of CG embraces a more stakeholder-
oriented approach (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). To this end, managers are also 
responsible towards employees, suppliers, customers and communities whose 
investment in the organisation is valuable (Jamali et al. 2008). The stakeholder 
approach to CSR, as advocated by Freeman (1984) who argues that ‘corporations are 
at the crux of a complex web of stakeholder relationships and have an obligation or 
responsibility to these different stakeholders’, is consistent with the broader concept 
of CG. Therefore, paying proper attention to stakeholders provides a potential link 
between CG and CSR. 
Both CG and CSR are expected to have positive long-lasting benefits which 
will strengthen the business. Good governance mechanisms allow successful 
reconciliation of interests of owners, managers and other stakeholders dependent on 
the organisation allowing it to obtain long-term capital and invest it proficiently 
(Jamali et al. 2008).  With regard to CSR, Bowman (1978), Alnajjar (2000) and Ntim 
and Soobaroyen (2013) found that it has a positive effect on corporate financial 
performance. However, the latter report that a combination of CG and CSR has a 
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stronger positive effect on corporate financial performance than CSR only. Firms with 
good governance structures tend to be more profitable (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). 
Therefore both CG and CSR can lead the firm towards its ultimate objective of making 
profits. 
CG has been theorised as a pillar of CSR by Hancock (2005), with other pillars 
being human capital, stakeholder capital and environment. Ho (2005) presents CSR as 
a dimension of CG. In her model, good CG entails taking into consideration the 
expectations of society and also internal stakeholders. Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005) 
describe CSR as part of a continuum which ranges from corporate conformance and 
corporate performance. Any of the above three ways of conceptualising CG and CSR 
shows that they are closely linked. Jamali et al. (2008) explain that CG and CSR are 
based on the same essential principles: honesty, transparency and accountability to 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
In the aftermath of previously-mentioned corporate scandals, the United States 
introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) which places greater responsibility on 
board for their actions and more emphasis on reporting on internal control. Several 
countries followed the US and introduced regulation for better corporate governance.  
This has seen boards being more independent and increase disclosure to promote 
transparency (Hauswald and Marquez, 2007). Diligent exercise of board 
responsibilities is one of the basic principles of corporate governance (OECD, 1999) 
which is reflected in the composition of the board. Patel and Dallas (2002) advocate 
that  
‘good corporate governance includes a vigilant board of directors, timely 
and adequate disclosure of financial information, meaningful disclosure 
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about the board and management process, and a transparent ownership 
structure identifying any conflicts of interests between managers, 
directors, shareholders, and other related parties’.  
A number of studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali, 2007; Barako and 
Brown, 2008; Jizzi et al. 2014) have empirically tested how board practices and 
ownership structure influence CSR practices. This study, therefore, posits that board 
practices and ownership structure will influence CSR practices in Mauritius. 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary  
The study examines the relationship between corporate governance and CSR. 
CSR and corporate governance practices vary among countries. A good starting point 
is therefore to understand the institutional settings of the country under study. This 
chapter explains the key issues, events and challenges surrounding CG and CSR 
practices and disclosure in Mauritius. 
This chapter starts with an overview of the transformation of the Mauritian 
economy over the years from an agricultural economy to a service-oriented one. The 
social and political context is also covered. The chapter then explains the legal 
framework governing financial reporting in Mauritius. 
Based on the advice of the World Bank several institutions were set up and 
legislation passed to strengthen the financial reporting system in Mauritius. The role 
of other bodies such as the MIPA, FRC and FSC are then explained. Corporate 
governance practices in Mauritius in line with 2004 King Report and selective sections 
of the code of corporate governance are covered. The special characteristics of the 
country and the challenge of meeting international corporate governance practices are 
discussed. Mauritius is one of the few countries which has mandated CSR and imposed 
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a CSR levy. A background to CSR legislation and the CSR environment in Mauritius 
throws light on CSR practices. The latest development in CSR legislation is also 
explained. This chapter covered factors specific to the country which are important to 
develop an understanding the uniqueness of the study. The conceptual link between 
CG and CSR is also covered. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theories used to explain the reasons for and the extent 
of CSR disclosure. Theory has been defined as ‘… an ordered set of assertions about 
a generic behaviour or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad 
range of specific instances’ (Sutherland, 1975). The main aim of theory is to ‘answer 
the questions of how, when or where, and why . . . unlike the goal of description, which 
is to answer the question of what or who’ (Bacharach, 1989). Several theoretical 
perspectives have been applied in support of CSR reporting and disclosure. Gray et al. 
(1993) classify voluntary disclosure theories into three types; economic theories, social 
and political theories and decision usefulness theories. However, ‘the most insightful 
theoretical studies are drawn from social and political theory studies’ (Gray et al. 
1995). Three commonly used socio-political theories to explain CSR are legitimacy 
theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory. These theories are often referred to 
as systems-based theories which assume that an organisation is influenced and in turn 
have an influence on the society in which it operates (Deegan, 2009).  
This chapter provides an overview of theories applicable to the practice and 
disclosure of CSR. The chapter starts with an overview of the stakeholder and 
instrumental stakeholder theories in sections 3.2 and 3.3.  A detailed discussion of the 
legitimacy and political economy theories is provided in sections 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively. Neo-institutional theory is examined in section 3.6. In sections 3.7 and 
3.8, two economic theories related to disclosure of CSR are covered, namely, 
signalling theory and agency theory. Section 3.9 covers public interest theory followed 
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by capture theory in section 3.10. These two theories are relevant to accounting 
regulation. Since CSR is mandatory in Mauritius these two theories provide an 
understanding of the need for regulation. In section 3.11, contingency theory is 
explained. The justification for the theoretical framework used in this study is provided 
in section 3.13. A summary of the chapter is provided in section 3.14. 
 
3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory examines how an organisation manages its relationship 
with stakeholders (Gray et al. 1995). Donaldson and Preston (1995) define a 
stakeholder as ‘persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of corporate activity’. Since the definition can include many 
persons or group of persons, Clarkson (1995) distinguishes between two types of 
stakeholders: primary and secondary. He defines a primary stakeholder as ‘One 
without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going 
concern’ while a secondary stakeholder is referred to as ‘those who influence or affect, 
or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but are not engaged in transactions 
with the corporation and are not essential for its survival’. The objective of classifying 
stakeholders in these two streams implies that the attention paid by firms to these two 
categories is likely to differ. This is the bone of contention between the two branches 
of stakeholder theory: ethical (normative) and managerial (positive).  
The ethical branch of stakeholder theory is prescriptive stating the ‘Do (Don’t 
do) this because it is the right (wrong) thing to do’ (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
The ethical branch assumes that stakeholders have intrinsic rights (for example safe 
working conditions and fair pay) and that all stakeholders have the right to be treated 
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fairly. The business is operated not for the sole purpose of increasing shareholders’ 
returns but ‘as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholders’ interests’ (Hasnas, 1998). Thus, 
management has a fiduciary duty not only towards shareholders but stakeholders as 
well. Management should give equal consideration to all stakeholders. Stakeholders 
should be considered as an end in themselves rather than a means to an end (Belal and 
Roberts, 2010). Management must manage the business to attain optimal balance 
among them (Hasnas, 1998). This may imply the sacrifice of shareholders’ interest to 
some extent at the expense of stakeholders, on account of the moral role of business 
and its social effects on people’s lives (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). Hence, the 
normative branch of the stakeholder theory assumes that the business has a social 
responsibility (Hasnas, 1998). Thus, involvement in CSR activities will be in activities 
which the firm believes it has a moral responsibility such as providing safe working 
conditions, reduction of pollution or sponsoring projects.  
Extending the idea of treating all stakeholders fairly, Deegan (2009) argues 
that all stakeholders have the right to be informed of how the organisation is affecting 
them even though they might not use the information. 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory takes the view that stakeholders 
have to be treated differently. Gray et al. (1996) note that: ‘the more important the 
stakeholder to the organisation, the more effort will be exerted in managing the 
relationship’. The criticality of resources which the stakeholders control will influence 
the attention given to them (Ullmann, 1985). For instance, the influence of lenders is 
considered to be high for a firm which is highly geared. Thus, it will put in more effort 
in managing its relationship with lenders. Information is a major element that can be 
employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) the stakeholder in order to 
gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition and disapproval’. Van 
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der Laan et al. (2005) argues that the support of stakeholders is essential for the long-
term success of the organisation. From an accounting perspective, the annual report 
provides the medium for the dialogue between stakeholders and the firm. 
Ullmann (1985) presents a three-dimensional model explaining the 
relationship between social disclosure and social and economic performance. The first 
dimension is based on stakeholder power. If a stakeholder is considered important the 
firm will meet the demand of that particular stakeholder. CSR activities and disclosure 
are therefore considered part of an effective strategy to manage stakeholders (Roberts, 
1992). The second dimension deals with the strategic posture which a firm adopts 
towards CSR activities. If a firm continuously monitors its position vis-à-vis its 
stakeholders and develop CSR activities which address their needs, the firm is 
perceived to adopt a strategic posture. The third dimension relates to the firm’s past 
and current economic performance. The firm’s economic performance will determine 
its involvement in CSR activities. The importance of meeting social responsibility 
goals decreases with low economic performance. 
A firm has numerous stakeholders and has to identify which stakeholder to 
cater for. In their model of stakeholder identification and salience, Mitchell et al. 
(1997) posit that the need of a stakeholder will be fulfilled depending on the 
combination of the stakeholder’s attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. A 
stakeholder is assumed to have power if it can compel the firm to accept its demands. 
 
3.3 Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
Instrumental stakeholder theory as advanced by Jones (1995) aims to describe 
what will happen if managers behave in certain ways. He argues that problems of 
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opportunism, inherent in organisations can be overcome by developing relationships 
with stakeholders based on trust and cooperation. For instance, developing trustworthy 
relationships with employees can earn the company a competitive advantage 
(Cummings and Patel, 2009). In short, instrumental stakeholder theory is a contingent 
one which purports that certain results can be obtained only if certain behaviours are 
adopted (Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi 2005).  
The importance of stakeholders for the current and future financial success of 
the firm has been the subject of several studies but their application in practice remains 
largely untested (Cummings and Patel, 2009). A major contribution to the instrumental 
stakeholder literature is the study carried by Polonsky (1995). His study focused on 
how an organisation can achieve greater organisational effectiveness and enhance its 
marketing strategy by adopting a stakeholder approach. The study classified 
stakeholders according to their involvement, being: supportive, marginal, non-
supportive or mixed-blessing. Using data from Fortune magazine about eight attributes 
of reputation, Riahi-Belkaoui (1991) measured organisational effectiveness. He also 
tested a model of social performance using part of the reputation index. He found that 
size and profitability were positively related to organisational effectiveness and social 
performance and negatively related to risk. Thus, he concluded that organisational 
effectiveness and social performance are conceptually similar. 
 
3.4 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations want to be perceived as operating 
within the norms and bounds of the societies in which they operate. Legitimacy theory 
is based on the assumption that a social contract exists between the organisation and 
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society. The social contract sets out the implicit and explicit expectations of how the 
organisation should conduct its operations.  
Businesses are therefore expected to behave according to society’s 
expectations. Gray et al. (1996) state that the explicit terms of the contract are 
embodied in legal requirements while the implicit terms are non-legislated societal 
expectations. Managers have the difficult task to anticipate society’s expectations to 
operate within society’s bounds.  
Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as: 
‘… a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate with some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ 
Legitimacy is a ‘conferred status that is judged and controlled by others rather 
than by the legitimating organisation’ (Chen and Roberts, 2010). CSR disclosure is a 
means to cope with the needs and demands of society (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). 
Legitimacy is a relative concept since it depends on the social system in which the 
organisation operates and is time and place specific (Deegan, 2009). In this respect, 
Mathews (1993) stated that: ‘Organisations draw on community resources and output 
both goods and services and waste products to the environment’. The organisation has 
no inherent rights to these benefits, and in order to allow their existence, society would 
expect the benefits to exceed the costs to society’.  
Tilling (2004) argues that there are two levels of legitimacy theory: the 
institutional forming the macro theory of legitimation and one level down, 
organisational legitimacy. Institutional legitimacy deals with how organisations 
(capitalism or government) have gained acceptance from society. From this 
perspective ‘external institutions construct and penetrate the organisation in every 
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respect’ (Suchman, 1995). Unlike the institutional view which takes legitimacy for 
granted, organisational legitimacy views it as ‘an operational resource ... that 
organisations extract - often competitively - from their cultural environments and that 
they employ in pursuit of their goals” (Suchman, 1995). Though legitimacy is a 
resource considered vital for the firm’s survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) the firm 
can engage and control the legitimation process by conforming to society’s 
expectations. Maurer (1971) states that ‘legitimation is the process whereby an 
organisation justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist’. Firms can, 
therefore, choose how they are going to engage in the legitimation process. When 
faced with the conflicting choice of either adapting existing operations to meet social 
norms (e.g. divest from polluting activities) or engage in a communication process to 
manage impressions (e.g. sponsoring environmental projects) managers will favour 
the latter (Mahadeo et al. 2011a).  
Most CSR studies are undertaken from an organisational legitimacy 
perspective. Organisational legitimacy is threatened when the behaviour of the firm 
and the expectations of the society are not aligned, giving rise to a legitimacy gap. 
Unacceptable behaviour can lead to boycotts of a firm’s product, factor suppliers 
restricting access to labour and/or capital and lobbying to increase fines or introduce 
new laws (Deegan, 2002).  Wartick and Mahon (1994) explain the circumstances when 
a legitimacy gap can occur: (1) There is a change in corporate performance, but society 
expectations of corporate performance remains unchanged; (2) Corporate performance 
is unchanged, but society expectations of corporate performance have changed; and 
(3) Corporate performance and society expectations change in different directions, or 
in the same direction but with differing momentum. 
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If a company faces a legitimacy gap it can pursue legitimation strategies. 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) list the following strategies: (1) Adapt its output, goals 
and methods of operation to conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy; (2) The 
organisation can attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of social 
legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practices, output and 
values; or (3) The organisation can attempt, through communication, to become 
identified with symbols, values or institutions that have a strong base of legitimacy.  
Lindblom (1994) proposes several strategies to adopt in circumstances where 
the legitimacy of an organisation is threatened. Tilling and Tilt (2010) summarise these 
strategies as follows: (1) Change itself; (2) Change the public; (3) Manipulation; and 
(4) Misrepresentation. These strategies mostly overlap and involve some form of 
communication and therefore disclosure.   
Suchman (1995) posits that the strategy chosen will depend as to whether a 
firm wants to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy. Tilling (2004) and Tilling and Tilt 
(2010) provide a refinement to the phases of the legitimation process by adding two 
more phases. In the first phase, firms want to establish legitimacy. This occurs in the 
initial stages of the organisation’s development where financial competence and 
meeting market expectations are important. If the organisation fails to do so, it loses 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its principal stakeholders (customers, suppliers, creditors). Once 
legitimacy has been established, in the second phase, the organisation has to maintain 
legitimacy. This stage has attracted the attention of most accounting researchers. This 
stage is harder than establishing legitimacy. Legitimacy is a dynamic construct which 
requires the organisation to be responsive to society’s expectation to be seen as 
legitimate. When firms enter new markets or change the way it does business in its 
current market, it enters the third phase where it may have to extend legitimacy. 
  
51 
 
Management must be proactive and attempt to win the confidence of wary 
stakeholders. An internal or external incident may threaten the organisation’s 
legitimacy.  
Social and environmental reporting papers have concentrated on Lindblom’s 
(1994) defensive strategies (Tilling et al. 2010). As an extension to the previous model, 
Tilling (2004) argues that if an organisation fails to defend its legitimacy, it enters a 
‘loss phase’. Taking the example of the tobacco industry, Tilling (2004) argues that 
the loss of legitimacy can become ‘chronic’ if the product is thought to be unsafe. 
However, the loss can be managed or slowed over a long period of time. The 
organisation can re-establish its legitimacy if it makes significant improvements. From 
the loss phase, an organisation can be moved back to the first stage or be moved into 
some form of disestablishment. Within the loss stage, there will be instances where the 
organisation will increase disclosure to counteract specific threats or where the 
organisation has made some fundamental changes to defend its legitimacy.  
Brown and Deegan (1998) found that firms which have attracted media 
attention due to their negative environmental actions, increase environmental 
disclosures in their annual reports. Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 
1989, Patten (1992) investigated the disclosure of US oil firms. He found an increase 
in environmental disclosures in the post-1989 period. When faced with a legitimacy 
crisis, firms increase their disclosures to legitimise their activities. Managers may 
purposefully not increase disclosures if they judge that disclosure is not the appropriate 
strategy to tackle a legitimacy threat or if previous disclosures have made matters 
worse (De Villiers and Van Standen, 2006). The reluctance to disclose environmental 
information is consistent with legitimacy theory. Similarly De Villiers and Van 
Standen (2006) state that a change in the composition of disclosure (general/ specific) 
  
52 
 
and even a reduction in the level of environmental disclosure can have legitimising 
effects. Companies may reduce the level of environmental disclosure to ‘avoid further 
scrutiny’.  
 
3.5 Political Economy Theory (PET) 
The view expressed by PET is that economic issues cannot be discussed in 
isolation but rather in conjunction with the political, social and institutional framework 
in which economic activity takes place. Gray et al. (1996) define political economy as 
‘the social, political and economic framework within which human life takes place’. 
Managers will engage in CSR activities to seek the support of those groups which can 
help the firm to further its business activities. For instance, firms will make political 
donations if they believe that these political donations will bring in benefits.  Amran 
and Devi (2008) found that firms which obtain government contracts have CSR high 
on their agenda. Arguably, the firm faces pressure from stakeholders and responds by 
making disclosures to either seek the support of these stakeholders (such as 
government, customers or environmental groups) or to reduce the pressure exercised 
by these stakeholders (Cotter et al. 2011). Guthrie and Parker (1989) argue that firms 
disclose CSR under themes as they recognise that there are several stakeholders 
interested in CSR information. They further claim that CSR disclosures whether they 
are at a minimal level or absent, lend support to political economy as it shows how 
reporters view the economic, social and political world in their own terms.  
PET has two variants labelled ‘classical’ and ‘bourgeois’. Classical PET is 
based on the works of Karl Marx which acknowledges the existence of sectional 
interests, conflicts within society and the central role of the state. In contrast, bourgeois 
  
53 
 
PET ignores these aspects and views the world as pluralistic whereby several 
stakeholders have the power to influence decisions made by firms. However, no 
particular stakeholder is expected to have the upper hand, bourgeois PET rather 
focuses on group interactions within society as a whole (Gray et al. 1996). Legitimacy 
and stakeholder theories are derived from the bourgeois stream of the PET. They are 
both based on the concept of social responsiveness whereby the company may adapt 
or change its strategy to change the perception of the public (Momin, 2006).  
 
3.6 Neo-Institutional Theory 
Neo-institutional theory explores how cultural, political and social forces lead 
to homogeneity in organisational structure and practices (Fogarty, 1996). It is accepted 
that institutional theory has a wider applicability as all organisations ‘are subject to 
regulative processes and operate under local and general governance structures’ 
(Dillard et al. 2004). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) made a major contribution to 
institutional theory by investigating why organisations in new fields initially display 
variety in their approach and form but tend to become similar once a field becomes 
well established.  The process of homogenisation which is at the heart of institutional 
theory is termed ‘isomorphism’. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define isomorphism as 
‘a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions’. Three forces are at play which leads 
to institutionalisation of certain practices.  
Coercive isomorphism can take the form of regulation or other informal 
pressures which compel organisations to follow institutionalised procedures. Mizruchi 
and Fein (1999) argue that coercive isomorphism come from two sources: pressure 
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from other organisations on which the focal organisation is dependent and an 
organisation’s pressure to conform to expectations of society. Coercive isomorphism 
is similar to the managerial branch of stakeholder theory where an organisation has to 
conform to the requirements of powerful stakeholders. In this respect Tuttle and 
Dillard (2007) note: 
 ‘The primary motivator is conformance to the demand of powerful 
constituents and stems from the desire for legitimacy as reflected in the 
political influences exerted by other members in the organisation field’.  
From a CSR perspective, a company could be forced to adopt voluntary reporting 
practices to show that its practices are in line with those espoused by powerful 
stakeholders and at the same time ignoring less powerful stakeholders (Deegan, 2009). 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organisation copies or improves on 
practices of other organisations to gain a competitive advantage in terms of legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Rahaman et al. (2004) state that uncertainty could be a 
driving force for such imitation. Therefore, to reduce uncertainty firms try to emulate 
other organisations which are viewed as successful. For instance, a new firm joining 
an industry may engage in CSR practices simply because other firms are involved in 
such practices. Following trends reassures stakeholders of the legitimacy of the 
organisation. Therefore without stakeholder pressure, firms are unlikely to imitate or 
exceed social reporting practices of other firms. As such, a firm may adopt CSR so as 
not to be seen as different from other firms. Therefore from a neo-institutional 
perspective, firms not only compete for resources but also seek social legitimacy (Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
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Normative isomorphism relates to pressure exercised by a group/organisation 
to follow certain institutional practices. Preparing financial statements which comply 
with international financial reporting standards is a form of normative isomorphism as 
professional accountants will adhere to these standards, though it might not be 
mandatory. In terms of CSR reporting, adherence to reporting guidelines like OCED 
or GRI promotes the disclosure of CSR information. Accounting bodies also issue 
guidelines on CSR reporting. Upon implementation by their members, it can lead to 
standardised practices.  
It is worth noting that in practice it is difficult to distinguish between these 
three forces (Deegan, 2009). To this end DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state: 
 ‘…two or more isomorphic pressures may be operating simultaneously 
making it impossible to determine which form of institutional pressure 
was more potent in all cases’. 
 In the same vein, Carpenter and Feroz (2001) used neo-institutional theory to 
investigate the United States of America state governments’ decision to change from 
cash accounting to accounting based on GAAP. They note that states which were early 
adopters of GAAP did so because of coercive pressure from credit markets while a 
combination of coercive and mimetic pressures could better explain late adopters. 
Another dimension of institutional theory is decoupling. Dillard et al.  (2004) 
state that ‘Decoupling refers to a situation in which the formal organisation structure 
or practice is separate and distinct from actual organisational practice’. Managers 
might ostensibly project an image of the company which is not really followed in 
practice. In terms of voluntary reporting practices, decoupling can be linked to 
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legitimacy theory where an organisation might paint a rosy picture of CSR practices 
in its annual report which is far different from actual practices (Deegan, 2009). 
 
3.7 Signalling Theory  
Market signalling theory was initially developed by Spence (1973) to explain 
asymmetry of information in labour markets. In the recruitment process, higher calibre 
applicants can distinguish themselves from other applicants by sending a signal 
through their higher level of education. With the passage of time, signalling theory has 
been applied to different fields of study including the voluntary disclosure literature. 
In the signalling environment, the sender (signaller) holds information which is not 
available to another party (ies) and must decide whether to send and how to send the 
information (signal) to the other parties (receiver). The receiver must then choose how 
to interpret the signal (Connelly et al. 2011). Omran and El-Galfy (2014) state that it 
is beneficial for the sender to disclose private information about itself if the 
information is credible and reduces outsider uncertainty. Managers of companies 
which have high growth prospects will signal this fact to investors through their 
accounts. Firms which are performing well and firms with neutral news will also have 
the incentive to report positive news to dispel any doubts about poor performance.  
Firms with poor performance do not have any incentives to report bad news 
(Godfrey et al. 2010). However, Cotter et al. (2011) argue that firms with bad news 
have an incentive to report their true performance to avoid litigation costs for failure 
to disclose and maintain the equity value of the company. Therefore, to be effective, 
the sender must be able to show that its signal is credible.  
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Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2001) distinguish between two types of signalling 
strategies; costless and costly. They argue that costless (cheap talk) strategies are used 
by undervalued firms to gain attention. Therefore, to be effective, the signal sent must 
not be easy to replicate and those who attempt false signalling do not benefit (Connelly 
et al. 2011).  Costly measures will add credibility to the signals. For example, managers 
can signal the sound health of their companies by increasing dividends. Managers are 
normally reluctant to decrease dividends as investors may interpret it as an adverse 
signal. From a voluntary disclosure perspective, better firms will signal their 
superiority by disclosing information in excess of what is required by law (Campbell 
et al. 2001). Firms prepare standalone reports and voluntarily disclose other 
information on the assumption that stakeholders interpret these initiatives favourably. 
Therefore, firms can use standalone reports to show that they are good corporate 
citizens or for ‘greenwashing’ (Mahoney, 2012). 
 
3.8 Agency Theory 
An agency relationship describes the contractual agreement between one party 
(the principal) who appoints another party (the agent) to act on its behalf. In the 
contract, the principal delegates some of the power to make decisions to the agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If both parties are utility maximisers, there is no 
guarantee that the agent will act in the best interest of the principal. A major issue 
which arises is to persuade the agent to act in such a way to maximise the principal’s 
welfare (Godfrey et al. 2010). This gives rise to certain costs termed agency costs.  
Deegan (2013) classifies agency costs into three types: monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and residual losses. Monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to 
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‘measure, observe and control’ the agent’s behaviour (Godfrey et al. 2010). Examples 
include the appointment of a board of directors so that managers provide credible 
information to shareholders and lenders which is fulfilled by: preparing audited 
financial statements and making disclosures (Watson et al. 2002). Under debt 
agreements, the lender (principal) might impose certain conditions on the firm (agent- 
manager acting for shareholders). This may require preparing quarterly financial 
statements to meet the contractual requirement of capital providers. These costs link 
managers’ interests to those of lenders (Cotter et al. 2011).  
The agent’s actions may still deviate from the principal’s objective despite 
incurring monitoring and bonding costs. For instance, the manager can take actions 
out of self-interest that are not in line with the principal’s interest such as changing the 
accounts to maximise his/her bonus. Barnea and Rubin (2010) view CSR as a source 
of conflict between managers and shareholders. They claim that affiliated insiders have 
the tendency to over-invest in CSR. Motivated by self- interest, managers will spend 
on CSR activities which improve the company’s reputation as a good citizen, indirectly 
improving their own rating as managers to the detriment of firm owners. On the other 
hand, non-affiliated shareholders (those who hold a stake in the firm as part of a 
diversified portfolio) will only be interested to invest in CSR if it increases the firm’s 
value. Harjoto and Jo (2011) argue that managers may strategically use CSR activities 
to gather support from stakeholders in a bid to save their position, reducing the risk of 
CEO turnover.  
Bonding costs can take the form of the cost of preparing financial statements 
by managers to show that they are operating in the interest of owners (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). ‘Managers bond themselves to prepare the financial statements’ 
(Deegan, 2013). Owners would require the financial statements to be audited to reduce 
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the risk that managers overstate the profits. To guard against the self-interest of 
managers, organisations may even place contractual limitations on the decision 
making power of managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Though monitoring and bonding costs aim to reduce dysfunctional decisions 
by managers, they may not be complete and effective. Thus, firms incur residual costs 
when the manager is an outsider (Ang et al. 2000). This is in fact the value of the lost 
profit because a contract’s full enforcement cost exceeds the benefits (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). 
 
3.9 Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory holds that regulation is necessary because of market 
failure. The aim of regulation is to protect the public interest and that society is better 
off with regulation than otherwise (Godfrey et al. 2010). The theory assumes that the 
regulator (usually government) has no independent role to play in the development of 
regulation. It rather acts as a neutral arbiter intervening at the request of ‘public 
interest’ agents. The government does not let its self-interest prevail in the regulation 
process (Deegan, 2013).  
Government intervenes to create a regulated financial reporting environment 
to ensure that firms provide accurate accounting information to the market. 
Consequently, this improves investor confidence and improves overall market 
efficiency (Omran and El-Galfy, 2014). The introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
aftermath of the collapses of Enron and audit firm Arthur Andersen can be viewed 
through the lens of public interest theory as new corporate governance, financial 
reporting requirements and auditing standards were introduced (Godfrey et al. 2010). 
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Public interest theory can be extended to explain the introduction of the CSR levy in 
the case of Mauritius. Since firms were mainly practising internal CSR the government 
had to intervene so that CSR activities benefit the wider society. CSR activities are 
now geared towards external CSR and benefitting needy people. Omran and El-Galfy 
(2014) argue that public interest theory ignores the opportunistic roles of the regulator, 
capture of the regulatory process by firms and the private interests of stakeholders. 
Moreover, the lack of competence of the regulator and their true intention to protect 
the public interest may compromise the usefulness of this theory (Gaffikin, 2008).  
 
3.10 Capture Theory  
Proponents of capture theory argue that though regulation is aimed at 
protecting the ‘public interest’, this laudable aim will not be achieved ultimately 
because, in the process, the regulatee eventually controls the regulator (Deegan, 2013). 
Capture theory assumes that all individuals pursue their self-interest and if a regulation 
will decrease their wealth, they will lobby to change the regulation so that the final 
version of the regulation is in their favour (Godfrey et al. 2013). The accounting 
standards-setting process in Australia is influenced by lobbyists from the profession 
and former executives of large companies who eventually ‘capture’ the standard-
setting process (Walker, 1987). In a move towards greater independence of accounting 
standards setting, the International Accounting Standards Board now requires that all 
members of the board are full-time employees of the IASB and have to sever ties with 
their previous employers (Deegan, 2013). When the government of Mauritius 
introduced the CSR levy in 2009, the private sector through the Joint Economic 
Council (JEC) lobbied to be part of the consultative committee for drafting guidelines 
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relating to allowable activities from CSR funds. Being part of the consultative 
committee allowed the private sector to influence the committee to include those 
activities which were practised by its members. 
 
3.11 Contingency Theory  
Contingency theory states that there is no best way to structure an organisation. 
Instead, a number of factors (contingencies) determine the appropriate structure of an 
organisation (Chenhall and Chapman, 2006).  These contingent factors are determined 
by the environment in which the organisation operates (Lawrence and Lorsh, 1967). 
Williams (2004) argues that technology and the environment in which firms operate 
are sources of uncertainty which results in differences between organisations.   
Extending the contingency theory to corporate reporting, Thomas (1986) 
argues that circumstantial factors which influence management choice of accounting 
practices can be classified into two sets; the environment of the enterprise and 
organisational attributes. In the same vein, Nobes (1998) accounts for international 
differences in financial reporting based on a country’s financial system. He argues that 
disclosure items are determined based on the relative importance of outsiders (lenders 
and individual shareholders, not forming part of the board of directors) compared to 
insiders (financiers such as government, families and banks). In countries where 
outsiders are more important, the demand for disclosure is higher. Studies of CSR 
reporting have considered a number of factors in explaining the extent and quality of 
disclosures.  
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3.12 Theoretical Foundation of this Study 
Legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory are all classified 
as systems-oriented theories in which the organisation is assumed to be influenced and 
in turn influences the society in which it operates (Deegan, 2002). The same 
phenomenon can be analysed from different perspectives. A particular entity can 
initiate a particular social activity as a result of its interaction with stakeholders while 
another entity could choose a similar activity to legitimise its activities. So the same 
activity could be analysed from stakeholder theory or from legitimacy theory 
standpoint. Compatible interpretation of the same business situation can be reached 
from different theoretical perspectives due to the overlapping nature of the three 
theories (Chen and Roberts, 2010). However, it’s the way a particular business 
situation is decomposed that differentiates the theories (Chen and Roberts, 2010).  
Legitimacy theory considers the impact of a firm’s action/s on the society as a 
whole while stakeholder theory is more specific, considering the consequence of a 
firm’s action on a particular stakeholder or how a stakeholder will benefit the 
organisation. Both legitimacy and stakeholder theories explain how an organisation 
can attain legitimacy and as such are overlapping rather than competing theories (De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). Further, Rashid (2015) claims that the legitimacy and 
institutional theories overlap. Firms might change their structures to follow other firms 
because of pressures to adopt a particular governance structure which has been granted 
legitimacy status. The decoupling dimension of institutional theory is in line with 
legitimacy theory.  As Suchman (1995) explains, legitimacy is not only strategic but 
also institutional. Furthermore, Deegan (2009) states that coercive isomorphism is 
similar to the managerial branch of stakeholder theory whereby the entity will disclose 
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social and environmental information to please those stakeholders which are powerful. 
All three theories offer useful insights in understanding managers’ decision to disclose 
CSR. 
There are several motivations to explain CSR reporting (Deegan, 2002) which 
means several theories can be used to explain CSR reporting. While some academics 
are critical of adopting a multi-theoretical perspective of CSR claiming that 
researchers should adopt ‘one view of the world’ (Deegan, 2002), Gray (1995) argues 
that the choice of competing theories is less related to arguments for and against such 
competing theories but is rather a question of ‘perception’. In the same vein, Jain and 
Jamali (2016), in a review of the CG-CSR literature conclude that a multiple-
theoretical lens is advisable to gain a better understanding of how CG systems 
influence CSR.  
This study uses three theories combining legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory 
and neo-institutional theory.  More than one theoretical approach is adopted as the 
period examined (2007-2014) covers periods of voluntary and mandated CSR practice 
and disclosure. One theoretical perspective will give a limited picture of the CSR arena 
in Mauritius. The reasons for choosing these theories as opposed to other theories are 
now discussed. 
For a number of reasons, this study does not consider economic-based theories. 
First, economic-based theories are concerned with maximising the value of the firm 
and not concerned with corporate citizenship (Cotter et al. 2011). Second, they assume 
that disclosure of information is undertaken to reduce information-asymmetry and as 
such considers shareholders to be the main target of disclosure (Lokman, 2011). CSR 
information has a larger audience which includes society. Finally, 
society/stakeholders/institutions pressure firms to attain legitimacy whereas 
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economic-based theories assume that disclosure of information is connected to 
monitoring management behaviour. Investigating whether CSR disclosure can 
maximise the value of the firm is outside the scope of this research. Therefore, 
economics-based theories are not considered relevant in explaining CSR disclosure for 
the purpose of this study. 
Legitimacy theory is based on the assumption that a ‘social contract’ exists 
between the firm and society and the firm has to operate according to society’s 
expectations to earn its ‘licence to operate’. Several reasons suggest that legitimacy 
theory is appropriate to study CSR in the Mauritian context. First, the Mauritian 
business environment is dominated by a few firms which have common 
shareholders/directors. The lack of transparency of the private sector in business 
dealings and recruitment of personnel has long been a public policy issue. While there 
is little incentive for these firms to engage in CSR activities it is believed that firms 
can only continue to operate if they comply with societal expectations earning their 
‘licence to operate’. Second, the CG code requires firms to report on their CSR 
activities. Mahadeo et al. (2011a) investigated CSR disclosures from 2004-2007 and 
found that legitimacy theory provides an explanation for CSR disclosures. Finally, the 
study also covers the effect of the MID (Maurice Ile Durable) event and several studies 
using legitimacy theory have shown that companies change their disclosure strategy 
to influence the perception of society following an incident/event (Tilling and Tilt, 
2010; Haji, 2013; Chu et al. 2013).  
While legitimacy pressures are still deemed to be prevalent during the study 
period, there are two of key events in 2009 which have to be considered; the CSR levy 
(2%) and the amendment of the Financial Reporting Act 2004. As guidelines for the 
use of CSR funds were imposed by the government, this means that firms can only 
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practise a certain set of CSR activities, leading to the standardisation of CSR practice. 
Due to the existence of coercive pressure, neo-institutional theory is deemed 
appropriate to explain CSR disclosures in the post-legislation period.  
Chen and Roberts (2010) argue that two theoretical considerations are 
necessary for a better understanding of social and environmental research.  They 
further argue that legitimacy theory does not explain how to meet social expectations. 
Conversely, institutional theory suggests that adhering to norms and rules can help an 
organisation to attain legitimacy. Adams and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007) claim that 
institutional theory is superior to other theories in explaining social and environmental 
accounting as it explains the path to legitimacy. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) used it 
to explain differences in CSR practices at firm level, based on the theoretical 
implications of legitimation and efficiency. Regarding the efficiency perspective, they 
claim that ‘regulative, cognitive and normative institutional pressures can cause firms 
to compete for critical resources in order to protect shareholder interests and maximise 
corporate profits.  
The view taken here is that institutional factors such as legislation will affect 
CSR practices and thus their disclosure. Although firms need to stick to guidelines for 
using their CSR funds, they still have the flexibility to choose among a number of 
activities. Management can also decide how much to disclose. As legitimacy theory 
and institutional theory have several points in common, it is believed that together they 
can provide the answer to both similarity and differences in CSR disclosures at the 
firm level in the Mauritian context. 
The MEF (2007) found that Mauritian companies were involved in some form 
of CSR activities, mostly internal. In the post-levy period, internal CSR activities and 
religious donations are no longer allowed to be funded by levy funds. Mauritius is a 
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multi-religious country where religion plays an important part in the life of people. It 
can also be argued that the employee is an important stakeholder for firms. As such, 
firms with good governance practices will be involved in internal CSR activities such 
as training and welfare of employees to meet the expectations of an important 
stakeholder. Also in their quest to maintain their legitimacy vis-à-vis religious 
organisations and thus society, firms will maintain the tradition to donate to religious 
organisations therefore going beyond the CSR levy to finance these activities. 
Stakeholder and legitimacy theory are used in combination to examine why firms go 
beyond the mandatory CSR threshold to be involved in voluntary CSR. 
 
3.13 Chapter Summary 
The choice of a particular theory, as opposed to others, will ‘at least, in part’ 
involve value judgement by authors (Deegan, 2009). Thus, there is no universal theory 
to explain CSR disclosures. This thesis puts forward the hypothesis that CSR 
disclosures are explained by three set of factors: company characteristics, board 
practices and ownership structure. Based on the context of the study, this thesis uses 
institutional theory to investigate the extent of CSR reporting. Discretionary CSR is 
examined from a legitimacy and stakeholder perspective.  
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Chapter 4 Literature Review 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review past empirical studies on CSR 
reporting. There is a growing body of literature on CSR reporting. Adams (2002) 
classifies studies seeking to establish the determinants of CSR into three categories. 
First, those which focus on corporate characteristics such as size, financial 
performance and age of companies. Second, general contextual factors such as country 
of origin, time, specific events, media pressure, cultural and economic context. Third, 
internal factors such as the presence of a CSR committee and management 
characteristics. The chapter covers all three sets of Adams (2002) categorisation with 
a particular focus on the first and third categories. This discussion is considered 
important as it shows gaps in the literature which provides the justification for the 
present study.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Definition of CSR and CSR reporting are 
covered in sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Motivations to disclose CSR are discussed 
in section 4.4. Section 4.5 reviews empirical studies on themes of CSR reporting. This 
is followed by empirical studies on corporate governance practices and CSR reporting. 
Studies on employee volunteering are discussed in section 4.7. Research that link firm 
characteristics and CSR reporting are covered in section 4.8. Further empirical studies 
from SIDS are discussed in section 4.9. The influence of regulation on reporting is 
empirically discussed in section 4.10. Finally, section 4.11 draws conclusions. 
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4.2 Definition of CSR 
The term CSR has no standard definition. A much-cited definition by the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2000) states that: 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the 
workforce and their families as well as of the community and society at large.’ Gray 
(2000) defines social and environmental accounting as: “the preparation and 
publication of an account about an organisation’s social, environmental, employee, 
community, customer and other stakeholder interactions and activities, and where 
possible, the consequence of those interactions and activities.” Using content analysis, 
Dahlsrud (2008) identified five dimensions common to these definitions: 
environmental, social, economic, stakeholder and voluntariness. The diversity in 
defining CSR mirrors the vast range of activities which can encompass CSR. This 
study adopts the previously mentioned definition provided by Gray (2000). 
This study defines voluntary or discretionary CSR as those activities which are 
not mandated by CSR guidelines. Firms which contribute more than the legally 
required amount are also considered to be involved in voluntary CSR. Since voluntary 
CSR implies firms have to contribute more than the legally required CSR amount, this 
study describes this action as ‘over-investment’ in CSR. 
Basil and Erlardson (2008) categorise CSR on the basis of whether an external 
party is involved or not. They group CSR activities into ‘internal’ and ‘external’. 
External CSR refers to those efforts which affect the community (Haughton et al. 
2009) which automatically involves an external party. Examples of external CSR 
activities include; philanthropic giving, community development programs, ecological 
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and sustainability initiatives, and other extra-organisational activities that enhance the 
firm’s social capital (Houghton et al. 2009). Internal CSR does not involve an external 
party. Health and safety policies and having a code of ethics are examples of internal 
CSR.  
 
4.3 CSR Reporting 
Hackston and Milne (1996) define CSR reporting as  
‘the provision of financial and non-financial information relating to an 
organisation’s interaction with its physical and social environment, as 
stated in corporate annual reports or separate social reports’.  
This shows that the company is accountable not only to shareholders but the 
society at large and that the aim of the business goes beyond making a profit for owners 
(Gray et al. 1987). Corporate social disclosures can include information of any type 
which is related to social responsibility (Gray et al. 1996). Typically it includes 
information relating to a company’s activities and aspirations relating to the 
environment, community, employees and consumers (Gray et al. 2001).  
Various terms are used to describe reporting in this area: such as Social 
Reporting, Environmental Reporting (together they are known as CSR reporting), 
Triple Bottom Line reporting or Sustainability reporting. This literature review draws 
from studies of these previously mentioned areas including voluntary disclosure 
studies as CSR reporting is voluntary in most countries. 
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4.4 Motivations to Disclose CSR  
Motivations underpinning social and environmental reporting are many and 
varied. Spence and Gray (2007) outline that the various reasons to report social and 
environmental information are tightly linked to a ‘business case’.   
 
4.4.1 Pressure from Stakeholders 
The existence of powerful stakeholders might prompt a firm to disclose CSR 
(Ullmann, 1985). Belal and Owen (2007) found that textile firms in Bangladesh 
disclose CSR to meet the requirements of powerful stakeholders. This includes 
multinational companies, international agencies, domestic NGOs, trade unions and 
political parties. In the same context, Islam and Deegan (2008) found that firms 
disclose CSR to meet the needs of international buyers.  
 
4.4.2 Threat to Organisational Legitimacy 
Firms use CSR reporting as a strategy when the legitimacy of their operations 
is under threat. Firms can increase or decrease CSR disclosures to counteract threats 
of legitimacy. Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Patten (1992) found an increase 
in CSR disclosure of oil companies based in North America.  
 
4.4.3 Complying With Legal Requirements 
Though CSR reporting is largely voluntary, certain countries such as France, 
Netherlands and Mauritius have imposed legal requirements to force firms to disclose 
their social and environmental performance. For instance, in the Netherlands, firms are 
required to produce two environmental reports; one to provide information to the 
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public, and another one for governmental agencies when the activities of the 
organisation are detrimental to the environment (Frost, 2007).  
 
4.4.4 Improved Corporate Image 
Firms can use CSR to enhance corporate reputation and public relations 
(KPMG, 2005). Corporate reputation is an important intangible asset and there is 
increasing evidence that CSR reporting is being used to manage corporate image 
(Toms, 2002). 
 
4.4.5 Financial Performance 
Good CSR performance leads to better financial performance (Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003). The link between social performance and financial performance has 
been extensively examined by researchers. Porter and Kramer (2006) posit that the 
relationship between CSR and profit depends on how CSR is managed. In the same 
vein, Gyves and O’Higgins (2008) report that CSR which is initiated internally 
provides benefits for the firm and its stakeholders. The study of Balabanis et al. (1998) 
further shows that the relationship between social and financial performance is not 
straightforward. They found that economic performance is related to both CSR 
performance and disclosure but the results were weak and lacked overall consistency.   
 
4.4.6 Building Customer Base 
Attracting and maintaining a customer base is key to the success of an 
organisation. Customers are increasingly cautious about conditions under which 
products that they buy are produced. The reported use of child labour has caused an 
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outrage among customers in developed countries. Adams (2002) states that disclosing 
information on CSR can minimise the risks of a boycott by consumers. Abrantes 
Ferreira et al. (2010) found that consumers value products which are socially 
responsibly produced and are prepared to pay up to 10% extra for the goods. 
 
4.5 Themes and Extent of Disclosures 
One of the rare studies examining developing countries was undertaken by 
Singh and Ahuja (1983). They reviewed the annual reports of 40 public sector 
companies using a 33 item disclosure index which included social, environmental, 
charitable and community activities. Approximately 50% of companies disclosed 
around 50% of items on the disclosure index. However, the sample was made up of 
public sector companies only. In a longitudinal study of Singaporean companies over 
ten years (1986-1995), Tsang (1998) explored the CSR reporting of 33 listed firms. 
Using content analysis, he examined annual reports using the following themes: human 
resource; environment and community involvement. Only 52% of companies made 
CSR reporting over the period. Human resources were the highest quantity of 
disclosures followed by community involvement. After a steady increase in social 
disclosures from the late 1980s till 1993, disclosure ratios stabilised. The author claims 
that since CSR reporting is voluntary, firms are not motivated to go beyond that level. 
Studies on developing countries started to grow in the early 2000s.  Belal 
(2001) studied CSR disclosures of Bangladeshi companies using annual reports. It 
provided a preliminary indication of the quantity of CSR disclosures and the nature of 
CSR practices in Bangladesh and found that the main area of disclosure was human 
resources. It is claimed that the presence of a unionised labour force can explain such 
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emphasis. Only 13% of companies disclosed information on community involvement. 
Belal (2001) noted in several instances that mandatory financial reporting 
requirements were not met by companies and concluded that the quantity of disclosure 
was low and mainly descriptive. However, it overlooked environmental disclosures. A 
similar study of Bangladeshi companies showing almost same results was carried by 
Imam (2000). Poor legal infrastructure and the lack of accounting professionals are the 
main reasons for the low level of CSR disclosure in developing countries (Elmogla et 
al. 2015).  
Emphasis on human-resource CSR reporting is highlighted by Ratanajongkol 
et al. (2006) in Thailand, Al-Naimi et al. (2011) in Qatar and Elmogla et al. (2015) in 
Libya. Analysing annual reports of the largest 40 Thai companies for CSR reporting 
over three years, Ratanajongkol et al. (2006) reported an increase in CSR reporting 
over the period 1997-2001 which they attribute to recent corporate governance 
changes. The second most disclosed theme was ‘community’. Disclosure on 
environment and product themes increased over the years but decreased as a 
proportion. Comparatively, none of the companies sampled by Al-Naimi et al. (2011) 
provided environmental information. Low concern for the environment seems to be 
common in developing countries as indicated by Kabir and Akinnusi (2012), (Belal, 
1997) and Imam (2000). Similarly, Elmogla et al. (2015) report a complete absence of 
consumer information in annual reports of Libyan companies. Conversely, in a study 
of Spanish companies, Echave and Bhati (2010) found ‘products and services’ to be 
the second most disclosed theme.  
CSR Studies in SIDS are rare. Lodhia (2000) explored CSR reporting of Fijian 
companies using their annual reports. Though the sample size was very small, it gives 
an indication that companies in Fiji (62.5%) follow other developing countries by 
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disclosing on human resource. Surprisingly environment was the least disclosed 
theme. However, due to the very small sample size (8) the result cannot be generalised 
to Fijian companies. On account of the importance of the environment for the country’s 
economy, the author raised concern about the lack of environmental consideration by 
companies. In a more recent research by Khan et al. (2013b) environmental disclosure 
showed an improvement with 20% of companies making such disclosure. It is worth 
noting that the environment was the most commonly disclosed theme followed by 
community and marketplace.  
Mahadeo et al. (2011a, b) found a rather different pattern of CSR disclosure in 
Mauritius which showed that the majority of companies (95%) made social disclosures 
while few companies made environmental (8%), health and safety (15%) or ethical 
(30%) disclosures. Mahadeo et al. (2011a) claim that the lack of human-based 
disclosure in Mauritius is contrary to other developing countries. This was evident as 
a ‘human resource/ employee’ category was not included in their study. However, 
social disclosures improved significantly over the period under consideration being 
declarative, monetary and quantitative rather than purely monetary in nature. The 
supremacy of community disclosure is also found in the study of Gao et al. (2005) in 
Hong Kong and Kabir and Akinnusi (2012) in Swaziland. Both studies found an 
upward trend in total disclosures over the periods under study.  
 
4.6 Corporate Governance Practices and CSR 
4.6.1 Ownership 
Eng and Mak (2003) studied the relationship between ownership structure and 
board composition with voluntary disclosure. The study used a sample of 158 firms 
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listed on Singapore Stock Exchange. Three ownership variables were examined: 
managerial ownership, block ownership and government ownership. Eng and Mak 
(2003) posit an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and block 
ownership with voluntary disclosure as a low proportion of the two mentioned 
variables increases the need for monitoring. Therefore, voluntary disclosure is 
expected to increase, thus reducing the need for monitoring. To mitigate high agency 
cost and weak governance structures, government ownership is expected to increase 
voluntary disclosure. Results were as predicted for government ownership and 
managerial ownership. However, no relationship was found between block ownership 
and voluntary disclosure. As regards board composition, outside directors were 
associated with lower levels of disclosure, which is at odds with prior studies. Eng and 
Mak (2003) explain that outside directors may be nominated by block holders and can 
have access to information internally rather than through public disclosure. 
Ghazali (2007) investigated the influence of ownership structure on CSR 
disclosure in the Malaysian context using annual reports. She notes significant 
differences in the extent of CSR disclosure even among listed companies. Director 
ownership was negatively related to CSR disclosure while government ownership was 
found to positively influence CSR disclosures. Ownership by the ten largest 
shareholders had no influence on CSR disclosures. Size measured by market 
capitalisation increased CSR disclosures while no evidence of the influence of industry 
affiliation and profitability on CSR was found. 
Rashid and Lodh (2008) were the first to investigate the effect of ownership on 
CSR disclosures, in Bangladesh. Using a two-stage least square regression they found 
that CSR disclosures increase with regulation thus highlighting that the stick approach 
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is necessary to increase disclosures in the context of developing economies. Results 
also showed that ownership structures influence CSR disclosures. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) investigated the relationship between firm 
characteristics, company ownership and board composition with the quality of 
environmental disclosures of 450 UK companies drawn from a well-diversified range 
of sectors over a single period. They found evidence of firm size and nature of business 
activities influencing the quality of CSR disclosures but also failed to find a significant 
relationship between ownership structure and board composition with CSR quality. 
In a study of large listed firms in South Africa over the period 2002 to 2009, 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) investigated the effect of corporate governance on CSR. 
Unlike other studies, they examined whether CG can positively moderate the link 
between financial performance and CSR. They found that better-governed firms are 
more likely to engage in CSR. Government ownership was positively associated with 
the CSR index showing that commitment to CSR can win the support of the 
government as a powerful stakeholder. As expected block ownership was negatively 
associated with CSR. Independent directors and board diversity positively impacted 
on CSR. A major finding of the paper was that CG and CSR combined has a greater 
effect on financial performance than CSR alone thus implying that CG positively 
influences the financial performance-CSR link. 
In a different context, Al-Bassam and Ntim (2016) unveiled the determinants 
of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in Saudi companies. 
Using self-constructed indices to measure voluntary disclosure and Islamic values, Al-
Bassam and Ntim (2016) found that firms which commit to high Islamic values are 
more likely to disclose than those who do not, showing insights of the influence of 
Islamic values on voluntary disclosure. Additionally, audit size, board size, 
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government ownership, institutional ownership and the presence of a corporate 
governance committee were all found to positively influence voluntary disclosure 
while block ownership reduced voluntary disclosure. 
 
4.6.2 Board Practices 
In the Malaysian context, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined the influence of 
a multitude of variables grouped under corporate governance, cultural and firm-
specific, with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Data for the study was collected from 
the annual reports of 167 companies for the year 1995. Two corporate governance 
variables; an independent non-executive director as chairperson and the proportion of 
family members on the board were found to be statistically significant in explaining 
voluntary disclosures. However, the negative relationship between an independent 
non-executive director and voluntary disclosure was contrary to their expectation and 
in contradiction with the agency theory. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) conducted another 
study comparing the extent and variety of CSR disclosures over two years. They also 
examined the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and ethnic 
background of directors and shareholders and CSR disclosures. Results showed a 
significant association of CSR disclosures with boards dominated by Malay directors, 
boards dominated by executive directors, chair with multiple directorships and foreign 
share ownership. The extent and variety of CSR disclosures also increased over the 
two periods. 
The effect of corporate governance on sustainability disclosure was 
investigated by Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), arguing that both are related concepts 
aiming to improve its relationship with stakeholders. Using US and UK companies in 
their sample, they used content analysis on annual reports and stand-alone reports to 
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measure sustainability disclosures. Findings show a positive association between 
community influential members and sustainability disclosure. However, the 
association is significant for stand-alone reports only and not for annual reports. Weak 
evidence of the existence of a CSR committee or CSR director with sustainability 
disclosure was noted. Surprisingly independent directors were not found to influence 
sustainability disclosure. Instead of classifying directors as independent or executive, 
Michelon and Parbonetti call for a better appreciation of the characteristics of 
independent directors as their backgrounds and competencies are not homogeneous. 
 
4.7 Employee Volunteering 
De Gilder et al. (2005) in a study of employees at Dutch ABN-AMRO Bank 
investigated the effect of employee volunteering on participants’ attitudes and their 
behaviour towards their employer. The study reports a positive attitude expressed by 
those who participated in the program. Colleagues who covered those involved in 
volunteering programs thus facing an increased workload, still expressed a positive 
attitude towards the program. 
 
4.8 Firm Characteristics 
Cowen et al. (1987) examined CSR disclosures of 134 US-based firms from 10 
industries. CSR disclosures were analysed using the Ernst and Whinney (1978) themes 
of disclosure: environment; energy; fair business practices; human resources; 
community involvement and products. Their findings show that corporate size is the 
most important explanatory variable in explaining CSR disclosures. However, they 
note that the presence of a CSR committee is only associated with human resource 
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disclosures suggesting that the committee is more concerned about employee safety, 
health and training than other themes. No relationship between disclosure type and 
industry affiliation was found. However, no theoretical background was used in 
explaining the choice of explanatory variables.  
Hackston and Milne’s (1996) study of New Zealand companies aimed to 
provide an up-to-date description of CSR reporting based on overseas documented 
CSR practices and also to examine the potential determinants of CSR reporting. 
Similar to other developed countries such as UK, US and Australia, ‘human resource’ 
was the most disclosed theme followed by ‘environment’ and ‘community’. Regarding 
determinants of CSR reporting, size and industry were found to be significant while 
profitability was not. The association was stronger for high profile industries than low 
profile industries. Dual and multiple listing also influenced CSR reporting but the 
authors argue that further investigation is needed to confirm whether the relationship 
can be extended to other countries. 
 
4.9 Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure in SIDS 
In SIDS, firms are typically run by dominant shareholders who are also actively 
involved in management. The dominant shareholder serves as CEO, chairman or vice 
chairman of 50.7% of the publicly listed firms, on average (Robinson, 2017). One 
exception is Mauritius where role duality is not allowed by the national code of 
corporate governance (NCCG, 2004; Robinson, 2017). Therefore the most pertinent 
corporate governance issue is the protection of the interests of minority shareholders 
against the dominant shareholders instead of the conventional conflict between owners 
and managers (Robinson, 2017). 
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In a descriptive study of the impact of ownership structure on the disclosure of 
voluntary information of companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange in Fiji, 
Khan et al. (2013b) found that companies making more voluntary disclosure are 
institutionally owned. Companies with a concentrated ownership structure especially 
those which are family owned disclose less strategic information but more CSR 
information. The authors highlight the lack of information regarding board members’ 
qualifications, board committees and other corporate governance mechanisms and 
questions the effectiveness of corporate governance in these firms. 
 
4.10 Regulation and CSR Reporting 
Frost (2007) examined the effect of introducing mandatory environmental 
reporting requirements in Australia. The findings showed the importance of 
environmental regulation in increasing environmental disclosures especially negative 
aspects of environmental performance. Similarly, Fallan and Fallan (2009) compared 
the volume and content variety of environmental disclosures during periods of 
voluntarism and regulated disclosure. Some evidence of substitution of annual report 
disclosure to separate report disclosure is noted. They resent the need for regulation 
arguing that regulation does not have a long-lasting effect.  
Conversely, Rashid and Lodh (2008) argue that a pro-regulation approach is 
required in developing countries to increase CSR reporting. Their study of Bangladeshi 
firms found an increase in the level of CSR reporting following regulation. Similarly, 
Mahadeo et al. (2011a) studied the effect of the introduction of a code of corporate 
governance on CSR reporting in Mauritius. The results showed an increase in CSR 
reporting following the implementation of the code. However, significant changes 
were only noticed two years after the implementation of the code. A change in the 
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variety of CSR reporting was also noticed after the introduction of the code. The 
importance of regulation is again highlighted by Haji (2013) who found an increase in 
CSR reporting after Bursa Malaysia mandated CSR reporting for all firms.  
While environmental disclosure is mandated by several countries, this is not 
the case for social disclosure. One of the rare studies on mandatory CSR disclosure 
was conducted in the US following the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
(CTSCA) of 2010. This Act requires large retail and manufacturing firms to disclose 
their actions to eliminate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains. 
Findings show that firms which face greater supply chain risk respond negatively to 
the CTSCA. A high compliance level to the legislation was noted though disclosure 
tends to be more symbolic than substantive. The authors argue that mandates only 
without additional rules and guidance may not lead to ‘meaningful social disclosure’ 
(Birkey et al. 2016).  
Chelli et al. (2016) compared environmental disclosure in France and Canada. 
France has a mandate regarding environmental disclosure whereas in Canada it is 
purely voluntary. Results show that a parliamentary regime is more successful in 
enhancing environmental disclosure, however, in both cases, substantive disclosure 
remains low. Similarly, Chauvey et al. (2014) assessed the changes in CSR reporting 
of 81 French firms between 2004 and 2014. France was one of the first countries to 
mandate CSR reporting in 2001. The research found an increase in space allocated to 
CSR disclosure together with the quality of information disclosed. However, 
disclosure quality and disclosure of negative information remain low. 
The tables which follow summarise those studies on voluntary disclosure 
drawing from strands in the literature such as ownership structure, board practices and 
corporate characteristics. 
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Table 4.1: Ownership Structure 
Author Aim Sample Findings 
Khan et al. (2013a) Examine the relationship 
between corporate governance 
and the extent of CSR disclosures
135 manufacturing companies 
over the period 2005-2009 
Board independence, public 
ownership, foreign ownership and 
the presence of an audit committee 
are positively associated with CSR 
disclosure while CEO duality has 
no effect on CSR disclosures. A 
negative relationship is found 
between managerial ownership and 
CSR. 
Muttakin and Khan 
(2014) 
Examine the effect of corporate 
characteristics on CSR disclosure
135 manufacturing companies 
over the period 2005-2009 
Larger firms and those which are 
export-oriented disclose more CSR 
information. Firms in the ‘process’ 
and ‘consumer’ industry 
categorisation disclose less CSR 
information than other industries. 
Family ownership has a negative 
impact on CSR disclosure. 
Amran and Devi (2008) To investigate the influence of 
government and foreign affiliates 
on corporate social reporting 
CSR 
 
Companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia in the year 2002/2003 
Evidence of government influence 
in terms of ownership and 
dependence on government 
contracts, on CSR is found while 
foreign ownership and dependence 
on a foreign partner do not 
influence CSR. 
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Table 4.2: Board Practices 
Author Aim Sample Findings 
Rao et al. (2012) To investigate the relationship 
between Environmental 
Reporting and Corporate 
Governance 
100 largest Australian firms 
listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX) 
 
A significant positive relationship 
between the extent of 
environmental reporting and the 
proportion of independent and 
female directors on a board is 
found. Board size and institutional 
shareholding were associated with 
higher disclosure. 
Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2012) 
To investigate the influence of 
corporate governance on 
sustainability disclosures 
57 Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index companies 
Community influential members 
positively affect sustainability 
disclosure. The presence of a CSR 
committee/ CSR director 
moderately influences 
sustainability disclosure while no 
evidence of board composition and 
CEO duality on sustainability 
disclosure is found.  
Haji and Ghazali (2013) To investigate the quality of 
voluntary disclosure practices by 
Shari’ah compliant companies 
(ShCCs) and its determinants 
 
76 ShCCs selected from various 
sectors listed on Bursa Malaysia 
in the year 2009 
The quality of voluntary 
disclosures by ShCCs is low 
compared to studies which 
previously investigated the quality 
of voluntary disclosures in 
Malaysia. Board size is significant 
in explaining the quality of 
voluntary disclosure. Company size 
and leverage used as control 
variables in the multi-variate 
analysis are also significant. 
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Chang et al. (2017) To explore the relationship 
between boards characteristics 
and CSR 
293 large Korean companies The relationship between board 
characteristics and CSR is non-
linear. Board independence has a 
positive effect on CSR only if the 
proportion of independent directors 
exceed the mandatory requirement 
of 25%. CEO-outside director ties 
lead to more CSR but can be 
detrimental on CSR when the ties 
become too ‘tight’ which impedes 
on independence. An increase in 
board educational diversity can 
increase CSR as members are more 
comfortable to express their ideas. 
Chintrakarn et al. (2016) To explore the effect of corporate 
governance quality on CSR 
3334 firm-year observations Findings point towards the over-
investment hypothesis. Higher 
levels of governance quality lead to 
a cut in CSR investment. The 
conflict resolution hypothesis 
which states that better governance 
brings more CSR investment is not 
supported. 
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Table 4.3: Themes of Disclosure and Corporate Characteristics 
Author Aim Sample Findings 
Cormier and Gordon 
(2001) 
Investigate the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and 
corporate characteristics 
3 Canadian Electric power 
companies 
Larger companies and publicly 
owned companies provide more 
disclosures than small companies 
and privately owned firms. 
Adams et al. (1998) Identify factors which influence 
CSR 
25 largest companies from 
western Europe 
Company size, industry affiliation 
and country of domicile all affect 
CSR disclosure pattern. Industry 
affiliation is significantly related to 
environmental and employee 
information but not to ethical 
information. Disclosure level 
across Europe varies significantly.  
Khemir and Baccouche 
(2010) 
Assess the extent of CSR 
reporting and its determinants 
23 non-financial firms listed on 
Tunisian stock exchange over the 
period 2001-2004 
Disclosure about products is the 
main theme of disclosure followed 
by human resource, environment 
and lastly community involvement. 
Firms’ degree of 
internationalisation, level of debt 
and political visibility are factors 
which influence CSR reporting. 
Usman and Amran (2015) Describe the trend of CSR 
practices in Nigeria and assess 
the relationship between CSR 
disclosures and corporate 
financial performance (CFP) 
68 listed firms on Nigeria Stock 
exchange 
Human Resource disclosures lead 
the themes of disclosure. 
Environment is the least disclosed 
theme. Community disclosure, 
Human Resource and product 
disclosure enhance CFP.  
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4.11 Conclusion 
Despite four decades of research on the determinants of CSR reporting, there 
is no consensus on the influence of CG characteristics on CSR reporting. For instance 
a number of studies report a negative relationship between block ownership and 
voluntary disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Rees and Radionova, 2015; Zheng 
et al. 2014) while Harjoto and Jo (2011),  Mallin et al. (2013) found a positive 
relationship between the two variables and no relationship is reported between the two 
variables by Brown et al. (2006).  Similarly, conflicting results have been found 
between CSR and other CG characteristics such as board size, the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and managerial ownership among others. 
Differences in institutional and economic contexts result in varying motivation to 
undertake CSR (Jain and Jamali, 2016) which can explain conflicting results. Belal 
and Momin (2009) call for ‘contextually anchored’ studies in emerging countries. 
Most studies have been conducted in developed countries such as UK, USA, 
Canada and Australia (Cowen et al. 1987, Clarkson et al. 2008; Newson and Deegan, 
2002; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004), or large developing countries such as Malaysia, 
India and Bangladesh (Imam 2000; Belal and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; 
Haniffa and Cooke; 2002; Rashid and Lodh, 2008; Rashid, 2015; Singh and Ahuja, 
1983). Studies on African countries and especially SIDS like Mauritius are very rare.  
A number of studies have been carried out over a single period (Rizk et al. 
2008; Al-Naimi,et al. 2011; Belal, 2001; Echave and Bhati, 2010). Results of these 
studies cannot be generalised. As explained by Mahadeo et al. (2011a), social, 
economic and political circumstances which give rise to CSR reporting do not unfold 
in the same period. A larger window of observation is therefore required for CSR 
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reporting studies. Furthermore, studies have focused on a segment of CSR reporting 
such as environmental reporting (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Rao et al. 2012; 
Rodrigue et al. 2015) or community disclosures (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2016). 
Many studies are also restricted to one particular sector, such as banks (Khan, 2010; 
Khan et al. 2009; Krasodomska, 2015). Furthermore, a number of studies use a binary 
variable to measure the dependent variable of their study. For example, Haddock-
Fraser and Fraser (2008) use a dichotomous score to measure environmental reporting 
of firms in the UK. Similarly, Kolk and Perego (2010) use a dichotomous score to 
measure whether firms provide assurance of sustainability statements. Likewise, 
Yunus et al. (2016) use a binary scale to investigate which firms adopted a carbon 
management system. Using a dichotomous scale to measure disclosure may give an 
improper account of the CSR/sustainability performance of a firm. It also neglects the 
richness of information disclosed by firms. 
This study contributes to the scarce CSR literature in the African region. The 
study also overcomes the weaknesses of other research by considering a broader view 
of voluntary disclosure i.e. CSR (both social and environmental) and not limited to 
environmental reporting. This longitudinal study over eight years implies a greater 
power of generalisation. CSR reporting is measured based on a 41-item index and not 
limited to a dichotomous score. 
Themes and extent of disclosure vary from country to country and results even 
differ for the same country at different time periods (Belal, 2001 and Imam, 2000). 
This lends evidence to the fact that motivations to disclose CSR is a complex 
phenomenon consisting of a set of interconnected logics (Freedman and Stagliano, 
1991). Events, social and political context and legislation among others, all play an 
important role in shaping the CSR landscape. However, few studies (e.g. Haniffa and 
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Cooke, 2005; Mahadeo, 2010 and Mahadeo et al. 2011a, b) attach importance to these 
factors and others simply ignore them. This study addresses such shortcomings by 
putting forward hypotheses and interpreting results based on local factors influencing 
CSR. 
In the unique Mauritian CSR environment, this study intends to shed light on 
the effect of the CSR levy on CSR activities of firms and reporting. This research 
provides an opportunity to examine whether Mauritian firms follow a disclosure 
pattern different from other developing countries as claimed by Mahadeo et al. 
(2011a). Due to non-inclusion of the ‘human resource’ theme in their study, this lacks 
validity. Furthermore, Mahadeo et al. (2011a, b) consider only firm characteristics. 
This thesis extends the work of Mahadeo et al. (2011a) by considering CG variables 
in addition to firm characteristics among determinants of CSR. Among the exploratory 
variables, this study explores the effect of firms which practise employee volunteering 
on CSR reporting. This perspective has been overlooked by other researchers (e.g. 
Sanders and Roefs, 2002; Muthuri et al. 2009) who have focused on the effect of 
employee volunteering. Another novelty of this study is the investigation of the CSR 
activities of firms which go beyond the 2% levy. This study is the first to examine 
discretionary CSR activities and characteristics of these firms in a mandatory CSR 
setting. 
The empirical evidence of the effect of legislation indicates that CSR 
disclosures increase but there are subtle differences of the regulation on CSR 
disclosures. Fallan and Fallan (2009) claim an immediate effect of regulation on CSR 
reporting while Mahadeo et al. (2011a) report a delayed effect. Frost (2007) reports an 
increase in disclosure but the substitution of voluntary disclosures by mandatory 
disclosures. More importantly, prior studies reported the incidence of regulations on 
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or related to CSR disclosures, this study reports the dual effect of mandatory CSR 
contribution (levy) and CSR disclosures. This study is also different from other studies 
such as Frost (2007) and Fallan and Fallan (2011) as CSR reporting is mandatory 
without any guidelines on ‘what’ and ‘how’ to report. Similarly, the CSR levy can also 
be paid as a tax if a company chooses not to be involved in CSR activities. The effects 
of these two regulations on CSR reporting are yet to be assessed. 
CSR activity and disclosure is a voluntary activity in most countries. This 
chapter reviewed a number of studies covering themes, the extent of CSR reporting 
and determinants of CSR reporting. The review shows that determinants of CSR 
reporting vary between countries, institutional settings and culture. There is not a set 
of pre-determined CG characteristics which influence CSR reporting. An appreciation 
of the context in which CSR reporting takes place is therefore important. Most 
importantly, this chapter identifies the shortcomings of previous studies and explains 
how this study will address these weaknesses. The contribution of this study to the 
CSR literature is highlighted.  
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Chapter 5 Hypothesis Development 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study aims to examine whether corporate governance practices influence 
CSR reporting in Mauritius. More particularly, it examines the influence of ownership 
arrangements such as block ownership, director’s ownership and Government 
ownership on CSR reporting. It also considers the effect of other factors such as board 
practices (board size, board independence, board diversity and director’s education), 
employee volunteering and the existence of foundations on CSR reporting. This 
chapter addresses three research questions: (1) To what extent CSR regulation 
influence CSR reporting? (2) Which corporate governance practices/other factors 
influence CSR reporting? (3) What are the determinants of voluntary CSR? These 
three research questions are developed into testable hypotheses. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 develops the hypothesis which 
links CSR regulation to CSR reporting. In section 5.2 hypotheses related to ownership 
structure are developed. This is followed by section 5.4 which elaborates on the 
influence of board characteristics on CSR reporting. This thesis includes two other 
factors (foundations and employee volunteering) which can potentially influence CSR 
reporting. Two hypotheses linking foundations and employee volunteering are shown 
in section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides a summary of hypotheses and finally section 5.7 
summarises the chapter. 
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5.2 CSR Regulation and CSR Reporting 
With the introduction of the CSR levy companies have the choice of using their 
CSR funds for approved CSR activities or pay it in the form of a tax. However, it 
remains to be assessed whether companies have continued their CSR engagement. The 
choice to be involved in CSR activities is a voluntary one. In line with the legitimacy 
theory, it can be contended that companies will perpetuate their CSR engagement to 
maintain their standing in society, following the circumstances under which the CSR 
levy was imposed. Though the CSR levy is not directly linked to CSR disclosure, it is 
expected that its influence will extend to CSR disclosure. First, mandatory CSR will 
in some way compel non-CSR engaged firms to be involved in CSR activities and, 
secondly if CSR disclosure mirrors CSR practices, an increase in disclosure can be 
expected. Third, in line with the requirements of the FRA (2004) firms will disclose 
CSR to avoid scrutiny by the regulator. From a neo-institutional theory perspective, 
coercive pressure in the form of the two previously-mentioned regulations will compel 
companies to be more socially and environmentally responsible and, at the same time 
be more transparent. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an increase in the extent of CSR reporting following 
CSR regulation. 
 
5.3 Ownership Structure 
5.3.1 Director Ownership 
When executive directors own a substantial part of the share capital, agency 
conflicts are lower. The principal-agent problem is exacerbated when managers have 
a low shareholding in the organisation giving rise to opportunistic behaviour by 
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managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such outside shareholders will increase 
monitoring which, in turn increases the costs of the organisation. Voluntary disclosures 
can reduce the need for such monitoring (Eng and Mak, 2003). High level of insider 
ownership means that the cost of non-value adding activities must be borne by them. 
If CSR decreases firm value, an increase in insider ownership will decrease CSR 
involvement (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Owner managed firms attract less public 
interest and consequently, their involvement in CSR activities might be minimal as the 
costs of such programmes might outweigh the benefits (Ghazali, 2007). Neo-
institutional theory predicts that firms with high managerial ownership will be less 
influenced by mimetic and normative pressures. As regards coercive pressure to be 
engaged in CSR, such firms might prefer to hand their mandatory CSR contribution to 
approved agencies or pay it in the form of a tax than being involved in CSR activities, 
which will enable them to concentrate on their core activities. Going beyond the 
mandatory CSR threshold is not the appropriate strategy to attain legitimacy for firms 
with high managerial ownership due to less powerful stakeholders. This discussion 
leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative association between the proportion of 
director ownership and the extent of CSR reporting  
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a higher proportion of director ownership are less 
likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
 
5.3.2 Block Ownership 
Ownership structure determines the level of management monitoring (Eng and 
Mak, 2003). In a widely held firm, agency conflicts and managerial opportunism are 
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common. Disclosure acts as a bonding and monitoring tool to reduce agency conflicts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jiang and Habib (2009) argue that ‘the extent and the 
quality of corporate disclosures are the outcomes of conflicting interests among 
management, majority and minority shareholders’  It can be argued that if the 
ownership of a company is concentrated the organisation will endeavour to meet the 
needs of the major shareholders.  However, large shareholders already have access to 
internal information and are less likely to demand additional disclosure (Lakhal, 2005). 
Since they do not need to attract capital from outside they are less inclined to disclose 
additional information (Habib and Jiang, 2009). Conversely, when shares in a 
company are widely held, a large number of shareholders may hold a small proportion 
of the shares. In such a situation accountability becomes an important issue as the 
shares may be held by the public at large. The higher level of accountability may be 
accompanied by greater involvement in social activities and disclosure of the same 
(Ghazali, 2010). Roberts (1992) states that disperse shareholding in the hands of those 
who have an interest in social activities (e.g. mutual funds) increase the pressure for 
social disclosures. An absence of disclosure in a firm with dispersed shareholding 
increases the information asymmetry between shareholders and the organisation which 
can entail severe adverse investor reaction.  
The absence of strong stakeholders inside a closely-held firm may result in low 
quantity and quality of CSR disclosure. From a stakeholder perspective, CSR is less 
important for a firm with concentrated ownership. Furthermore, closely held firms can 
better avoid coercive, mimetic and institutional pressures including CSR, than firms 
with dispersed ownership (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  This discussion leads to 
following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between the proportion of 
shares held by block holders and the extent of CSR reporting. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a higher level of block ownership are less likely to 
engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
 
5.3.3 Government Ownership 
 Government-owned entities look beyond the profit maximisation perspective 
and have to embrace social goals. The conflicting objectives faced by these firms 
require more communication with other shareholders (Eng and Mak, 2003). With the 
increasing awareness about social and environmental responsibility globally and in 
light of mandatory CSR, these companies have government-appointed directors who 
have the moral and professional responsibility to implement government initiatives. 
‘Being in sync with the government is important for the survival’ (Amran and Devi, 
2008). Government-owned companies are also more politically sensitive. The fact that 
they are run by public funds, activities of these firms are more in the eyes of the public 
as government ownership is equivalent to a business being owned by the public at 
large (Ghazali, 2007). Therefore, government shareholding can be expected to result 
in greater CSR disclosures as these firms must promote transparency and discharge 
their public accountability (Said et al. 2009; Post et al, 2011). This discussion leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between the presence of 
government ownership and the extent of CSR reporting. 
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5.4 Board Characteristics 
5.4.1 Board Independence 
In modern organisations, the separation of ownership and management gives 
rise to a conflict of interest due to the lack of trust between managers and shareholders. 
Shareholders are unsure whether management decisions and actions are in the best 
interest of the organisation (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). From a neo-institutional 
perspective, independent directorship is a strategy to reduce this conflict of interest as 
directors who are independent of the organisation are better placed to monitor 
conformance to rules, codes and norms. Independent directors can bring better 
governance to improve overall board effectiveness (Prasanna, 2006) which can 
improve firm performance (Bonn, 2004). Independent directors’ act as a check and 
balance mechanism ensuring that companies act in the best interest of shareholders 
and stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The ability of the board to monitor and 
ratify managerial decisions is enhanced by boards comprising of a higher proportion 
of independent directors as they care about their reputation (Cheng and Courteney, 
2006). They are also more concerned about the social responsibility of the company 
as this can improve their prestige and honour in society (Zahra and Stanton, 1988). 
Tricker (1984) views CSR as a strategy to close the legitimacy gap between 
management and shareholders via non-executive directors. Independent directors are 
less inclined to management and predisposed to influence firms to provide information 
to a broad range of stakeholders (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). 
Moreover, the salaries of independent directors are not linked to the financial 
performance of the organisation and therefore are more concerned about the long-term 
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sustainability of the organisation rather than short-term financial performance, 
encouraging practice and reporting of CSR activities (Ibrahim and Howard, 2003). A 
survey of independent directors in Australia showed that they play an active role in 
ensuring that the business meets its social responsibility (Brooks et al. 2009). This 
discussion leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors and the extent of CSR reporting. 
Hypothesis 5b: Firms with a higher proportion of independent directors are 
more likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory 
requirements. 
 
5.4.2 Board Size 
Board size refers to the number of directors sitting on the board and varies 
among countries. The average board size in Mauritius is 10 while in Europe, countries 
such as France, Belgium, Spain and Germany tend to have a larger board which 
averages 13 to 19 members (Heidrick & Struggles, 2011). 
Larger boards are associated with greater monitoring abilities and with broader 
stakeholder representation it increases attention towards the environment (Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Halme and Huse, 1997). Conversely, in smaller boards, the workload 
of members is greater, which impedes on their ability to monitor management (John 
and Senbet, 1998). However, drawbacks associated with large boards include slow 
decision making and lack of unanimity which eventually affects board effectiveness 
and efficiency (Rao et al. 2012). Larger boards can lead to lower monitoring with 
members engaging in free riding and shrinking of responsibilities which can result in 
a few managers dominating the board decisions and thus impacting negatively on CSR 
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practices and disclosures (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Conger and Lawler (2009) 
argue that a board of 9 to 13 members is the ideal size but it is the ability of members 
to work as a team which makes boards effective. 
From a neo-institutional theory perspective, a larger board is in a better position 
to monitor compliance with regulations and conformance to norms (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, the chance of having a dominating CEO is lessened 
as the board has better monitoring abilities (Harris and Raviv, 2005), as such CSR 
matters can be discussed by a larger board. From a legitimacy theory point of view, 
the wide representation of stakeholders can persuade firms to go beyond the mandatory 
CSR guidelines and engage in voluntary CSR. This discussion leads to following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a positive association between board size and the 
extent of CSR reporting. 
Hypothesis 6b: Firms with a larger board size are more likely to engage in 
voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory requirements. 
 
5.4.3 Board Gender Diversity 
The issue of diversity becomes important as women and minorities are 
increasing in proportion in the workforce (Erhardt et al. 2003). Watson et al. (1993) 
claim that diversity brings a greater knowledge base, creativity and innovation which 
can lead to a competitive advantage. Gender diversity is the most debated element of 
diversity at board level (Mahadeo et al. 2012; Rao et al. 2012). Women representation 
on corporate boards remains low. One-third of Australian companies have no woman 
represented on their board while nearly half of companies have only one female board 
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member (Kang et al.  2007). Similarly, in the US only 15 percent of board members in 
large companies are women (Terjesen and Singh, 2008) and even lower (3%) in 
Mauritian listed companies (Mahadeo et al. 2012).  
Board gender diversity can create a better atmosphere in the boardroom as 
women are more prepared for meetings and ask questions (Huse and Solberg, 2006) 
which promotes better quality board discussion and increases the ability of the board 
to provide better monitoring of a firm’s disclosures. Better monitoring results in more 
transparency in the form of increased public disclosure meaning that managers have 
less scope to use private information to their benefit. It also enables investors to gain 
firm-specific information at a reduced cost (Gul et al. 2011). Female directors attribute 
greater importance to philanthropy than economic performance, implying that firms 
with more women directors are more inclined to engage in CSR (Nabil and John, 
1994). This is because women as compared to men possess more communal traits such 
as affection, kindness and concern for others’ welfare (Galbreath, 2016). Female 
directors can enhance independence which can improve transparency through 
increased disclosure (Rao et al. 2012). Carter et al. (2003) concluded that a positive 
significant relationship exists between the proportion of women or minorities on the 
board and firm value. They also observe that the proportion of women and minorities 
increases with firm size and board size but decreases as more insiders join the board 
of directors. Gender equality legislation and changing social attitudes have contributed 
to bringing more women in the boardroom (Mahadeo et al. 2012). Mauritius attributes 
high importance to gender equality. It has a minister responsible for gender equality 
affairs and parties willing to contest municipal elections are required to have a 
threshold of at least one-third of women candidates. Neo-institutional theory posits 
that a spill-over effect of the above initiatives will induce companies to promote 
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greater woman representation on their boards which will enhance CSR disclosures. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that board gender diversity can help the organization to 
maintain its legitimacy by linking the firm with the external environment. It is expected 
that gender-diverse boards will exert pressure for keeping with traditional CSR 
activities even if it implies going beyond the mandatory CSR contribution. This 
discussion leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive association between the proportion of board 
gender diversity and the extent of CSR reporting. 
Hypothesis 7b: The presence of a female board member increases the 
likelihood for a firm to engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory 
requirements. 
 
5.4.4 Directors’ Education 
To build a highly effective board, firms should consider their needs and bring 
the right mix of knowledge, information, power, opportunity and availability (Congler 
and Lawler, 2001). It can be argued that education influences an individual’s act. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) claim that the field of study of an individual will have an 
influence on a person’s cognitive base. For instance, a person educated in engineering 
and a person educated in law would have a different cognitive base and would, 
therefore, be different. Individuals with different academic backgrounds view the 
social role of an organisation differently (Chang et al. 2017). Better educated managers 
can provide a rich pool of ideas and contribute to board discussion through an in-depth 
analysis of matters, leading to better decisions. Moreover, they are more inclined to 
adopt innovative ideas and accept ambiguity (Westphal and Milton, 2000; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). Using academic background as a possible factor influencing 
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strategic change, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) hypothesized that academic fields like 
science or engineering are linked with innovation, progress and improvement; 
consequently, people studying these fields are more open to change than those 
studying arts or business students. Their findings proved their hypothesis correct. 
Ralston et al. (1997) argue that when countries become industrialised there is a 
convergence towards Western capitalistic values. Industrialisation has given rise to 
common education to support technology, which can lead to homogeneity across 
societies (Ralston et al. 1993). Palmer et al. (1993) found similarities in the strategy 
adopted by people having followed the same type of education.  Respondents in the 
study of Congler and Lawler (2001) identified accounting and finance professionals as 
major providers of expert knowledge to board discussions when discussing strategy. 
From a neo-institutional perspective, it can be argued that directors who have an 
accounting/business/ finance academic background (hereafter referred to as business-
educated directors) have received a common education and must have been exposed 
to CSR as part of their formal education. They are expected to be more familiar with 
CSR issues than directors having studied a different academic field. These directors 
can choose to provide more disclosures to show the accountability of the organisation 
which can enhance the organisation’s image (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Directors 
holding a social qualification have a better knowledge of the expectations of the 
society and can, therefore, advise on CSR activities which can prevent a legitimacy 
gap. This discussion leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a positive association between the proportion of 
business-educated directors and the extent of CSR reporting. 
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Hypothesis 8b: The presence of a director holding a social qualification 
increases the likelihood for a firm to be involved in voluntary CSR practices in addition 
to mandatory requirements. 
 
5.5 Other Factors- Foundations and Employee Volunteering 
5.5.1 Foundations 
Mauritian CSR rules permit a company or group of companies having a CSR 
fund of more than Rs 2million to set up a Special Purpose Vehicle often termed as a 
‘foundation’ to implement their CSR projects. With a number of companies setting up 
foundations to further their social goals, CSR in Mauritius has become more 
‘institutionalised’ (Pillay, 2015). Foundations can engage themselves in long-term and 
strategic projects since they can attract a considerable amount of CSR funds.  Since 
several companies in a group can channel their CSR funds to one foundation, on the 
grounds of accountability, these companies are expected to disclose CSR projects 
carried out by the foundation. This discussion leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9a: There is a positive association between companies channelling 
their CSR funds to a foundation and the extent of CSR reporting. 
Hypothesis 9b: Companies channelling their CSR funds to a foundation are 
more likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory CSR 
requirements. 
 
5.5.2 Employee Volunteering  
Volunteering is ‘an activity that is performed outside of work, as a consequence 
of an individual’s choice to donate time to non-profit activities’ (De Gilder et al. 2005). 
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Some companies encourage staff to do volunteer work during their working hours at 
the expense of the company. Employees leave their usual company task and may, for 
instance, help in a neighbouring school or contribute to the development of a 
community safety program (De Gilder et al., 2005). Corporate employee volunteer 
programs are an innovative way for companies to show their commitment to the 
community, improve company reputation and instil a good corporate culture 
(Houghton et al. 2009). A number of reasons are provided by companies initiating 
employee volunteering programs such as ‘doing good’, ‘cooperating with others’, 
‘trusting’ or ‘networking’ (Muthuri et al. 2009). When CSR is mandatory and 
companies cannot use it to gain a competitive edge, employee volunteering can be 
used as a differentiating strategy to achieve the same objective. From a stakeholder 
theory perspective, employee volunteering links the company to an important 
stakeholder: the community. Being in touch with the community makes it easier for 
firms to be in accord with society’s expectations. Such practice can only benefit the 
company if it is reported. It can, therefore, be hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 10: There is a positive association between employee volunteering 
and the extent of CSR reporting. 
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5.6 Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed above are summarised in table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
Regulation Hypothesis 1: There is an increase in the extent of CSR 
reporting following CSR legislation 
Ownership structure 
(Director ownership) 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative association between 
the proportion of director ownership and the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
Ownership structure 
(Director ownership) 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a higher proportion of director 
ownership are less likely to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
Ownership structure 
(Block ownership) 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between 
the proportion of shares held by block holders and the 
extent of CSR reporting 
Ownership structure 
(Block ownership) 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a higher level of block 
ownership are less likely to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
Ownership structure 
(Government 
ownership) 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between the 
presence of government ownership and the extent of CSR 
reporting 
Board Practices 
(Board independence) 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive association between 
the proportion of independent directors and the extent of 
CSR reporting 
Board Practices 
(Board independence) 
Hypothesis 5b: Firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors are more likely to engage in 
voluntary CSR practices in addition to mandatory 
requirements. 
Board Practices 
(Board size) 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a positive association between 
board size and the extent of CSR reporting 
Board Practices 
(Board size) 
Hypothesis 6b: Firms with a larger board size are more 
likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to 
mandatory requirements. 
Board Practices 
(Gender diversity) 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive association between 
the proportion of board gender diversity and the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
Board Practices 
(Gender diversity) 
Hypothesis 7b: The presence of a female board member 
increases the likelihood for a firm to engage in voluntary 
CSR practices in addition to mandatory requirements. 
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Board Practices 
(Education) 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a positive association between 
the proportion of business educated directors and the 
extent of CSR reporting. 
Board Practices 
(Education) 
 
Hypothesis 8b: The presence of a director holding a 
social qualification increases the likelihood for a firm to 
be involved in voluntary CSR practices in addition to 
mandatory requirements. 
 Foundation Hypothesis 9a: There is a positive association between 
companies channelling their CSR funds to a foundation 
and the extent of CSR reporting. 
 Foundation Hypothesis 9b: Firms channelling their CSR funds to a 
foundation are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory CSR requirements. 
Employee volunteering Hypothesis 10: There is a positive association between 
employee volunteering and the extent of CSR reporting. 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
This thesis argues that CSR reporting in Mauritius is influenced by corporate 
governance practices, other factors (employee volunteering and foundations), CSR 
regulation and corporate characteristics. The first hypothesis is developed around neo-
institutional theory which argues that CSR regulation will bring an increase in CSR 
reporting. Using a combination of legitimacy and neo-institutional theories, 
hypotheses relating to corporate governance practices and other factors were 
developed. The same set of factors were used to explain involvement in voluntary 
CSR. Legitimacy and stakeholder theories were used to explain the decision to adopt 
voluntary CSR.  
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Chapter 6 Research Method 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methods used to test the study hypotheses. 
More specifically, it details the measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 explains positivism and 
phenomenological research paradigms. In section 6.3 the research design which 
compares deductive and inductive research approaches is explained. Then the research 
methodology and design used in this study are explained. In section 6.4 the models to 
be estimated as well as the measurement of the dependent variables, the independent 
variables and the control variables as well as data sources are covered. The 
assumptions of multiple regression are outlined in section 6.5. Finally, section 6.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy one adopts can be thought as the assumptions about 
the way one views the world. Maylor and Blackmon (2005) state that research 
philosophy is about the ontological assumptions about the nature of reality: ‘what is 
considered to exist and, just importantly, what does not exist in the environment we 
are studying.’ In their research process ‘onion’ Saunders, et al. (2009) describe 
positivism, realism and interpretivism as three research philosophies through which 
knowledge is developed and is considered acceptable (Figure 5.1). They further argue 
that these three philosophies are different ‘if not mutually exclusive’. Before going 
  
106 
  
further, there are three terms (ontology, epistemology and methodology) which are 
frequently used and which need to be defined.  Healy and Perry (2000) describe 
ontology as the ‘reality’ that researchers investigate; epistemology is the relationship 
between the reality under investigation and the researcher; while methodology is the 
strategy used by the researcher to investigate that reality.  
Two extreme classifications of research philosophies are positivism and 
phenomenology. Positivism is also described as traditional, quantitative or empiricist, 
while, the phenomenological approach is also referred to as post-positivist, subjective 
or qualitative (Collins and Hussey, 2007).   
Figure 6. 1: The Research Process Onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2009) 
Positivism is derived from the philosophy of science (Mayor and Blackmon, 2005). 
The researcher takes the role of an objective analyst, interpreting data which is 
assumed to be collected in a value-free manner (Saunders et al. 2009). Thus, the 
researcher must be separate from what he/she is researching to remain objective. This 
  
107 
  
distance can be physical, for example, performing a postal survey or by a procedure 
such as separating planning and execution of research (Mayor and Blackmon, 2005). 
The emphasis of positivism lies in a highly structured methodology whereby 
observations can be replicated and they lend themselves to statistical analysis 
(Saunders et al. 2009). 
The phenomenological paradigm is critical of the positivist approach arguing 
that the social world is far too complex to be reduced to ‘laws’ which apply in the 
physical sciences. The world is ever changing; conditions which apply now may not 
be relevant in three months’ time, which implies that generalisability is not possible 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Easterby-Smith et al. (2006) explain that the phenomenological 
paradigm views reality as being socially constructed. People make different 
interpretations of the one situation which leads to different courses of action and 
changes in the nature of their social interaction with one another (Saunders et al. 2009). 
Phenomenology appreciates differences in interpretation, feelings and actions and tries 
to explain why and how people have these different experiences rather than finding 
some ‘laws’ or external factors to explain their behaviour (Easterby-Smith, 2006). As 
opposed to scientific research, the researcher is part of the phenomenon he/she is 
observing. 
 
6.3 Research Approach and Design 
6.3.1 Deductive and Inductive Approach 
In a deductive research approach, there is a well-established role of theory 
which guides the development of hypotheses and choice of variables. Under this 
approach, the researcher sets a theoretical framework and goes about testing it (Ali and 
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Birley, 1999). Conversely, in an inductive research approach, the researcher makes 
knowledge claims based on a constructivist perspective. The researcher collects data 
with the intention to develop themes from the data (Elmogla, 2009). Basically, a 
deductive approach follows a positivist paradigm whereas an inductive approach 
follows a phenomenological paradigm. A comparison of inductive and deductive 
research approaches are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Robson (1999) [cited in Saunders et al. 2009] lists the sequential steps of 
deductive research as: 
 1) - Develop a hypothesis based on a theory; 
2) - Express hypothesis in operational terms (explain variables to be tested and   
how they are going to be measured), which explains the relationship between 
variables; 
3) - Test the hypothesis; 
4) - Conclude whether the outcome is in line with theory or indicates the need 
for modification; and 
5) - If required, modify theory based on findings. 
Table 6.1: Comparison between Deductive and Inductive Research Approaches 
Deductive emphasis Induction emphasis 
Highly structured approach Flexible approach to permitting changes 
of research emphasis as research 
progresses 
Researcher is independent of the 
research process 
Researcher is part of the research process
Need to explain causal relationships 
among variables 
Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events 
Collection of quantitative data Collection of qualitative data 
Sufficient sample size to generalise 
conclusions 
Less concern with the need to generalise
Develop theoretical framework Area of inquiry identified but no 
theoretical framework 
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Outcome: theory tested based on 
whether hypotheses are accepted or 
rejected 
Outcome: theory developed  
Source: (Saunders et al. 2009; Ali and Birley, 2009) 
6.3.2 Study Design 
Research design relates to a framework for collecting and analysing data, 
which serves as a plan, strategy or structure to assist a researcher’s investigations 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). There are four types of research design: longitudinal design, 
experimental design, cross-sectional design and case study design (Muwazir, 2011). 
In a longitudinal design, ‘a sample is surveyed and then surveyed again on at least one 
further occasion’ (Byrman and Bell, 2011). 
This study adopts a positivist approach using a hypothetico-deductive 
methodology. The steps outlined by Robson (1999) are followed to test the hypotheses. 
This study uses a longitudinal design in a panel study as it intends to investigate CSR 
reporting over time for several companies. 
 
6.4 Model Specification 
The hypotheses are to be tested using multiple regression. Following Petersen 
(2009), robust standard error technique will be used. Three regression equations aim 
to identify the impact of regulation on CSR reporting; the influence of corporate 
governance practices and other factors on CSR reporting and the influence of corporate 
governance practices and other factors on voluntary CSR in a mandatory CSR 
environment. The variables to be used in the estimation are in Table 6.2. 
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6.4.1 Regulation and CSR Reporting 
CSRIit = α + β1REGit + β2DIROWNit+ β3BLOCKOWNit+ β4GOVOWNit 
+β5BDSIZEit + β6BDINDit + β7BDDIVit + β8FOUND it + β9SIZEit +β10INDUSTRY 
+ β11PROF it-1 + ℮it  
The dependent variable, CSR Reporting (CSRI), is a function of 11 
independent and control variables. See section 6.4.4 for the details of the dependent 
variable measurement. 
 
6.4.2 Corporate Governance Practices and CSR Reporting 
CSRIit = α+ β1DIROWNit+ β2BLOCKOWNit+ β3GOVOWNit +β4BDSIZEit + 
β5BDINDit + β6BDDIVit + β7DIREDUit+ β8FOUNDit+ β9EMPVOL+ β10SIZEit 
+β11INDUSTRY + β12REGit + β13PROF it-1 + ℮it  
The dependent variable, CSR Reporting (CSRI), is a function of 13 
independent and control variables. See section 6.4.4 for the details of the dependent 
variable measurement. 
 
6.4.3 Corporate Governance Practices and Voluntary CSR 
VOLCSRit = α+β1 DIROWNit + β2 BLOCKOWNit +β3BDSIZEit + β4BDINDit 
+ β5BDDIVit + β6SOCIALEDUit+ β7PROFit-1 + β8 FOUNDit + β9SIZEit +β10 IND + ℮it 
The dependent variable, voluntary CSR, (VOLCSR) is a function of 10 
independent and control variables. See section 6.4.5 for the details of VOLCSR 
measurement. 
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6.4.4 Dependent Variable Measurement: CSR Index (CSRI) 
Content analysis is used to quantify the extent of CSR disclosures of 
companies.  Content analysis is a technique of codifying the text of writing into various 
groups or categories which captures the aspects of CSR information (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008). It assumes that frequency indicates the importance of the subject 
matter (Krippendorff, 1980). There are several stages of content analysis, Wolfe 
(1991) lists them as follows: Identify the question(s) to be investigated; Determine the 
sampling units; Determine and define the content categories; Determine the recordings 
unit; Determine the coding mode; Test coding on a sample of text and assess reliability 
and validity. 
Table 6.2: Variables – Definition of Dependent and Independent 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
CSRIit is the CSR Index of company i in period t. It is measured using 
the CSR checklist. 
VOLCSRit is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if a company is 
involved in voluntary CSR, otherwise zero (0). It is measured 
using the voluntary CSR checklist. 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
Ownership Structure 
DIROWNit represents the proportion of shares held by directors of company 
i  in period t. 
BLOCKOWNit is the proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders 
of company i in period t. 
GOVOWNit is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 for the presence 
of Mauritian Government or its investment arm as shareholder, 
else zero (0). 
Board Practices
BDINDit It represents the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board of company i in period t. 
BDSIZEit is the number of directors of company i in period t. 
BDDIVit It represents the proportion of female directors on the board of 
company i in period t. 
DIREDUit is the proportion of directors, qualified in 
accounting/finance/business of company i in period t. 
SOCEDUit  is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 for the presence 
of director(s) qualified in social studies/sociology/social work 
of company i in period t, else zero (0). 
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Other Variables 
FOUNDit is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if company i 
channels its CSR funds through a foundation in period t, else 
zero (0). 
EMPVOLit   is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if company i runs 
an employee volunteering program in period t, else zero (0). 
 Control Variables
SIZEit is the natural logarithm of total assets of company i in period t. 
PROFit-1 is the return on equity (ROE) of company i in period t-1. 
INDUSTRYit Industry dummies based on SEM industry classification 
REGit is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 in years CSR is 
mandatory i.e. 2010-2014, else zero (0). 
 
6.4.4.1 Stage 1 - Identify question(s) to be answered 
The starting point is to identify the questions to be answered. Content analysis 
is used in this thesis to analyse annual reports of companies to measure the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
 
6.4.4.2 Stage 2 - Determine sampling units 
At this stage two decisions have to be made: first, selecting the source to be 
examined and second determining which component of the source to analyse 
(Elmogla, 2009). Companies can communicate CSR details using various media, 
including social reports, billboards, websites, TV, the press and annual reports among 
others. Campbell (2000) justifies the use of annual report in undertaking research on 
social reporting for two reasons: the company has complete control over the issue of 
this document, apart from the audited financial sections, and; it is usually the most 
commonly circulated public document produced by the company. Furthermore, it is a 
statutory requirement in many countries including Mauritius for companies to produce 
annual reports. This makes comparison relatively easier (Tilt, 2001).  
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Focusing only on the annual report might give an incomplete picture of CSR 
(Unerman, 2000) as it represents only a small proportion of corporate communication 
channels (Islam and Deegan, 2010). However, considering all CSR sources is 
practically impossible (Zehgal and Ahmad, 1990). Annual reports are permanent 
records which are widely available (Cormier et al. 2004). Guthrie and Parker (1989) 
argue that management has complete editorial control of the annual report and are 
therefore free from journalistic distortions. Furthermore, ‘what organizations choose 
to include in (and omit from) their annual reports is a conscious decision that 
communicates a significant message to stakeholders’ (Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). 
Annual reports of companies for the eight-year period 2007-2014 are used for 
the purpose of this study. While it is acknowledged that company websites are 
becoming an important medium to communicate CSR information, this study has 
elected to ignore web-based disclosures due to the dynamic nature of company 
websites, as it would have been difficult to trace when changes occur. Similarly, this 
study also ignores stand-alone reports as only a few companies use this method of 
disclosure in Mauritius. A number of prior studies have examined annual reports; for 
example Deegan and Rankin (1999), Raar (2006), Khan (2010), Rao et al. (2012) and 
Ho and Taylor (2013). 
 
6.4.4.3 Stage 3 - Determine and Define the Content Categories 
Webb (1990) identifies two decisions which researchers must make at this 
stage. First, whether categories are going to be mutually exclusive. If one item can be 
included in two categories then including the same item in both categories for 
statistical analysis can result in dubious results. The second decision lies in defining 
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the categories i.e. how narrow or broad definition to adopt. A proper definition of CSR 
and its categories is therefore important to measure CSR appropriately.  
Gray et al. (1995b) argue that the use of the following four themes is 
established in the literature: natural environment; employees; community and 
customers. This thesis uses environment, human resource, products and consumers and 
community as themes of disclosure. Branco and Rodrigues (2006), AlNaimi et al. 
(2011) and Ahmad et al. (2017) have used similar themes. Of utmost importance is the 
validity of the CSR index, that is, it measures or represents what it is supposed to 
measure (Webb, 1990). However, the NCCG does not contain specific disclosure 
requirements. The researcher reviewed a number of studies: Mahadeo et al. 2011, 
Hackston and Milne (1996), Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), 
Purushothaman et al. 2000, Said et al. (2009), Newson and Deegan (2002) to initially 
construct a CSR index. Since CSR became mandatory in 2009, the CSR index had to 
reflect this change. An initial index was constructed. 
 
6.4.4.4 Stage 4 - Determining the Recording Unit 
Another decision concerns the unit of analysis. Content analysis can be applied 
in several ways to measure the extent of CSR disclosure. Vourvachis (2007) classifies 
them into two streams: volumetric and index approaches. Joseph and Taplin (2011) 
refer to volumetric analysis as disclosure abundance while the index measures 
disclosure occurrence. Volumetric analysis of disclosures can be applied by counting: 
the number of words (Deegan & Rankin, 1996); the number of sentences (Hackston 
and Milne, 1996) or the number of pages (Guthrie and Parker, 1989).   
Whether we want to measure disclosure abundance or disclosure occurrence, 
the starting point is a checklist of disclosure items. Disclosure occurrence counts the 
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number of items with at least some disclosure (Joseph and Taplin, 2011). Coy (1995) 
defines a disclosure index as a list of pre-selected items which is devised to measure 
something specific in a particular context. In this method, the researcher allocates a 
score of one for the presence of a certain information and zero otherwise.  
One limitation of the disclosure checklist lies in its subjective nature. For 
instance, ‘environmental mission statement and objectives’ can be treated as either one 
item or two items if we split them into ‘environmental mission statement’ and 
‘environmental objectives’. Disclosure of both will reap a score of 2 if the items are 
split whereas if it is treated as one item, it will make a score of 1 (Joseph and Taplin, 
2011). Another limitation is that it ignores the quality and materiality of information 
disclosed (Najah, 2012).  
As regards volumetric measurement, several units of measurement have been 
used in CSR studies such as words, sentences and pages. Hackston and Milne (1996) 
criticise the measurement of disclosures using the number of words, claiming that the 
researcher is faced with the difficult task of judgement, which can lead to serious 
disagreement among coders. They claim that the use of the number of sentences 
overcomes this problem. However, the use of either the number of sentences or words 
cannot measure non-narrative disclosures like charts and photographs which can 
convey information more effectively than words (Unerman, 2000). In the literature, 
both disclosure abundance and occurrence methods are widely accepted and ‘the 
decision to use one is rather a matter of personal preference than an understanding of 
the differences based on empirical evidence’ (Joseph and Taplin, 2011). 
This study uses an index to measure the extent of CSR reporting. This method 
of CSR reporting measurement and the themes of disclosure are consistent with studies 
carried by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), Purushothaman 
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et al. (2000) and Said et al. (2009). The steps followed in the construction of the 
checklist and the calculation of the Corporate Social Responsibility Index (CSRI) is 
detailed in section 6.4.4.6. 
 
6.4.4.5 Stage 5 - Determine the Coding Mode  
Coding can be done by human effort, computers or a combination of both. 
Since some of the annual reports were available in hard copy only, human effort was 
used during the whole coding process.  
 
6.4.4.6 Stage 6 - Test Coding on Sample of Text  
Weber (1990) advises to code a sample of text which can provide clarity about 
the exercise and also reveal any ambiguity in the coding rules. A consultation meeting 
was scheduled with the supervisors and the researcher. The researcher received advice 
about the way to proceed with the coding process and pitfalls to avoid in the process. 
This also gave the researcher the opportunity to ask questions to clarify any doubts. 
The researcher sent a sample text to a PhD colleague and another person who would 
be a member of the coding team. A spreadsheet and clear rules for coding were sent to 
these two persons. The results showed that there was no major problem. 
The checklist was then pilot tested on twenty annual reports, half of which were 
from the pre-legislation and post-legislation periods respectively. In addition, the 
annual reports of three top performers from Price Waterhouse Coopers corporate 
reporting awards 2013 were scrutinised to have an idea about items disclosed by these 
companies as it is presumed that disclosure practices on these companies will represent 
the high end in total disclosures. This is to ensure there is some variability in the 
disclosure score of companies (Ghazali, 2007). A spreadsheet was created with 
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year/company forming the vertical axis and items of disclosure on the horizontal axis. 
Items disclosed in the annual reports but not found in the disclosure index were noted. 
This exercise showed the need to create two separate categories: ‘Human resources’ 
and ‘Products and Customers’. As such elements of disclosure relating to ‘Ethics’ and 
‘Health and Safety’ were reclassified under ‘Human Resources’ and ‘Products and 
Customers’. An item was included in the checklist only if it is disclosed in at least two 
annual reports. Consequently, several items were removed from the checklist. 
A checklist covering four areas of disclosure was constructed (Table 6.3). The 
four areas of disclosure were: Environment, Human Resources, Products and 
Consumers and Community. The guidelines for CSR spending limits the use of CSR 
funds to some specific purposes. The majority of allowable activities under the 
guidelines are related to the community. As such community is the theme having the 
largest number of items in the checklist. 
A dichotomous procedure was adopted whereby an item appearing on the 
checklist which is disclosed is marked as 1 or else 0. If the same issue is discussed 
twice, only one mark is allotted as a reiteration of issues emphasises on quality rather 
than quantity (Puroshotaman et al. 2000). The CSR Index (CSRI) which serves as a 
proxy for CSR reporting for each company will be the sum of all items disclosed 
divided by the maximum allowable score (41). More specifically, the CSR Index for 
each company is calculated using the following equation: 
ܥܴܵܫ ൌ෎݆݀݊
௡ୀସଵ
௝ୀଵ
 
where dj=1 if item j is disclosed; 0 if item j is not disclosed; n is the number of 
items. The total CSRI is a combination of the scores for the environment, human 
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resource, products and consumers and community. The total scores (CSRI) are not 
weighted thus assuming that all categories of disclosure have the same importance. 
The majority of studies use unweighted indices as they are of equal relevance to all 
companies and there is no subjectivity in allocating weights (Marston and Shrives, 
1991). 
 
6.4.4.7 Stage 7- Reliability and Validity 
In content analysis, reliability means that the same text must be coded in the 
same way by different people (Elmogla, 2009). Krippendorff (1980) identifies three 
types of reliability while undertaking content analysis: stability, reproducibility and 
accuracy. Stability is applicable when the same content is coded several times by the 
same coder. If results are inconsistent, it shows unreliability. This is the weakest form 
of reliability as there is only one person involved (Weber, 1990). The second form of 
reliability is reproducibility also called inter-rater reliability. This involves assessing 
the proportion of errors made by various coders. To assess the accuracy of content 
analysis, the coding results are either compared with a benchmark set by a panel of 
experts or from previous studies (Milne and Alder, 1999). Guthrie and Matthews 
(1985) argue that an agreement rate of 80% or above is acceptable for inter-coder 
reliability. 
Following Elmogla (2009), several steps were undertaken to ensure the 
reliability of the data collected. Five annual reports were initially coded by the 
researcher and the process was repeated one week later. The results were found to be 
stable. The same five annual reports were then coded by the researcher’s colleague. 
There were minor differences in the categorisation of text. These minor differences 
were resolved after discussion with the principal supervisor. 
  
119 
  
Table 6.3: CSR Checklist 
Environment  Human Resource 
1. Environmental policy  1. Employee Health and Safety  
2. Environmental management  2. Employment of women 
3. Pollution from business operations  3. Employee training  
4. Prevention of environmental damage  4. Code of ethics 
5. Conservation /recycling activities  5. Equal opportunities 
6. Reduce pollution  6. Number of employees 
7. Support NGO in environment field  7. Family activities 
  8. Medical check up 
  9. Employee study scheme 
  10. Support employees with long term 
sickness 
Products and Consumers  Community 
1. Product safety  1. Housing programme  
2. consumer safety practices   2. Promote women empowerment 
3.Consumer complaints/satisfaction  
 3. Support literacy and numeracy 
skills  
4. Major types of products/service 
 4. Prevention of drug, cigarette and 
alcohol consumption 
5. Improvement in product/service 
quality 
 
5. Youth empowerment 
  6. Training for unemployed/ 
retrenched 
  7. Donations to NGOs/ Foundations 
to fight poverty 
  8. Calamities 
  9. Sports and leisure activities for 
vulnerable children 
  10. Support education of children 
from vulnerable group 
  11. Sponsorship of clubs/federations 
  12. Support to the elderly 
  13. Support to disabled 
  14. Support to NGOS in preventing 
communicable / Non-communicable 
diseases 
  15.Run artistic classes for vulnerable 
children 
  16. Educational facilities/support to 
schools in needy areas 
  17. Blood donation 
  18. Charitable donation in addition to 
CSR 
  19. Extra contribution to CSR fund 
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Of equal importance to reliability is the validity of the coding process. 
Krippendorff (1980) defines validity as the extent to which coders agree that the list 
of themes placed in each category has a similar meaning or connotation. During pilot 
testing, there was an agreement between all coders regarding the categorisation of text. 
In addition, the categories used and the themes making up each of the categories have 
been used by several authors as mentioned previously which is another indication that 
the categorisation process is valid. 
 
6.4.5 Dependent Variable Measurement: Voluntary CSR (VOLCSR) 
Companies are bound to spend their CSR funds on one or a combination of the 
three ways; practise activities prescribed by the guidelines, donate the funds to a 
registered NGO or pay it in the form of a tax. The guidelines explicitly prevent the use 
of CSR funds for the following: 
(i) Contribution to religious activities; (ii) Contribution to activities 
discriminating on the basis of race, place of origin, political opinion, colour or creed; 
(iii) Contribution to trade unions; (iv) Sponsorship for marketing purposes (v) 
Contribution to political parties; (vi) Shareholders and senior staff benefits (schemes 
benefiting staff and/ or their family members and shareholders holding more than 5% 
of shareholding); (vii) Staff welfare (including e.g. current and future staff training 
costs); and (viii) activities which are against public safety and national interest 
(Mauritius CSR Guidelines, 2009) 
However, firms are free to engage in these activities by using funds other than 
the CSR levy to do so. This implies that firms willing to do so have to contribute more 
than the 2% levy. Since a number of these activities were practised by companies prior 
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to 2009, twenty annual reports for the years 2010-2014 (post-levy period) were 
scrutinised to judge whether companies were still practising these activities. Of the 
eight items listed in the guidelines only items (i) and (vii) are retained, as the others 
fall outside the purview of CSR. The objective is to know whether firms are willing to 
spend more than the levy amount to engage in these activities. After reviewing the 
twenty annual reports, a list of six activities not allowed by CSR guidelines was 
compiled which are listed below. One more item (Extra contribution to CSR funds) 
was added to the checklist as some firms reported that they have voluntarily 
contributed more than the mandatory threshold. 
An index comprising the seven activities were constructed using a 
dichotomous scale. If a company is involved in employee training, for instance, a score 
of 1 is allotted, otherwise 0. Item 7 was included as some companies disclosed that 
they voluntarily contribute more than the mandatory amount towards CSR. After 
collecting data on voluntary CSR it was noticed that 69% of companies were involved 
in that activity and that most had a score of 1 or 2 out of the maximum of 7. A 
dichotomous total score was therefore adopted. Any company having a total voluntary 
CSR score of 1 or above was given a dichotomous score of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Table 6.4: Voluntary CSR Checklist 
No. Voluntary CSR activities 
1. Employee training (Amount spent/Training hours mentioned) 
2. Medical checkup for employees 
3. Religious donation 
4. Employee study scheme 
5. Supporting employees with long-term sickness 
6. Family activities 
7. Extra contribution to CSR fund 
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6.4.6 Independent Variable Measurement 
This study considers corporate governance practices as being the prime factor 
which influences the dependent variables. Under corporate governance practices, this 
study considers board practices and ownership structure. These are explained below. 
 
Ownership Structure 
 The ownership of firms in Mauritius is concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals. Family owned and managed firms and cross-shareholding are common 
features of the Mauritian corporate sector. This study classifies ownership structure 
into block ownership, director ownership and government ownership. Similar to 
Cheng and Courtney (2006) and Ho and Taylor (2013), block ownership represents 
the proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders. Sami and Musallam 
(2015) define director ownership as the proportion of shares held by directors. Cheng 
and Courtney (2006) define government ownership as the proportion of shares held by 
the government and its investing arm, the State Investment Corporation, Mauritius. 
These are then converted in a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if a company 
has the Mauritian Government or its investment arm as a shareholder, or 0 otherwise. 
A variable BLOCKOWN represents block ownership. Director ownership is 
represented by the variable DIROWN and finally, government ownership is 
represented by the variable GOVOWN. 
 
Board Practices 
Leblanc (2004) states three components of effective boards. First, board 
membership i.e. the board must comprise of individuals with a range of competencies 
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and expertise. Second, board structure, which includes board size, board composition 
and leadership structure. Third, board process represents the appropriate balance of 
behaviour which promotes effective interaction between board members and 
management. 
Corporate boards in Mauritius are traditionally one-tier where executive and 
non-executive directors both form part of the ultimate decision-making authority of a 
company. The NCCG states that there must be an appropriate balance of executive and 
non-executive directors on corporate boards with a minimum of two of each. The 
variable, BDIND represents the proportion of non-executive independent directors 
which meet the definition of the NCCG. Jizi et al. (2014) posit that a larger board can 
direct management to engage in and disclose CSR to stakeholders. Consistent with 
Rao et al. (2012) board size (BDSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors on 
the board. Gender-diverse boards bring wider perspectives to board discussion. As 
women are more stakeholder-oriented and aligned with the needs of the market, 
increasing women representation on boards can enhance financial performance and 
sustainability disclosure (Arayssi et al. 2016). Board gender diversity is measured by 
the number of women on the board compared to the board size and is denoted by the 
variable, BDDIV. The educational background of directors can influence disclosure 
practices (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Two variables representing directors’ 
educational background are considered; DIREDU which represents the proportion of 
the directors with a qualification in accounting/finance/business and SOCEDU, which 
represents directors qualified in social studies/sociology/social work. These are 
measured by using a dichotomous scale with 1 representing the presence of one or 
more director with the characteristic, or 0 otherwise.  
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Other Variables 
This study also considers employee volunteering and foundations. Both 
variables are measured using a dichotomous scale. Employee volunteering 
(EMPVOL) takes the value 1 if a company is involved in employee volunteering, 
otherwise 0. Similarly, foundations (FOUND) takes the value 1 if a company channels 
its CSR funds through a foundation, and 0 otherwise. 
 
6.4.7 Control Variable Measurement 
Size 
Mahadeo et al. (2011a) argue that large companies are more visible and their 
activities are subject to enquiry, criticism and/or attention by government authorities, 
media and civil society. In the same vein, Cowen et al. (1987) point out that larger 
firms are under pressure to exhibit social responsibility as they have a larger number 
of shareholders. Since their activities have a larger impact on society, they receive 
more attention from the general public. Several studies confirm the positive link 
between company size and CSR (Mahadeo et al. 2011a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
and Patten, 1991). Similar to Trotman and Bradley (1981) and Kimberly (1976), this 
study uses the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for size. 
 
Profitability  
Profitability gives management the flexibility to be involved in social 
responsibility programs. Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Cormier and Magnan (1999) and 
Cowen et al. (1987) found a positive association between profitability and CSR. Return 
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on Equity is used as a measure of profitability, consistent with Said et al. (2009), Eng 
and Mak (2003) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005).  
ROE = ௉௥௢௙௜௧	௔௙௧௘௥	௧௔௫஻௢௢௞	௩௔௟௨௘	௢௙	௘௤௨௜௧௬ 
As an alternative measure of profitability, Return on Assets (ROA) is used, in 
line with Hackston and Milne (1996), Jizi et al. (2014) and Haji (2013). 
ROA = ௉௥௢௙௜௧	௕௘௙௢௥௘	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧	௔௡ௗ	௧௔௫்௢௧௔௟	௔௦௦௘௧௦  
 
Industry 
The activities of industries which have a visible impact on society are expected 
to disclose CSR (Mahadeo et al. 2011). Morhardt (2010) studied the disclosure 
practices of 454 companies from 25 industries and found that companies with the low 
socio-environmental impact such as homebuilders, wholesalers, oil equipment and 
photographic equipment producers have low disclosure levels. Those firms with 
considerable impact on the environment such as utilities and petroleum have scores 
above the range. He also observes high scores for banks and motor vehicles and parts 
industry, which he puts on account of ‘strong retail-customer’ interactions. To control 
for industry effect on CSR, industry dummies are introduced in the regression 
equation.  
 
Regulation 
In 2009, two regulations which impacted on CSR practices and disclosures 
were introduced. To cater for this possible effect, a dummy variable is introduced 
which takes a value of 1 in years 2010-2014, and otherwise 0. The large majority of 
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companies in the sample have a financial year ending 30 June. Therefore, the effect of 
the above regulation (if any) can be felt from the year 2010. 
 
6.4.8 Data 
Sample 
The sample selected for this study comprises companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). Forty-six companies were listed on the SEM as at 30 
June 2014 and the study considers this whole population. The SEM industry 
classification is used and three industries represented by one firm each are grouped 
under ‘other’. The industry classification in the sample is shown Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Industry Classification 
  
The choice of listed companies is motivated by several factors. Mauritius is a 
small country with a preponderance of small firms. Publication of an annual report is 
not mandatory for small firms. Listing rules oblige listed companies to produce an 
annual report and their operations encompass the whole economy. It is therefore 
Sector Number of companies % 
Banks and Insurance 7 17 
Commerce 6 15 
Industry 7 17 
Investment 13 31 
Leisure and Hotel 5 13 
Other 3 7 
Total 41 100 
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believed that focusing on listed firms will show a proper picture of CSR practices in 
Mauritius. 
The study spans the period 2007-2014. A breakdown of the number of 
observations is shown in Table 6.6. Out of a maximum of 326 observations, 287 were 
observed which represents around 88% of the sample. The remainder (12%) were not 
available. In 2009, the CSR levy was introduced and analysis will be conducted both 
pre and post this date. 
Table 6.6: Sample Description 
 
Collection 
It is worth noting the numerous obstacles faced by the researcher in collecting 
the annual reports. Not all companies publish annual reports on their website. 
Commonly, only three to five annual reports immediately preceding the reporting 
period are available. This study spans over eight years so additional efforts were 
required to collect the annual reports. Since listing rules oblige listed companies to file 
their annual reports with the SEM, the researcher contacted the SEM to request access 
to the SEM library. The marketing manager of the SEM responded to the request by 
stating that public access to the SEM library is not allowed. The researcher then 
Year No. of listed firms Observed firm years  
2007 41 34 
2008 40 38 
2009 40 34 
2010 37 36 
2011 38 37 
2012 41 38 
2013 43 39 
2014 46 31 
Total 326 287 
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contacted individual companies through their ‘contact us’ email address available on 
their websites but the response rate was very low. Company secretaries were then 
contacted but again the response rate remained low. The Director of SEM was then 
contacted in a final attempt to collect the annual reports but the request remained 
unanswered. The last step was to access annual reports from the Companies Division 
of the Ministry of Finance which acts as a central repository of financial information 
of companies. However, regulations state that companies need to file a copy of their 
financial statements with the companies division while CSR information which is the 
main interest of this thesis, is sourced from annual reports. A number of companies go 
beyond the requirement of the law and file a copy of their annual report with the 
companies division. The researcher was, therefore, able to collect part of the missing 
data from the Ministry of Finance. For those companies which file their financial 
statements only with the companies division, CSR information could not be collected 
and had to be removed from the sample. As many annual reports had to be accessed 
physically, what was initially planned to take three months lasted for nine months. 
 
6.5 Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
A number of conditions must be met when conducting multiple regression. 
Performing multivariate analysis without checking for these conditions can lead to 
spurious results. These conditions are explained below. 
 
6.5.1 Sample Size 
It is important to have an adequate sample size for results to be generalizable. 
When a sample is small, results may not be replicated when applied to other samples, 
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which reduces the scientific value of the results (Pallant, 2007). Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) give a guide regarding the number of cases which depends on the number of 
independent variables (n); number of cases = 50 + (n x 8). This study considers 13 
independent variables, therefore the minimum number of cases according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) should be 154 (50+104). This criterion is largely met as 
the number of cases considered in this study exceeds 200. 
 
6.5.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to high correlation among independent variables. 
Multicollinearity can cast doubt on the validity of a variable (coefficient) in the model 
(Mahadeo et al. 2011). Singularity occurs when one independent variable is actually a 
subset of another independent variable (Pallant, 2007). Rashid and Lodh (2008) argue 
that correlations among independent variables greater than 0.75 are of concern and as 
such one of these variables must be removed from the regression equation. The 
correlation matrix (Table 6.7) reveals the highest correlation of 0.462 which is well 
below the guide provided by Rashid and Lodh (2008). None of the predictors has a 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) greater than 3 which further confirms that 
multicollinearity is not of concern. Bowerman and O' Connel (1990) argue that a VIF 
of 10 or more indicates a strong linear relationship among predictors. 
 
6.5.3 Normality 
Observations should be normally distributed. However, a violation of this 
assumption is not of major concern if the sample size is large (Coakes and Steed, 
2001). To check for the normality of variables, skewness and kurtosis are examined. 
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The dependent variable (CSRI) showed no deviation to normality rules. Furthermore, 
the Q-Q plot for CSRI shows that observations lie around the 45-degree line. While it 
is not a rule that independent variables should be normally distributed, Mahadeo et al. 
(2011a) argue that this allows for a meaningful interpretation of regression statistics, 
especially the F and T-tests. Based on previous studies (Rao et al. 2012; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002) independent variables which failed to meet the normality criteria were 
transformed. Thus, total assets which acts as a proxy for company size was 
transformed using its natural logarithm. All other continuous variables not meeting the 
normality criteria (DIROWN, BDDIV AND PROF) were transformed into normal 
scores using the Van der Waerden transformation (Mahadeo et al. 2011a).  
This is an extension to rank regression and was proposed by Cooke (1998) 
where ranks are replaced by normal scores (Amran and Devi, 2008). While using 
normal scores, the power of F and T-tests are preserved and meaningful interpretation 
of regression coefficients can be made.  
Furthermore, there are advantages of using normal scores in case of non-linear 
data or monotonicity problems (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). This method of 
transformation has been widely used in previous CSR studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Mahadeo et al. 2011a; Amran and Devi, 2008). 
The transformation yielded positive results as tests carried out following 
transformation showed that normality issues were properly addressed. 
 
6.5.4 Outliers 
Multiple regression is sensitive to outliers (Pallant, 2007). One way to 
determine outliers is to examine residual statistics. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) 
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define outliers as those which have standardised residual values above +3.3 or less 
than -3.3. As such, observations outside the range specified by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) were omitted from the analysis.  
 
6.5.6 Normality, Homoscedasticity, Independence of residuals 
An examination of a scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values and Q-Q plot is undertaken to check whether the fundamental assumptions of 
multiple regression analysis are satisfied (Amran and Devi, 2008). Residuals which 
refer to the difference between observed and predicted values must follow a normal 
distribution. From the histogram of ‘regression standardised residual’ it can be 
observed that residuals are normally distributed (bell-shaped). This is confirmed by 
examining Appendix 1 which shows that residuals lie on the 45-degree line. 
Homoscedasticity means that residuals for predicted dependent variable scores 
must be the same for all predicted scores (Pallant, 2007). It can be observed that 
residuals are centred towards zero with roughly a rectangular shape, implying residuals 
are homoscedastic. Independence of residuals means that residuals should not be 
correlated. The Durbin-Watson statistic which is close to 2, confirms that residuals are 
not correlated, therefore serial correlation is not an issue.  
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Table 6.7: Pearson’s Correlation Matrices of Independent Variables 
 Correlations  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 
VIF 
1 DIROWN 1  1.618 
2 BLOCKOWN -0.219*** 1  1.737 
3 GOVOWN -0.074 0.117 1  2.172 
4 BDIND -0.050 -0.282*** 0.070 1  2.460 
5 BDSIZE -0.163*** -0.066 0.036 -0.163** 1  1.757 
6 BDDIV -0.060 -0.190*** 0.238*** 0.462*** -0.074 1  2.511 
7 DIREDU 0.057 0.071 -0.132** 0.066 -0.012 0.165*** 1 1.665 
8 FOUND 0.039 -0.055 -0.305*** -0.048 0.404*** -0.160** 0.331** 1 1.874 
9 EMPVOL -0.123** 0.071 -0.089 0.050 0.072 -0.046 0.089 0.161** 1 1.258 
10 SIZE 0.059 0.054 -0.014 -0.120** 0.275*** -0.269*** 0.027 0.460*** 0.208** 1 2.142 
11 PROF -0.013 0.040 -0.020 -0.008 -0.055 -0.034 -0.032 -0.099 -0.036 -0.062 1 2.057 
12 REGULATION -0.048 0.063 0.007 0.118** -0.099 0.114 0.156*** 0.117 0.094 0.038 0.021 1 1.108 
13 SOCEDU -0.073 0.129* -0.114 0.099 0.054 -0.116 0.137** 0.230*** 0.191*** 0.160*** -0.009 0.062 1  
 *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.5.7 Endogeneity 
If an increase in independent directors increases CSR reporting but reporting 
level also attracts independent directors, the two measures are said to be endogenous 
(Rao et al. 2012). In other words, there could be reverse causality. To test the 
possibility of reverse causality between corporate governance practices and CSR 
reporting (CSRI), Block Exogeneity Wald test was conducted. The results which are 
summarised in Table 6.8 show that CSRI does not have a causal effect on any of the 
corporate governance practices (DIROWN, BLOCKOWN, BDIND, BDSIZE and 
DIREDU).  
The possibility of omitted variables is present in all statistical models. This 
possibility has been checked using the Ramsey Regression Equation Reset Test 
(RESET). The results show no evidence of omitted variable bias.   
Since there are no omitted variables and the model residuals are normally 
distributed, it can be taken as an informal sign that there are no obvious estimation 
issues (Rao et al. 2012). 
Table 6.8: Block Exogeneity Test Results  
Dependent variable Excluded Chi-Square Degrees of 
Freedom 
Probability 
DIROWN  CSRI 0.237536
 
1 0.6260
BLOCKOWN CSRI 0.102734
 
1 0.7486
BDIND CSRI 1.039012
 
1 0.3081
BOARD CSRI 0.589989
 
1 0.4424
DIREDU CSRI 0.002731
 
1 0.9583
FOUND CSRI 1.213311
 
1 0.2707
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explains the methodology used to test the study hypotheses. The 
sample selection and data gathering process are explained in detail.  A major part of 
this chapter is devoted to explaining the process used to measure the extent of CSR 
reporting and voluntary CSR, which are the dependent variables for this study. Content 
analysis is used to measure the extent of CSR reporting using an index constructed 
using prior studies and adapted to the Mauritian context. Analytical models were 
devised to test hypotheses. All explanatory variables used in the models, classified 
under board practices, ownership variables and other variables are explained and their 
inclusion is justified. The next chapter provides the empirical results based on content 
analysis. 
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Chapter 7 Analysis and Results  
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the empirical results of the study. The chapter has two 
major parts; the first contains a descriptive analysis of the results. Using content 
analysis, the frequency and extent of CSR reporting of sampled companies are 
investigated under four categories: Environment, Human Resource, Products and 
Consumers and Community. The period under investigation coincides with two 
distinct legislative regimes which are assumed to impact on the extent of CSR 
disclosures.  The chapter examines CSR practices and reporting before and after the 
regulatory change. The second part shows the results of multivariate analysis. It 
identifies the determinants of CSR reporting and voluntary CSR practices in Mauritius. 
The results from the analytical models are presented and discussed. For the sake of 
comparison, this study uses other countries sharing the same characteristics as 
Mauritius, such as, Malaysia and Fuji which are both developing countries and multi-
ethnic. Bangladesh is also included, being a developing country and covered 
extensively in the literature. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section comments 
generally about CSR disclosure practices in sampled firms. This is followed by an 
analysis of environmental disclosures in section 7.3. The evolution of Human 
Resource disclosures is detailed in section 7.4. In section 7.5, Products and Consumers 
disclosures are analysed. Community disclosures are examined in section 7.6. In 
section 7.7, voluntary CSR practices in a mandatory setting are discussed. This is 
followed by the results of hypothesis testing of changed regulation on CSR in section 
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7.8. In section 7.9, descriptive statistics of independent variables are shown. This is 
followed by regression analysis results in sections 7.10. The logistic regression results 
which show the determinants of voluntary CSR are found in section 7.11. The 
penultimate section provides a summary of the results. Finally, section 7.13 
summarises the whole chapter. 
 
7.2 General Comments 
More than 85% of companies reported on their CSR activities during 2007-
2014 (except 2008) as shown in Table 7.1. A possible explanation for the high rate of 
companies involved in CSR reporting is the high number of accounting professionals 
working in the corporate sector in Mauritius. It is worth noting that there is no local 
professional accounting body and the local regulatory body of accountants (Mauritius 
Institute of Professional Accountants) does not offer its own qualification. 
Accountants in Mauritius are mainly UK-qualified, and members of Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
(ICAEW).  These professional bodies attach importance to CSR disclosure which is 
passed to their members through training. The influence of Western education could 
be one reason that explains the actual result. A second reason is the detailed reporting 
framework which is in place backed by the Companies Act 2001 and the Financial 
Reporting Act 2004. Thus, normative and coercive isomorphism can be a possible 
explanation for the high proportion of companies reporting CSR. These observations 
are in contrast with Ahmad and Nicholls (1994) and Elmogla et al. (2015) who claim 
that developing countries lack accounting professionals and have a poor legal 
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infrastructure. Since 88% of companies were already involved in some form of CSR 
in 2007 (pre-legislation) and reached 100% in 2013, it can be argued that the impact 
of legislation on CSR participation has been moderate. However, this also shows the 
compulsion to be involved and to report CSR.  
Table 7.1: CSR Reporting by Companies 
 
With regard to categories of disclosure, the percentage of companies making 
environmental disclosure increased from 32% in 2007 to reach 100% in 2014 (Table 
7.2). Human Resource has been the most popular category of disclosure over the years. 
It has attracted disclosures from over 80% of companies, reaching nearly 95% in the 
last three years. Products and Consumers is the least popular disclosure category 
among companies which dropped from 71% in 2007 to 5% in the next year and reached 
55% in 2014.  
A steady increase is noted in the number of companies which engaged in 
community disclosures since 2008. It is worth noting that almost all companies made 
some form of disclosure regarding the environment, human resource and the 
community. Though the guidelines prescribe CSR practices, the choice to be 
 Year 200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
No of companies listed  41 40 40 37 38 41  43  46
No of annual reports 
collected 
34 38 34 36 37 38 39 31
No of disclosing companies 30 27 32 33 34 37 39 31
Percentage making 
disclosure 
88 71 94 92 92 97 100 100
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involved/not involved in a particular activity is a corporate message to stakeholders. 
In the next section, the evolution of CSR disclosures within each category is examined. 
Table 7.2: CSR Reporting by Category  
 Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Environment 32% 55% 71% 72% 81% 89% 97% 100%
Human resource 82% 61% 85% 86% 89% 95% 95% 94%
Product and consumers 71% 5% 18% 14% 19% 18% 13% 55%
Community 71% 63% 88% 78% 81% 84% 95% 90%
 
 
7.3 Environment  
A steady increase in companies disclosing environmental information is noted 
from 2007, reaching 100% in 2014 (Table 7.3). Mauritian companies compare very 
favourably with their counterparts in developing countries as regards environmental 
disclosure. Only 20% of Fijian companies made environmental disclosures in 2009 
and 2010 (Khan et al. 2013). The Environment category consisted of seven sub-
categories. An increasing number and proportion of companies have adopted an 
‘environmental policy’ over the years. When it comes to ‘environmental management’ 
only a few companies (not more than 8%) acknowledge using international standards 
such as ISO 14000 or GRI to manage the impact of their operations on the 
environment. The cost of these certifications may be prohibitive thus explaining low 
disclosure levels. Moreover, only 16% of companies come from the manufacturing 
sector, an industry sector that has a direct impact on the environment. 
Environmentalists play a passive role in Mauritius, so these firms face low levels of 
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stakeholder pressure. Hence, they do not feel the need to have international 
certifications as it does not convey legitimacy status. 
Consistent with previous studies (Rizk et al. 2008; Belal, 2001) environmental 
disclosure tends to provide positive information about the firm such as conservation 
and recycling rather than ‘bad news’ such as pollution caused by the firm. The non-
disclosure of environmental information has also been interpreted from the lens of 
legitimacy theory (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). Though by a very low 
proportion, an increase in the number of firms disclosing pollution is noted. Proactive 
steps towards a better environment such as ‘prevention of damage’, ‘conservation and 
recycling’ and ‘improvement in processes’ have all experienced an increase. This 
could be the result of the Maurice Ile Durable (MID) project. The ‘Maurice Ile 
Durable’ is a project initiated by the then Prime Minister in 2007. It aims to educate 
the public on sustainability matters and reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuel. 
An increase in support to NGOs operating in the ‘environment field’ is also noted after 
2009. This is due to the introduction of the CSR levy, and one of the ways companies 
can use their CSR levy is by donating to NGOs.  
The high degree of concern for the environment in the corporate sector is an 
encouraging sign for a small island developing state like Mauritius. This result is at 
odds with other developing countries such as Bangladesh and Libya where the 
environment seems to be neglected. Several reasons can explain this dissenting result. 
Mauritius is extremely dependent on the environment as compared to other developing 
countries.  
 
   
140 
 
Table 7.3: Environmental Disclosures 
 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Disclosing companies 12 35 21 55 23 68 26 72 31 84 33 87 38 97 31 100 
Sub-category                 
Environmental policy 10 29 20 53 24 71 26 72 27 73 33 87 36 92 30 97 
Environmental management, systems and audit (e.g. ISO, GRI) 1 3 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 8 3 8 3 8 1 3 
Pollution from business operations 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 8 6 15 2 6 
Prevention or repair of damage to the environment 7 21 7 18 8 24 4 11 5 14 10 26 20 51 20 65 
Conservation of natural resources and recycling activities 2 6 4 11 4 12 6 17 10 27 18 47 21 54 21 68 
Improvement in processes to reduce pollution 3 9 3 8 7 21 7 19 12 32 16 42 14 36 16 52 
Support NGOs in environment field 4 12 9 24 12 35 15 42 14 38 16 42 10 26 12 31 
N- Number of companies disclosing  
%- Percentage of companies disclosing 
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Tourism is one of the main pillars of the Mauritian economy. The main 
attractions of the country are mainly beaches which over the years, have suffered from 
erosion with the process of climate change. Several campaigns were organised to 
educate the population of the importance of keeping a clean environment and how the 
action of each individual matters.  
The results also show that the involvement and commitment of people in the 
highest level of the hierarchy of an organisation/ country can lead a project towards 
success. Another reason for the interest in environmental disclosure is the involvement 
of various stakeholders in the MID project. Stakeholders from ministries, parastatal 
bodies, the private sector, local communities and civil society were all involved in 
elaborating plans to achieve the MID mission.  
With almost all companies involved in some form of environmental disclosure 
by 2013, this can also be the result of mimetic pressure whereby companies have 
followed what their counterparts are doing. Abstinence from disclosing pollution 
levels in the initial years (2008-2010) can be due to lack of technical knowledge 
towards its estimation. Disclosure of carbon emissions requires companies to hire the 
services of an expert. On one side, there is a cost which is involved, on the other side, 
companies would better avoid scrutiny about the ecological impact of their operations 
(Mahadeo et al. 2011b). Furthermore, a number of companies seek the services of 
communication agencies to produce their annual report. The objective of these 
agencies is to project a positive image of the company. As such, they may dissuade 
companies to disclose negative information.  However, an increase in the number of 
companies disclosing pollution levels is noted from 2011 and which reached 15% in 
2013. It shows companies are more transparent regarding the effect of their activities 
on the environment. Users of annual reports are therefore better informed about the 
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environmental activities and initiatives of companies (Frost, 2007). Concrete actions 
towards a better environment such as ‘conservation and recycling’, ‘prevention of 
damage’ and ‘improvement in processes’ though on the increase, need further 
improvement. The former two sub-categories have reached the 50% threshold which 
is in the right direction.  
Villiers and Van Staden (2006) argue that companies in South Africa do not 
disclose environmental information because it does not have a legitimising effect. It 
can be argued that due to the importance of environmental concerns for Mauritius, 
legitimacy motivations can explain the high number of companies which disclose 
environmental information in this study. 
 
7.4 Human Resource 
 ‘Human Resource’ is one of the most disclosed themes among Mauritian 
companies. Apart from the drop in 2008, an increasing number of companies were 
involved in HR disclosures over the period under consideration (Table 7.4). This result 
is consistent with studies carried in other developing countries (Belal, 2001; 
Ratnajongkol et al. 2006; Pratten and Mashaat, 2009) where an emphasis on HR 
disclosures is noted.  
Table 7.4 shows that there has been an increase in the disclosure of almost all 
sub-categories of employee disclosure over the period. A notable increase is found in 
two sub-categories: health and safety and ethics. This is due to a requirement of the 
NCCG (2004) which necessitates companies to report regularly on them. Disclosure 
about ‘employment of minority/women’ is nearly absent.  
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Table 7.4: Human Resource 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Sub-category   
Disclosing companies 27 79 23 38 28 82 31 86 34 92 36 95 38 97 29 94 
Employee Health and Safety 14 41 15 39 20 59 20 56 25 68 30 79 36 92 29 94 
Employment of women  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 2 5 3 10 
Employee training  8 24 11 29 14 41 12 33 13 35 20 53 24 62 23 74 
Code of ethics 19 56 20 53 26 76 27 75 32 86 30 79 35 90 29 94 
Equal opportunities 4  12 2 5 6 18 8 22 7 19 10 26 11 28 12 39 
Number of employees 3 9 5 13 5 15 5 14 3 8 12 32 13 33 14 45 
Family activities 0 0 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 6 16 4 10 5 16 
Medical check up 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 0 4 11 7 18 5 13 4 13 
Employee study scheme 0 0 1 3 1 3 1 3 2 5 1 3 1 3 1 3 
Support employees with long term sickness 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 
N- Number of companies disclosing  
%- Percentage of companies disclosing 
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Mauritius is a country which promotes gender equality. Gender discrimination towards 
employment of women has not been an issue in Mauritius (Ramdhony et al. 2012). As 
such, companies do not deem it important to bring this issue to the attention of 
stakeholders. Companies disclosing ‘Training’ has more than doubled between 2007 
and 2014, even though companies are not allowed to use their CSR levy to finance 
training for their employees. Disclosure of ‘equal opportunities’ showed a significant 
increase from 12% in 2007 to 39% in 2014. This can be explained by the fact that the 
Mauritian private sector has been criticised for not following fair employment policies 
(NCCG, 2004). The Equal Opportunities (EO) Act which has been long awaited by 
the Mauritian people eventually came into force in 2013.  
By disclosing commitment towards employee health and safety and ethics, 
companies are adhering to the NCCG and the FRA. This disclosure is consistent with 
neo-institutional theory which predicts that firms will bend to coercive pressure 
exerted by regulators.  This result is in line with the finding of Mahadeo et al. (2011a) 
who reported an increase in the number of companies reporting on health and safety 
and ethics. The increase in the number of companies providing ‘Equal opportunity’ 
disclosure is an attempt to gain moral legitimacy with stakeholders. Equal opportunity 
has been a topical issue in Mauritius and in anticipation of the EO Act a growing 
number of companies disclosed on this matter. There is a common perception that 
employment of an individual is linked to his/her ‘community’ (NCCG, 2004). This 
perception creates an environment of distrust between employer and employee and 
even amongst employees. Therefore, to attenuate the perception that hiring/firing/ 
promotion/demotion decisions are ostensibly linked to a person’s ‘community’, 
companies have increasingly disclosed that they offer equal opportunities to 
employees. Low disclosure levels for ‘supporting employees with long-term sickness’ 
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and ‘study’ is circumstantial. Costs involved in running ‘family activities’ and 
‘medical check-up’ may explain low involvement in these two activities but at the 
same time, a slightly increasing trend can be noted. The slight increase can be 
interpreted as a move towards a moral form of legitimacy. Mahadeo et al. (2011a) 
reports that the pattern of disclosure of Mauritian companies is different from other 
developing countries such as Bangladesh and Thailand where human resource 
disclosures are greater than other CSR categories. However, findings from Table 7.1 
do not support this claim.  Table 7.1 shows that HR was the most disclosed theme in 
2007. An increasing trend is noted and it is the second most disclosed theme in 2013. 
The main reason for different results relates to the categories used in performing a 
content analysis of annual reports. Mahadeo et al. (2011a) used four categories of CSR 
in their study: social, ethics, environment and health and safety. Obviously, if a human 
resource category is itself not included, results will be different from studies which 
include such a category.  
 
7.5 Products and Consumers 
The noticeable low percentage of companies disclosing ‘Product and 
Consumers’ is common in developing countries. Elmogla et al. (2015) report that 
‘Consumer’ disclosure was totally absent in their sample of companies over the five 
year (2001-2005) period under investigation. Similarly, Imam (2000) found that only 
10% of companies provide consumer disclosure, in Bangladesh. Product and 
consumers is the least disclosed theme. Of the five sub-categories (Table 6.5) only two 
reached the 20% threshold.  
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Table 7.5: Products and Consumers 
 
 
 Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Disclosing companies 10 29 2 5 6 34 5 36 7 19 7 18 12 21 17 55 
Sub-category   
Product safety 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 
Consumer safety practices  1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 3 0 0 
Customer 
complaints/satisfaction  
3 9 0 0 2 6 0 0 2 5 3 8 5 13 5 16 
Major products/services 7 21 2 5 0 0 2 6 6 16 0 0 2 5 17 55 
Improvement in 
product/service quality 
8 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 16 4 10 5 16 
N- Number of companies disclosing  
%- Percentage of companies disclosing 
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Ignorance of product and consumers disclosure in the annual report has been noted in 
studies by Elmogla et al. (2015) in Libya, Imam (2000) in Bangladesh, Gray et al. 
(1995) in the UK and Branco and Rodrigues (2006).  Therefore, the low attention to 
product and consumer is a worldwide trend 
It is also worth noting that two sub-categories (Discussion of major products/ 
services and improvement in product/service quality) which attracted disclosure from 
more than 20% of companies in 2007 did not preserve the same attention, falling even 
to 0% in some years then showed improvement in the last two years. Pratten and 
Mashat (2009) argue that the low disclosure about consumers in Libya is due to the 
past practices of those firms when they were state-owned. Preparers of annual report 
at that time ignored the consumer and this tendency has perpetuated. While such 
argument is not valid in Mauritius, the target audience of the annual report can be the 
main reason for such low disclosure. Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) contend that the choice 
of a medium for disclosing information depends on the target audience. Branco and 
Rodrigues (2006) argue that the annual report is intended for investors. Human 
resource, being an important resource, it is logical that investors would be interested 
in it, thus, the reason for high disclosure about employees in the annual report. 
Conversely, company websites are used to disseminate information targeted to a 
broader audience including consumers.   The researcher is inclined to consider that the 
same reason may apply to companies in Mauritius. While further investigation is 
required to confirm the reason, an analysis of the trend of ‘product and consumer’ 
disclosure shows a sudden drop after 2007. Since these years coincide with a growing 
use of the internet, companies may have substituted annual report disclosures about 
products and consumers with web disclosures.  From a pragmatic legitimacy point of 
view, the calculated self-interest of the organisation about its most immediate 
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audiences states that the consumer is relatively less important to warrant disclosure in 
the annual report. 
 
7.6 Community 
Community disclosures appear in almost all (95%) companies’ annual report 
in 2013, though a majority (71%) of companies were already disclosing community 
information in 2007. This finding is in accord with Mahadeo et al. (2011a, b) in 
Mauritius and Usman and Amran (2015) in Nigeria. Community comprises of 19 sub-
categories (Table 7.6). All experienced an increase following the introduction of the 
CSR levy. 
‘Housing programme for needy families’ has shown a major increase post-
2010. The low number (3 or less) of companies engaged in this activity prior to 2010 
is understandable as this activity requires substantial investment. There is a noticeable 
increase in this sub-category between 2012 and 2013 due to the requirement of 
companies to spend half of their CSR funds on priority areas; social housing being one 
of them. This is evidence of coercive isomorphism to bring firms towards CSR 
activities which benefit those most in need. ‘Promoting women empowerment’ which 
was below 10% prior to the CSR levy, reached 32% by 2011. Empowering women 
can be a strategic form of CSR where both society and company may benefit 
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Table 7.6: Community Disclosure 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Disclosing companies 24 71 23 61 29 85 28 78 31 84 32 84 37 95 29 94 
Sub-categories (19)    
Housing programme for needy families 1 3 0 0 1 3 2 6 6 16 5 13 9 23 4 13 
Promote women empowerment 3 9 2 5 4 12 9 25 12 32 11 29 6 15 13 42 
Literacy and numeracy skills training  1 3 4 11 4  12 5 14 5 14 2 5 11 28 5 16 
Prevention of drug, cigarette and alcohol consumption 1 3 3 8 3 9 5 14 5 14 4 11 2 5 2 6 
Youth empowerment  5 15 3 8 10 29 8 22 8 22 6 16 8 21 13 42 
Training for unemployed  2 6 2 5 3 9 8 22 6 16 5 13 8 21 14 45 
Donations to NGOs to fight poverty 5 15 5 13 8 24 16 44 15 41 18 47 23 59 17 55 
Calamities 0 0 3 8 2 6 4 11 2 5 0 0 9 23 2 6 
Sports and leisure activities for vulnerable children 8 24 11 29 16 47 20 56 21 57 24 63 20 51 19 61 
Support education of children from vulnerable group 3 9 16 42 21 62 23 64 27 73 28 74 31 79 28 90 
Sponsorship of clubs/federations 3 9 4 11 10 29 10 28 5 14 0 0 2 5 7 23 
Support to the elderly 0 0 1 3 1 3 11 31 2 5 4 11 4 10 0 0 
Support to disabled 6 18 6 16 7 21 16 44 12 32 11 29 13 33 15 48 
Support to NGOs’ in preventing diseases  6 18 9 24 15 44 16 44 19 51 17 45 20 51 19 61 
Artistic classes for vulnerable children 4 12 2 5 3 9 10 28 15 41 11 29 15 38 15 48 
Educational facilities 9 26 17 45 21 62 26 72 25 68 26 68 28 72 26 84 
Blood donation 0 0 1 3 2 6 3 8 0 0 1 3 2 5 0 0 
Charitable donation  8 24 7 18 12 35 6 17 11 30 8 21 13 33 7 23 
Extra contribution to CSR fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 4 10 0 0 
N- Number of companies disclosing  
%- Percentage of companies disclosing 
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 It can provide skills to women who can then enter the labour force at a time when the 
country is facing labour shortages in manufacturing sectors such as textile and seafood 
processing where a growing number of foreign workers are imported to overcome the 
deficit. Educational support through ‘support literacy and numeracy skills for general 
population’, ‘supporting the education of children from vulnerable groups’ and 
‘educational facilities/support to school in needy areas’ is a priority CSR activity, 
reaching 90% in 2014. Having an educated and trained workforce has been the priority 
of successive governments. Moreover, education is the most effective way to eradicate 
poverty. Education from pre-primary to tertiary level is free in Mauritius. However, 
poverty causes children to drop out of education. By helping vulnerable children to 
further their education companies seek to gain moral form of legitimacy. 
An analysis of ‘support education of vulnerable children’ shows 62% of 
companies in 2009 practised this activity which increased to 79% by 2013, which again 
is the consequence of changes in 2012 of CSR guidelines. ‘Donation to NGOs’/ 
foundations to fight poverty’ has increased from 15% in 2007 to 59% in 2013. The 
spirit of the CSR levy is to engage firms in activities which alleviate poverty. 
‘Donation to NGOs’/foundations to fight poverty’ is a means to gain cognitive 
legitimacy. Similarly, from a neo-institutional theory perspective, this subcategory is 
growing into a standardised practice with companies trying to emulate others. This 
action assures stakeholders of the legitimacy of the organisation. ‘Sports and leisure 
activities for vulnerable children’ shows an increasing trend over the years. Pockets of 
poverty are concentrated in certain areas of the country. In these areas, excessive use 
of alcohol and drugs are common social problems affecting young people.  Engaging 
children in sports activities is an effective way to prevent them from falling into the 
 
   
151 
 
aforesaid scourges. Therefore, the increasing trend relating to this activity can be 
interpreted as an attempt to gain ‘moral legitimacy’. 
 
7.7 Voluntary CSR in a Mandatory CSR Regime 
The CSR levy has changed the CSR landscape in two ways: first, by setting a 
minimum amount to be spent on CSR activities and second, by prescribing a list of 
allowable CSR activities and non-allowable activities.  Given the restriction placed on 
activities allowed to be funded from the CSR levy, firms have had to adjust their CSR 
activities to stay in line with the guidelines. It implies that some CSR activities which 
were carried out for years had to be either stopped, or that the firm must spend more 
by contributing more than the mandatory 2% to fund these voluntary/discretionary 
activities.  
It was found that firms still engage in voluntary activities outside the guidelines 
(Table 7.7). The decision to engage in voluntary CSR in a mandatory regime is 
motivated by the desire by firms to legitimise their position with stakeholders. A 
combination of the legitimacy and stakeholder theories explains this position. 
Religious donations were common prior to the CSR levy. However, a sudden drop in 
this activity is noticed, from 32% of companies engaged in 2009 to only 17% in 2010. 
This is attributed to the immediate effect of the mandatory regime which prohibited 
the use of CSR funds for religious purposes. This activity received subsequent 
companies’ allocations.  
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Table 7.7: Voluntary CSR Activities 
 
 
Year 2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Religious donation  12 35 6 17 11 30 8 21 13 33 7 23 
Extra contribution to CSR fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 4 10 0 0 
Staff welfare   
Employee training  14 41 12 33 13 35 20 53 24 62 23 74 
Family activities 1 3 1 3 1 3 6 16 4 10 5 16 
Medical check up 1 3 0 0 4 11 7 18 5 13 4 13 
Employee study scheme 1 3 1 3 2 5 1 3 1 3 1 3 
Supporting employees with long term 
sickness 
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 
N- Number of companies disclosing  NA- Not Applicable 
%- Percentage of companies disclosing 
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Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2015) note that discourses, beliefs and rules in Mauritius 
are largely influenced by religion and ethnicity which are not regarded as merely 
private matters.  
Companies have traditionally donated funds to religious organisations (MEF, 
2007) and perpetuating the tradition is a step to maintaining pragmatic legitimacy 
‘Extra contribution to CSR funds’ refers to additional contributions made by firms to 
fund activities which are still within the guidelines. 5% and 10% of companies in 2012 
and 2013 respectively contributed more than the levy. A typical example of a 
disclosure relating to extra contribution to CSR funds is taken from Omnicane’s 2012 
annual report: 
 ‘With the amendment in the computation of the 2% of mandatory CSR 
funding as from 2012, Omnicane Foundation’s CSR budget considerably 
reduced to Rs1.1 million compared to Rs9.8 million in 2011. In its 
commitment to pursue its CSR actions for the betterment of the 
community, Omnicane Board agreed to make a special voluntary 
contribution of Rs3 million to the 2012 CSR budget. This has enabled 
Omnicane Foundation to maintain its social engagement’. 
Many of the projects undertaken require regular injection of funds as they are 
continuous projects. For example, Sun Resorts, in its 2012 annual report states that it 
provides full funding of a day care centre which supports 95 children. If the profit of 
the company goes down, it implies that CSR funds available will decrease, which 
impacts on these types of projects. In the extreme situation, Sun Resorts makes a loss, 
this will mean that support to run the daycare centre will be withdrawn, putting in 
jeopardy the existence of the centre and affecting the lives of the children. Therefore, 
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the decision to contribute more than the 2% CSR levy to keep the day care centre 
running is motived by moral legitimacy reasons.  
In its 2013 annual report Mauritius Union states that it wants to be  
‘A step ahead of the law: we decided not to restrict ourselves to the new 
method of calculating (2% of CSR), which leads to the allocation of a 
sum only at the end of each year. Instead, we opted to allocate an annual 
budget to CSR independently of the mandatory 2% of profits’.  
Therefore, if a firm believes that the mandatory guidelines acts as a constraint 
to the proper running of their CSR activities, they are prepared to over-invest to meet 
expectations of their stakeholders. 
The choice of companies to continue with training activities despite their 
exclusion from the mandatory guidelines is an attempt to meet the expectations of an 
important stakeholder. Having a trained and skilled workforce can provide a company 
with a competitive advantage. Employee training is a strategic form of CSR where 
economic and social benefits converge (Husted and Salazar, 2006). The company 
benefits from an increase in competitiveness as a result of training and employees 
benefit from skills which they can carry into new jobs. 
Costs involved in running ‘family activities’ and ‘medical check-up’ may 
explain the low involvement in these two activities, yet at the same time a slight 
increasing trend can be noted which can be interpreted as a move towards a moral form 
of legitimacy. 
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7.8 Descriptive statistics  
Table 7.8 shows the descriptive statistics of independent variables used in 
models 1 and 2, prior to transformation. The board size of companies listed on the 
SEM varies between 4 and 15. The mean of around 10 is similar to Australian 
companies (Rao et al. 2012) and South African companies (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013). On average 33% of board members are non-executive and independent 
directors. This is considered high when compared to 7% in Bangladesh (Khan et al. 
2013) but lags behind Malaysia on 63% (Said et al. 2009). Business educated directors 
vary between 9 and 100% with an average of 51%. Female directors average 4%. This 
is low compared to FTSE 350 companies where the average is 8% (Arayssi et al. 2016). 
As regards ownership structure, companies are owned on average 55% by 
block holders. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report that around 60% of shares are held 
by block holders in Malaysia. Comparatively, in Saudi Arabia block shareholding 
averages only 33%. Director ownership averages 2.5% in companies which is low 
compared to an average of 20% in Malaysia (Ghazali, 2007) and 27% in Bangladesh 
(Khan et al. 2013). Government ownership is on the low side with only 11% of firms 
having the government as a shareholder. Comparatively, 64% of firms on Bursa 
Malaysia have government as a substantial shareholder (Ghazali, 2007).  
On average 59% of firms use a foundation to channel their CSR funds while 
17% of firms practice employee volunteering. Total assets (size) is an average of Rs17 
million. Return on equity varies between -2% to 32% showing high variability, with 
an average of 0.3%. 
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Table 7.8: Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics for the 
Whole Sample (2007-2014) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
CSRI 0.24 0.59 0.2593 0.1208
DIROWN 0.00 36.33 2.5171 6.48711
BLOCKOWN 0.05 1.00 0.5552 0.21915
GOVOWN 0.00 1.00 0.1120 0.31594
BDSIZE 4.00 15.00 9.6314 2.27267
BDIND 0.10 1.00 0.3381 0.23347
BDDIV 0.00 0.40 0.0368 0.06834
DIREDU 0.01 1.00 0.5153 0.20299
FOUND  0.00 1.00 0.5909 0.49279
EMPVOL  0.00 1.00 0.1732 0.37904
SIZE 56301.00 5.55E8 1.7161E7 4.82782E7
REGULATION 0.00 1.00 0.6250 0.48486
PROF -2.07 32.60 0.3017 2.16033
 
Table 7.9 shows the frequency distribution of nominal variables used in the 
logistic analytical model. 69% of the sampled observations engaged in voluntary CSR 
(VOLCSR), in addition to mandatory requirements. 22% of companies reported the 
presence of a director with a social qualification (SOCIALEDU) on the board. Female 
directors (BDDIV) were present in 31% of companies. 39% of companies came from 
manufacturing while 61% came from other sectors. 
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Table 7.9: Nominal variables (2010-2014) 
Nominal variables  Frequency % 
VOLCSR    
Yes  113 69 
No   51 31 
SOCIALEDU    
Yes   36 22 
No  128 78 
BDDIV    
Yes   51 31 
No  113 69 
INDUSTRY    
Manufacturing   64 39 
Other  100 61 
 
7.9 Regulation and CSR Reporting 
It can be observed from Figure 7.1 that the CSRI (Corporate Social 
Responsibility Index) has increased steadily from 12% in 2007 to reach 30% in 2013. 
The extent of CSR reporting of Mauritian companies as measured by the CSRI 
compares favourably with other developing countries such as Bangladesh and 
Malaysia where it averages 13% and 14% respectively (Rashid, 2015; Said et al. 2009). 
The Maurice Ile Durable (MID) project and the regulation regime change have all 
contributed to the increase in total disclosures.  
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Figure 7.1: CSR Reporting Trend 
 
 
In the wake of regulation regime change, a shift in the pattern of CSR reporting 
can be observed. Figure 7.2 shows that pre-legislation, ‘Environment’ disclosures 
topped the list of categories. Following regulation regime change ‘Community’ was 
the highest by 2010 and is explained by the emphasis of regulation regime change to 
be ‘community’ focused. Coercive pressure caused firms to alter their activities and 
thus CSR disclosures. New legislation prohibits the use of CSR funds for training and 
employee welfare activities. The immediate reaction of companies was to readjust their 
activities favouring more ‘community’ activities, in line with the guidelines. However, 
realising the importance of employees, firms have reiterated their support towards 
‘human resource’ related activities. 
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Figure 7.2: CSR Reporting Pattern 
 
Table 7.10 reports the regression results for the whole sample. The results of 
hypotheses are tested using panel data covering 8 years (2007-2014). Model 1 tests the 
effect of regulation on CSR reporting. The F value of 8.160 is significant at 1% level 
and the adjusted R2 explains around 44% percent of the variation in CSR reporting.  
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Table 7.10: Regression Results of CSRI on the Explanatory Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Independent 
variable  
Intercept -0.175
(0.127)
-0.094
(0.044)
-0.306
(0.005)
0.512 
(0.446) 
-0.016
(0.887)
DIROWN  -0.027
(0.007)***
-0.028
(0.003)***
-0.023
(0.000)***
-0.027 
(0.001)*** 
-0.028
(0.003)***
BLOCKOWN -0.062
(0.193)
-0.060
(0.183)
-0.0014
(0.742)
-0.029 
(0.465) 
-0.044
(0.350)
GOVOWN -0.073
(0.067)*
-0.092
(0.014)**
-0.073
(0.016)**
-0.088 
(0.003)*** 
-0.070
(0.067)*
BDIND -0.092
(0.093)*
-0.104
(0.044)*
-0.096
(0.049)*
-0.046 
(0.259) 
-0.097
(0.064)*
BDSIZE 0.016
(0.003)***
0.016
(0.002)***
0.007
(0.191)
0.010 
(0.022)** 
0.014
(0.009)***
BDDIV 0.031
(0.033)**
0.044
(0.028)**
0.036
(0.005)***
0.022 
(0.048)** 
0.040
(0.007)***
DIREDU - -0.033
(0.526)
0.019
(0.681)
0.126 
(0.781) 
-0.003
(0.953)
FOUND 0.0102
(0.000)***
0.098
(0.000)***
0.074
(0.000)***
0.088 
(0.000)*** 
0.107
(0.000)***
EMPVOL - 0.078
(0.000)***
0.091
(0.000)**
0.107 
(0.000)*** 
0.099
(0.000)***
SIZE/ SIZE1 0.030
(0.018)**
0.022
(0.067)*
0.063
(0.000)***
- 0.016
(0.178)
REG 0.074
(0.001)***
0.071
(0.001)***
0.064
(0.001)***
0.071 
(0.000)*** 
-
PROF/ PROF1 0.022
(0.027)**
0.022
(0.069)*
0.009
(0.237)
- 0.019
(0.047)*
Banks and 
Insurance 
-0.014
(0.629)
-0.016
(0.573)
-0.006
(0.814)
- -0.019
(0.524)
Commerce 0.095
(0.002)***
0.068
(0.007)***
0.038
(0.113)
- 0.065
(0.014)**
Investment 0.033
(0.138)
0.006
(0.921)
0.049
(0.00)***
- 0.018
(0.459)
Other 0.031
(0.604)
0.006
(0.921)
0.035
(0.478)
 0.009
(0.868)
Model summary  
F statistic 8.160 *** 9.166 *** 11.175*** 12.32*** 7.486***
R2 0.498 0.564 0.623 0.506 0.505
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.503 0.567 0.465 0.437
Observations 170 174 166 186 126
Significant (*** at 1% level or less, ** at 5% level or less and * at 10% level or less) 
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The test variable REG is significant at 1% level. With a positive coefficient, it 
implies that CSR reporting has increased significantly following the regulatory regime 
change. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported, regulation in the form of the CSR levy 
and mandatory CSR disclosure via the Financial Reporting Act (2004) have increased 
CSR reporting. This result is at odds with Fallan and Fallan (1999) who found that 
modest regulation may cause firms to reduce their voluntary disclosure. From a neo-
institutional theory perspective, it shows that coercive pressure whereby firms are 
compelled to spend on CSR and report same in the annual report brings more CSR 
disclosure. This result also shows that stricter laws are required to increase CSR 
reporting.   
 
7.10 Corporate Governance Practices and CSR Reporting 
Model 2 tests the influence of corporate governance practices and other factors 
such as employee volunteering and foundations on CSR reporting. The F value of 
9.303 is significant at a 1% level, suggesting that the model as a whole can be used to 
explain CSR reporting in Mauritius. The adjusted R2 states that the model explains 
around 51% of the variation in CSR reporting in the sampled firms. This section 
provides a detailed interpretation of the results. 
 
7.10.1 Ownership Structure and CSR Reporting 
Hypothesis 2a is empirically supported. The impact of director ownership on 
CSR reporting is significant (p=0.003) and negative. This finding is in line with 
Ghazali (2007), Eng and Mak (2003) and Khan et al. (2013). The economic implication 
is that one standard deviation increase (decrease) in director ownership causes a 0.18 
   
162 
  
(6.49 x 0.028) decrease (increase) in CSRI. This supports the neo-institutional view 
which predicts that owner-managed firms are less prone to mimic their competitors 
due to the absence of influential stakeholders. 
Hypothesis 3a predicted a negative relationship between block ownership and 
CSR reporting. The negative relationship is supported but is not significant (p=0.183). 
Hypothesis 3a is thus not supported. This finding supports Ghazali (2007) and Said et 
al. (2009). From a neo-institutional theory point of view block owners are less likely 
to be influenced by normative and cognitive institutional demands as compared to 
firms with dispersed ownership (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). On account of their 
significant ownership, block holders can request internal CSR reports rather than rely 
on public reports (Zheng, Balsara and Huang, 2014). Block shareholders already have 
access to private information through representation on the board and therefore 
pressure to disclose CSR does not arise.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive association between government ownership 
and CSR reporting. Results indicate a negative and significant effect of government 
ownership with CSR reporting. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. This finding accords 
with Dam and Scholtens (2012) who report that communication with stakeholders is 
poor in state-owned companies, but contradicts the evidence of positive support by 
Haji (2013), Tagesson et al. (2009) and Al-Bassam and Ntim (2016). 
A number of reasons can explain the negative relationship between 
government ownership and CSR reporting. First, government involvement in business 
activities is limited. Government shareholding in the companies listed on the SEM is 
low with majority shareholding in only two of the companies. This implies that 
government has limited representation on the boards of these companies. Thus, even 
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with all good intentions, directors nominated by the government have limited ability 
to pursue the socially responsible and accountable agenda of the government. 
Second, the Government of Mauritius invests in strategic areas such as 
telecommunications, water and electricity. 60% of companies with government 
shareholding operate as quasi-monopolies. While it can be argued that government-
owned entities should show that they are operating according to the expectations of 
the nation and are thus involved in greater CSR (Ghazali, 2007) and that firms which 
have the government as important stakeholder should have CSR high on their agenda 
to win the government’s support (Amran and Devi, 2008), these arguments do not hold 
in a quasi-monopoly situation. The absence of competition means that the need for 
accountability and legitimacy is less felt by these firms. They can avoid coercive and 
mimetic pressure without major consequence. CSR is relegated in importance, thus, 
they communicate less CSR information. 
Religion and ethnicity pervade in all spheres of life and there is a tendency to 
link hiring and firing decisions to religious belonging (NCCG, 2004). Nominations on 
boards of state companies are often decided on criteria other than competence and 
experience. These government-nominated directors cannot impart the government’s 
CSR agenda to these companies. 
 
7.10.2 Board Practices and CSR Reporting 
Hypothesis 5a posits that the percentage of independent directors (BDIND) is 
positively associated with the level of reporting. Empirical evidence shows a 
statistically significant (p=0.044) but negative relationship between BDIND and 
reporting. An increase in the percentage of independent directors leads to lower 
reporting. Hypothesis 5a is therefore not supported. This contradicts previous studies 
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(De Villiers et al. 2011; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Choi et al. 2013). The negative 
association is however supported by Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez (2010). The model predicts a fall of 0.023 (0.23 x 0.10) in the 
CSRI for one standard deviation increase in BDIND. From a neo-institutional 
perspective, independent directors are supposed to bring legitimacy to the organisation 
by bridging the gap between corporate practices and social expectations (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). However, this does not appear to be the case in Mauritius. 
Moreover, Mahadeo et al. (2012) found a negative association between the proportion 
of independent directors and financial performance.  
One possible explanation for the unexpected negative relationship between 
board independence and CSR reporting can be the lower average of board 
independence of companies listed on the SEM compared to other studies. For instance, 
Jizi et al. (2014) and Rao et al. (2012) who found a positive association between board 
independence and CSR, report values of 80% and 60%, respectively. The average for 
board independence is 33% for firms on the SEM. The current Code provides for a 
minimum of two independent directors to be represented. However, compliance with 
the code has been mainly to the ‘letter’ rather than the ‘spirit’ (Mahadeo et al. 2012). 
When independent non-executive directors are outnumbered by other directors, their 
contribution to board decisions is limited. As such they may align themselves to the 
majority of directors, adopting a ‘rubber stamp’ attitude forsaking their true role of 
independent directors. 
Board members are often appointed by powerful CEO’s. These board members 
are often personal friends or family members of majority shareholders and therefore 
appointed based on personal ties rather than qualifications. ‘As a result they (directors) 
have been unwilling or unable to ensure effective oversight’ (World Bank, 2002). This 
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can compromise the independence of these directors therefore, limiting their role as 
monitors (Johnson et al. 2012).  
The result can be better understood in the context of the research. As explained 
earlier, due to the smallness of the country having truly independent directors is 
difficult in Mauritius. In a study by Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2008) a director of a 
private company declared ‘It is not easy to find people who are really independent. 
Not only independent but people who will bring value to the board.’ Having competent 
and independent directors seems to be problematic and Soobaroyen and Mahadeo 
(2008) argue that the appointment of independent directors tend to be ‘more symbolic 
than substantive’. Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) are critical of the role played 
by independent directors in encouraging greater disclosure. They claim that 
independent directors lack experience and knowledge and in certain instances are 
‘indifferent to societal concerns’. Arguably in this context independent directors 
cannot fully exercise their role of acting as ‘check and balance mechanism’ in 
promoting board effectiveness.  
Company directors of large firms in Mauritius normally come from a tightly 
knit business community with the same people serving on several boards (Mahadeo et 
al. 2012; NCCG, 2004). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that interlocking relationship 
can have important implications for governance especially independence. Interlocking 
of firms might lead to decisions in favour of management to the detriment of 
shareholders (Johnson et al. 2012). Liu and Yang (2008) point out that sitting on 
several boards can lead those members to become less committed with their job. Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) concluded that firms having outside directors serving on three 
or more boards experience lower profitability and exhibit lower market-to-book value 
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ratio. The researcher is inclined to consider that inter-locking of directors compromises 
the independence of directors thus culminating in an adverse effect on CSR reporting. 
An alternative explanation is provided by Eng and Mak (2003) for the negative 
relationship between board independence and CSR reporting. They argue that 
independent directors may be nominated by block shareholders who may acquire 
information directly. These directors pay a substitute -monitoring role to disclosure. 
Hypothesis 6a predicts that board size is positively associated with the extent 
of reporting. The result is statistically significant (p=0.002) which suggests that 
Mauritian firms with a larger board size provide more information on their CSR 
performance. Hypothesis 6a is therefore supported. This result supports the findings 
of Rao et al. (2012), Haji (2013) and Al-Bassam et al. (2015) but contradicts the 
findings of Bai (2014). This result is also in accord with the neo-institutional 
framework. A larger board size can be representative of a diverse range of stakeholders 
(Kock et al. 2012) who can demand a greater variety of CSR activities.  
Hypothesis 7a states that board gender diversity exhibits a positive relationship 
with reporting. Hypothesis 7a is accepted (p=0.028)  This finding is consistent with 
Arayssi et al. (2016) and Rao et al. (2012) who found that gender-diverse boards tend 
to make more disclosures. From a neo-institutional perspective gender-diverse boards 
are in a better position to monitor adherence to rules and norms as the presence of 
women leads to better oversight from a managerial point of view (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009).  
The representation of women on corporate boards in Mauritius still lags behind 
advanced countries. However, there are two positives which can be gathered from the 
findings of this study. First, even if women representation is very low, it has the power 
to positively influence CSR reporting. This is because women encourage participative 
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communication and can, therefore, sensitise board members towards CSR initiatives 
(Bear et al. 2010). Women as compared to men possess more communal traits such as 
affection, kindness and concern for others’ welfare (Galbreath, 2016). Second, data 
from this study shows that women make up to 40% of one or more boards, which is a 
good signal and a step toward the worldwide trend of increasing women representation 
on corporate boards. 
Hypothesis 8a predicts a positive relationship between director education and 
CSR reporting. Director education displays an insignificant (p=0.526) and negative 
relationship with CSR reporting. This result supports Haniffa and Cooke (2002). It 
does not support the neo-institutional framework which posits that homogeneity in 
education can result in greater disclosures.  
The non-significant relationship between the proportion of business-educated 
directors and CSR reporting shows that educational background alone is not enough 
in making the board more accountable by pushing for more disclosures. Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) argue that financial expertise is not the only skill and knowledge 
required on boards. It has to be acknowledged that directors may be involved in 
activities and professions different from their academic backgrounds (Mahadeo et al. 
2011c). Moreover, directors carry their experience which enable them to interpret 
business situations (Olffen and Boone, 1997) and which can prove more valuable in 
acknowledging accountability. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) argue that single industry 
experience in the long run can create resistance to change, with directors preferring 
status-quo. As stated before, directors in large companies in Mauritius come from a 
select group of people and tend to have long tenures (Mahadeo et al. 2012). Even 
though changes might be occurring in the market place, long standing directors may 
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fail to react to these changes. Thus, a potential reason to explain the non-significant 
association between business-educated directors and CSR reporting. 
Sonnenfeld (2002) argues that having more board members with financial 
expertise does not guarantee better governance. Taking the example of Enron, he 
argues that the firm had an accounting professor along with international bankers, 
former financial market regulars, and current financial service firm leaders on board. 
However, they could not understand Enron’s activities on the international financial 
markets. Therefore, a business academic background does not necessarily predispose 
an individual towards greater accountability in terms of higher disclosures. 
 
7.10.3 Foundation and CSR Reporting 
Hypothesis 9a predicts that the existence of a foundation to run CSR activities 
in a company is positively associated with the extent of reporting. The result is 
statistically significant (p=0.000) which suggests that Mauritian firms which channel 
their CSR funds through a foundation provide more information on their CSR 
performance. Hypothesis 9a is therefore supported. 
Foundations are non-profit organisations set by profit-making entities to 
implement social projects. Since a foundation is comparable to a pool of funds from a 
number of companies, on the grounds of accountability these foundations have to show 
how funds have been utilised which is then reported in the annual reports of 
contributing companies. The monitoring function of donor companies is highlighted 
in a study by Pillay (2015) where the executive of a company which runs a foundation 
states  
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‘…the company is regularly putting cash into it, is regularly monitoring 
it. You have the finance director and the company secretary on the board 
of the foundation, and it’s not just left to its own devices…’ 
Foundations are meant for those companies or group of companies with a CSR 
fund in excess of Rs2 million. Since foundations manage a considerable amount of 
funds, they can implement a greater variety of CSR activities. Therefore companies 
contributing to a foundation have more to report upon. Greater variety of CSR 
activities can also be explained by each contributor trying to lobby for the foundation 
to engage in those activities which will legitimise their operations in the eyes of their 
relevant ‘publics’. For example a firm willing to employ people in its immediate 
environment might push for an employability project to train people, making them 
more employable and also acting as a potential pool of candidates for recruitment by 
the firm. Another firm contributing to the same foundation and operating in the health 
sector could suggest that the foundation runs health check programmes for the 
community which would show care for the community and also benefit business 
operations.  
Foundations foster strategic alliances with NGOs to implement certain CSR 
projects as these NGOs have the expertise in specific fields. Collaborating with an 
NGO enables the patron (foundation/company) to share decision making about 
allocation of resources and also it shows that the foundation is responsive to pertinent 
issues about stakeholders (Amran et al. 2014).  NGOs are accountable to themselves 
in terms of responsibility to carry out their mission and to their staff (Dhanani and 
Conolly, 2015) and do also have an upward responsibility towards their patrons 
(Najam, 1996). As recipient of CSR funds, these NGOs must provide an account to 
foundations/companies. This information is then relayed to those companies which 
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ultimately fund the foundation. Collaboration with an NGO allows the company via 
the foundation to be involved in a greater variety of CSR activities, thus a higher level 
of CSR reporting. This result is corroborated by Amran et al. (2014) who found a better 
CSR reporting quality for those firms which build partnership with an NGO. 
 
7.10.4 Employee Volunteering and CSR Reporting 
Hypothesis 10 posits a positive relationship between employee volunteering 
and CSR reporting. Employee volunteering (EMPVOL) has a positive coefficient and 
is significant (p=0.000). Hypothesis 10 is therefore accepted. It implies that firms 
which run a corporate volunteering program disclose notably more than those which 
do not follow such practice. Organisations seek legitimacy by adhering to norms 
valued by key institutions in society (Campbell, 2007). Employee volunteering allows 
for better understanding of stakeholders expectations for companies and helps in 
‘reaching shared understandings of the values which govern common business 
practices’ (Muthuri et al. 2009). This result is in accord with neo-institutional theory 
as ‘norms’ of business practice are mutually agreed and understood by working in 
close collaboration. Firms practising employee volunteering will therefore capitalise 
on their proximity to stakeholders and show that they are conforming to expectations 
by reporting such activity. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that organisations compete for institutional 
legitimacy in addition to resources. When CSR is mandatory, firms can use employee 
volunteering as a strategic tool to show that they are different from their competitors. 
For example, a firm selling educational items may send its employees to volunteer in 
nearby schools to show children how to use technology in their education. Children 
benefit from an increase in knowledge while the firm can potentially increase sales 
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from those children who were exposed to the training sessions. However, publicizing 
the event through the annual report or other means will bring greater benefits to the 
organisation. Even those individuals who have not directly benefitted from the actions 
of the company will lend their support to the organisation, seeing the organisation’s 
positive actions (Bhattacharya et al. 2009). Furthermore, reporting on employee 
volunteering is an ‘implicit endorsement’ from the non-profit sector that the 
organisation is socially responsible (Basil et al. 2009). 
Firms that encourage employee volunteering are better at attracting potential 
employees (De Gilder et al. 2005). This occurs when the initiatives of the employer 
match the employee’s cause (Lindgreen and Swaen, 2005). Some form of congruence 
is required between the company’s objective and the employee’s intentions to bring 
the best out of employee volunteering activities. Most of activities under the purview 
of employee volunteering are employer-initiated i.e. intra-organisational (Peloza and 
Hassay, 2006) which means management decides on activities to be undertaken and 
provides the required support. Basically, management would prefer those activities 
which would directly/ indirectly benefit the business operations. When employees can 
have their say on activities they want to volunteer, satisfaction is greater for employees 
which can be reflected in the employee’s performance at work. Inter-organisational 
employee volunteering which allows employees to choose and lead philanthropy 
projects, enables them to acquire project management skills (Peloza and Hassay, 2006) 
which can benefit the employee and the company in the future. In this scenario it would 
be expected that the organisation will report more on CSR on account of a variety of 
CSR projects undertaken. Employees will compete for their projects to be funded 
resulting in a number of projects being carried out by the employer to motivate 
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employees to volunteer. The extract below is taken from the annual report of State 
Bank of Mauritius (SBM) (2010) and best illustrates the researcher’s point. 
‘SBM staff is encouraged to volunteer their time and talent to support the 
community. Following its success and request from staff, the SBM 50:50 
Matching Scheme has been upgraded to SBM 1:2 Matching Scheme. 
Under the scheme, staff members are encouraged to organise fund-
raising activities in favour of NGOs/ community organisations of their 
choice, with the Company topping up the amount by twice the proceeds 
raised, subject to a ceiling. We have seen an increasing number of 
employees getting involved in community development initiatives’. 
Companies perceive that employee volunteering can be used as a strategy to 
manage a damaged reputation (Basil et al. 2009). For example a firm accused of using 
child labour in its production process may ask its employees to volunteer in 
neighbouring schools, showing that it cares for the education of children, in an attempt 
to rebuild its reputation. Changing the perception of the community requires 
communication which can be achieved through disclosure in the annual report. 
Rebuilding trust through employee volunteering is a currently used strategy (Muthuri 
et al. 2009). Following corporate scandals in Europe and the US which has eroded the 
trust of the community, firms in the UK food industry are using employee volunteering 
to reach out stakeholders demonstrating that they are legitimate and can be trusted 
(Muthuri et al. 2009). Thus, employee volunteering can be used as a responsive 
strategy to rebuild trust and ameliorate a firm’s reputation. As reputation management 
is the most important reason to disclose CSR (KPMG, 2005), firms involved in 
employee volunteering will disclose more CSR. 
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7.10.5 Control variables and CSR Reporting 
7.10.5.1 Regulation 
Regulation (REG) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 in years when 
CSR is mandatory, otherwise 0. REG has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 
1% level (P=0.001). This result implies that disclosures are significantly higher than 
when CSR was purely voluntary. A significant influence of regulation on disclosures 
have been reported by Kolk and Prego (2010), Fallan and Fallan (2009) and Mahadeo 
et al. (2011a).  
 
7.10.5.2 Profitability 
Profitability (ROE) is significant at the 10% level (p=0.069) and is positively 
related to CSR. The result implies that an increase in profitability increases disclosures. 
This finding accords with Tagesson et al. (2009) and Cormier and Magnan (1999). 
However, it contradicts the result of Mahadeo et al. (2011a) who found a negative 
relationship between profitability and CSR in the Mauritian context. The mandatory 
nature of CSR in Mauritius from 2009 explains the opposing results between this study 
and Mahadeo et al. (2011a). Higher profits allow firms to spend more on activities thus 
increasing disclosures. The results show that more profitable firms disclose 
significantly higher. 
  
7.10.5.3 Company Size 
Company size (Total Assets) has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 
10% level (p=0.067).  This result is in line with Haniffa and Cooke (2005); Mahadeo 
et al. (2011a); Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and also consistent with neo-institutional 
theory. Large firms are better equipped financially to adhere to normative and 
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regulatory pressure for increased activities. Larger firms are under greater scrutiny by 
the public and disclose more CSR information to meet the needs of a greater number 
of stakeholders. 
 
7.10.5.4 Industry 
Overall, the results show limited influence of industry affiliation on CSR 
reporting. ‘Banks and Insurance’ has a negative coefficient and is insignificant. It 
means that companies in that sector have lower CSR reporting compared to others. 
‘Commerce’ has a positive coefficient and is significant at 1% level (p = 0.007). A 
similar result was found by Mahadeo et al. (2011a) between ‘Commerce’ and Ethics’ 
disclosures. The investment sector has an insignificant influence on CSR reporting 
which is in line with Mahadeo et al. (2011a). Similarly, ‘others’ also does not influence 
CSR reporting levels. The ‘Industry’ sector was omitted from the analysis to avoid 
multicollinearity among the various industries. 
 
7.10.6 Robustness Test 
A series of tests are conducted to check the model’s robustness. In model 3, 
two control variables are replaced by alternative proxies. Firm size (SIZE) represented 
in the original model (Model 2) by the natural logarithm of total assets is replaced by 
the natural logarithm of sales revenue (SIZE 1). The natural score of ROE using Van 
der Waerden’s formula (PROF) which represents profitability, is swapped with its 
equivalent for return on asset (ROA) as an alternative measure of profitability 
(PROF1). The results in model 3 are not qualitatively different from model 2. The only 
notable difference is BDSIZE which was positive and significant (p<0.01) in model 2 
but is positive and insignificant (p=0.191) in model 3. All other main variables which 
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were significant in model 2 (Director Ownership, Government Ownership, Board 
Independence, Foundation, Employee Volunteering) maintained their original sign 
and significance, though in some cases the level of significance changed. 
Model 2 was run, keeping the regulation dummy (REG) and dropping other 
control variables which gives rise to model 4. Again, the results in model 4 are not 
qualitatively different from model 2. The only difference is BDIND which was 
negative and significant (p<0.05) in model 2 but becomes negative and insignificant 
(p =0.259) in model 4.  
Given the changes of 2009, it is necessary to verify the stability of the model 
i.e. whether the same analytical model can be used to explain reporting in both the pre-
legislation and post-legislation period. The CUSUM test (Ploberger and Krämer, 
1992) showed that the results are within tolerable limits. It can, therefore, be concluded 
that the coefficients are stable over the whole time period. Nevertheless, the sample 
was partitioned representing the pre-legislation and post-legislation periods. Model 5 
shows the regression results for the post-legislation period (2010-2014). Model 5 is 
not qualitatively different from the regression results for the whole sample (Model 2). 
All predictors and control variables, significant in model 2 are equally significant in 
Model 5, albeit in some cases at a different level. Due to a limited number of cases 
(106) in the pre-legislation period, the exercise could not be repeated for that period. 
 
7.11 Logistic Regression Results 
Companies have the discretion to contribute more than the 2% levy and to 
engage in CSR practices not allowed by the guidelines. Some companies do not go 
beyond that, mainly because of the additional cost involved, which puts them at a 
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competitive disadvantage. It is assumed that the decision to engage in voluntary CSR 
in addition to the mandatory threshold is motivated by the desire to meet the needs of 
an important stakeholder and/or for legitimising their activities.  
Table 7.11 shows the results of direct logistic regressions used to assess the 
impact of a number of variables on the likelihood of engaging in voluntary CSR. The 
main model (model 6) contains seven independent variables and three control 
variables. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test produced a Chi-square value of 
11.137 with a significance level of 0.638 (> 0.05), thus showing support for the model. 
Model 6 containing all independent variables was statistically significant with a Chi-
square value of 54.85 and p < 0.01, meaning that the model was able to distinguish 
between cases which are involved in voluntary CSR (VOLCSR) and those which are 
not. Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R square also called the pseudo-R square 
provide the coefficient of determination in a similar manner to multiple regression 
(Pallant, 2007). Results indicate that the model accounts for between 43.3% (Cox & 
Snell R Square) to 63.8% (Nagelkerke R square) of variance in voluntary CSR. The 
model classified 80% of cases correctly. The small number of observations (164) used 
for the logistic regression is due to the fact that only years 2010 to 2014 can be 
considered. Since the CSR levy was introduced in 2009, voluntary CSR in addition to 
the mandatory CSR threshold applies to the post-levy period. Therefore, years 2007-
2009 are ignored for this analysis. 
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Table 7.11: Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Engaging in Voluntary 
CSR (VOLCSR) 
 
 
 
 Model 6 Model 7
 Coefficient (Odds ratio) Coefficient (Odds ratio)
Intercept -3.856
(0.021)
-4.392
(0.012)
DIROWN -1.640***
(0.194)
-1.890***
(0.151)
BLOCKOWN -1.111
(0.329)
-1.590
(0.254)
BDIND -1.049
(0.350)
-1.372
(0.254)
BDSIZE 0.135
(1.144)
0.026
(1.027)
BDDIV 1.442**
(4.229)
1.870***
(6.485)
SOCIALEDU 1.228*
(3.415)
1.070*
(2.914)
FOUND 1.583***
(4.867)
1.527***
(4.604)
INDUSTRY -0.683
(0.505)
-0.436
(0.646)
SIZE/SIZE1 0.540*
(1.716)
0.898*
(2.455)
PROF/PROF1 -0.175
(0.839)
-0.292
(0.747)
Model summary  
Chi-squared  54.85 58.29
Total observations 164 164
Correctly classified (%) 80 80.2
*** significant at 1% level or less; **  significant at 5% level or less and * 
significant at 10% level or less 
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7.11.1 Ownership structure and VOLCSR 
Hypothesis 2b predicts a negative relationship between director ownership and 
voluntary CSR. The odds ratio for Director’s ownership (DIROWN) is less than one 
(0.194) and therefore has a negative coefficient.  
It implies that a 1% increase in director ownership reduces the likelihood of 
engaging in voluntary CSR by 80.6 % (1 - 0.194), other things equal. Alternatively, 
for every 1% less of director’s ownership, the odds of engaging in voluntary CSR 
increases by 5 times (1/0.194). H2b is accepted (p<0.01), director ownership reduces 
the odds of engaging in voluntary CSR. This finding is supported by Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011) who report that managerial ownership does not incite firms to 
undertake CSR beyond minimum compliance level. 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) claim that owner-managers might over-invest in CSR 
as their companies can benefit from a higher CSR rating. Managers will personally 
benefit from a higher CSR rating as they will be viewed as owners who care about 
their employees and the community. With a better reputation, managers have better 
job prospects and bargaining power (Jo and Harjoto, 2011). However, the results show 
otherwise.  
The absence of external control mechanisms such as takeovers and lack of 
competition due to market concentration in the hands of few conglomerates can also 
explain the reluctance for managers to over-invest in CSR. In this situation, managers 
lead a ‘quiet life’ which can be compared with a monopoly situation with no incentive 
to start new ventures (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).  If the board comprises of 
several family members and the CEO is part of them, the chance of a CEO turnover is 
even bleaker. Thus CEOs do not need to show their managerial talent by undertaking 
   
179 
  
CSR activities beyond compliance level. Hypothesis 5b posits a negative relationship 
between block ownership and voluntary CSR. 
The coefficient of block ownership (BLOCKOWN) is negative as predicted 
but insignificant, 3b is thus not supported. From a stakeholder theory point of view, 
the absence of strong stakeholders for block owners means that they face less pressure 
to undertake CSR activities. Further analysis of what type of ownership structure 
(family, director or institutional) constitutes block ownership can spread light on the 
non-significant association between block ownership (BLOCKOWN) and voluntary 
CSR (VOLCSR). The strategic choice hypothesis of Harjoto and Jo (2011) who 
expects insiders affiliated with the firm (block owners) to overspend on CSR does not 
hold.  
 
7.11.2 Board Practices and VOLCSR 
In hypothesis 5b it was initially thought that board independence can increase 
the likelihood of voluntary CSR, however, the coefficient of board independence 
(BDIND) is negative (odds ratio<1) and significant (p<0.05). H5b is not supported. 
Other things equal, for every unit increase in the percentage of independent directors, 
the odds of adopting voluntary CSR decreases by 0.350. This result seems to meet the 
over-investment hypothesis of Barnea and Rubin (2010) who argued that good 
corporate governance should prevent over-investment in CSR. There is no clear 
monitoring mechanism which can prevent management from over-investing in CSR. 
Of the internal and external measures, board independence can be one which can 
oversee top management’s role on behalf of dispersed shareholders (Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). The results in some way show that corporate governance mechanisms can 
prevent over-investment in CSR. This finding is consistent with the relationship 
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between board independence (BDIND) and CSR index (CSRI). If board independence 
cannot increase CSR practices within the mandatory framework, obviously, it cannot 
work on voluntary CSR practices. Independent directors may not think differently 
from insiders because they are demographically similar and therefore cannot offer 
different insights on decision making (Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
Hypothesis 6b predicts that a larger board size increases the likelihood for a 
firm to go beyond the mandatory CSR threshold. Board size (BDSIZE) is positive but 
insignificant (p=0.305). 6b is therefore not supported. While board size is significant 
in explaining the level of CSR reporting, its impact on voluntary CSR is less visible. 
A cursory look at the descriptive statistics for board size shows that the standard 
deviation is low (1.8) compared to the mean of 9.99, which means that those firms 
involved in VOLCSR have roughly the same board size. As such, board size follows 
a norm rather than being a factor which can differentiate firms.  
Hypothesis 7b predicts that gender diverse boards are more likely to engage in 
voluntary CSR practices. Board diversity (BDDIV) has a positive coefficient and is 
significant (p<0.05). As predicted the presence of one or more women on the board 
increases the likelihood that a firm engages in voluntary CSR. This result means that 
stakeholder theory holds, which predicts that women can link the firm with external 
stakeholders and can also improve the social performance of firms (Hafsi and Turgut, 
2013).  The results confirm that women are not solely concerned with the financial 
performance of the firm. Women are prepared to sacrifice financial performance to 
meet the needs of an important stakeholder. As advocated by Westphal and Milton 
(2000) minority group members can stimulate the decision-making process by 
questioning conventional ideas, and offering unique perspectives. 
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Hypothesis 8b states that the presence of a director with a social qualification 
on the board (SOCIALEDU) increases the likelihood for a firm to practise voluntary 
CSR. The odds ratio of 3.415 means that companies with a director qualified in the 
social field is three times more likely to engage in voluntary CSR compared to those 
companies with no director in the social field. 8b is accepted (p<0.1). This result 
supports stakeholder theory which posits that qualified managers can bring legitimacy 
to a firms’ activities. The influence of director education on CSR has been empirically 
tested by Elm et al. (2001) who found that educational attainment positively influences 
concern for the environment. However, Post et al. (2011) failed to show that directors 
with advanced education are more committed to CSR.  
A manager’s academic background is an indication of their underlying attitude 
and expertise (Wesrphal and Milton, 2000).  Business-educated directors can assume 
a variety of roles. For example, an individual qualified in management can occupy a 
position in marketing, general management, human resource among others. Though 
their academic background may have exposed them to CSR, the diversity of roles they 
can assume may fail to provide a direct link to CSR. Conversely, directors with a social 
academic background have a better understanding of the needs of the society through 
knowledge acquired as part of their education. Also, the roles they can occupy based 
on their qualifications is limited to the social field. Thus, the combination of education 
and experience bring better exposure to the needs of stakeholders. Hence, they can 
persuade the board to go beyond the mandatory CSR guidelines to legitimise the 
activities of the firm. 
The presence of social-educated directors represents a small minority of firms 
listed of the SEM. A study by Wesphal and Milton (2000) found that minority directors 
can offer perspectives different from majority directors.  The sample of this study is 
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dominated by business educated directors with an average of 52%. The mere presence 
of a social educated director can provide an outlook of the firm’s need to engage in 
activities in addition to those prescribed by CSR guidelines. This is because minority 
directors can challenge the conventional perspective of majority directors since the 
former have the skills and expertise which majority directors do not have (Wesphal 
and Milton, 2000). Thus directors with a social academic background can be 
instrumental to a firm in identifying and meeting a firm’s social responsibility. For 
example, a director with a social academic background can persuade the board to carry 
on with a project despite having to inject more than the legal amount of CSR funds 
required because of the negative consequences of disrupting the project on the 
community. These directors may ask for additional investment which conflict with 
short-term economic interest for long-term gains for shareholders (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Post et al. 2011).  
 
7.11.3 Foundations and VOLCSR 
Hypothesis 9b states that companies which contribute CSR funds to a 
foundation are more likely to exceed the mandatory CSR spending. The use of a 
foundation (FOUND) to channel CSR funds is indeed one of the strongest predictors 
of voluntary CSR (p<0.01). H9b is therefore accepted. A number of companies and 
foundations work in close collaboration with NGOs to implement their CSR activities 
(Pillay, 2015). Mandatory CSR has seen an escalation in the number of NGOs aiming 
to attract CSR funds. Whether foundations fund an NGO or run their own CSR 
programs, projects are long-term and require regular injection of funds. Firms might 
contribute more than the mandatory amount to keep programs running because of 
moral legitimacy reasons. 
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Pillay (2015) explains that some loss-making companies were still making 
CSR commitments. Some CSR projects date prior to the regulatory change or when 
companies were profitable and they still continue to fund these projects because they 
believe that the projects are ‘worthwhile’ even if they do not ‘technically’ have the 
money to contribute (Pillay, 2015). Again from a moral legitimacy perspective, firms 
maintain existing CSR programs are going beyond the mandatory requirement. 
Foundations mainly attract funds from a number of affiliated companies which 
is known by the public, through the holding company or main company in the group. 
For example ‘Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB) Foundation’ is in the eyes of the 
public operated by the Mauritius Commercial Bank, although its Foundation receives 
funding from several companies in the group.  A number of studies have pointed out 
that CSR has a positive influence on reputation (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al. 2005; 
Lu et al. 2015). Reputation is one of the most important intangible assets for companies 
(Toms, 2002) and this reputation exists in the mind of stakeholders (Lu et al. 2015). 
Firms will endeavour to maintain their standing in society by injecting more funds than 
the legal requirement in their foundations to keep their CSR activities going. 
Retreating from a long-term project due to insufficient funds is therefore not the way 
forward due to negative consequences on the reputation of the firm. To maintain their 
legitimacy status, firms will exceed the CSR threshold and report upon those activities 
to cater for the needs of stakeholders who are involved in the assessment of the firm’s 
reputation. The positive impact created on stakeholders will enhance the firm’s 
reputation (Lu et al. 2015). 
 
7.11.4 Control variables and VOLCSR 
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7.11.4.1 Industry 
For the logistic model, firms are classified under ‘manufacturing’ or ‘other’, 
with manufacturing firms denoted by a zero (0) and other firms denoted by one (1). 
Industry (INDUSTRY) has a negative coefficient and is insignificant (p>0.05). It 
implies that other firms are less likely to be involved in voluntary CSR than 
manufacturing firms. This result is in accord with Qu (2011). Manufacturing firms are 
expected to display greater concern for social responsibility because they are 
politically sensitive (Cooke, 1992). As their activities are under more scrutiny by the 
public, these firms will attempt to meet demands from primary stakeholders. This 
result is at odds with Hafsi and Targut (2013) who found that service firms have a 
better corporate social performance than manufacturing firms.  
 
7.11.4.2 Profitability 
Profitability (PROF), as measured by return on equity, is negatively related to 
voluntary CSR and is insignificant. This is in line with the results of Cowen et al. 
(1987) and Clarkson et al. (2008). Mixed results have been reported by authors about 
the CSR-financial performance relationship, as Hughes et al. (2001) and Moore (2001) 
report a negative relationship whereas Cormier and Magnan (2004) and Murray et al. 
(2006) exhibit a positive relationship. Heinze (1976) claims that profitability gives 
management the flexibility to undertake extensive CSR programs and this claim 
should logically hold for voluntary CSR. However, it appears from the results that 
profitability is not a determining factor for a firm to spend above the compulsory 
amount.  
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7.11.4.3 Firm Size 
Firm size (SIZE) as measured by total assets, is positively related to voluntary 
CSR and significant. This result is consistent with Stanny and Ely (2008) and Morhardt 
(2010) who support the firm size-CSR effect. Larger firms make a greater impact on 
society and have a large number of shareholders and are expected to undertake more 
CSR activities (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Large companies also have greater social 
visibility and tend to experience greater demand for sponsorship and donations. If they 
fail to support such demands, they can face serious consequences (Mahadeo et al. 
2011a). From a stakeholder theory perspective, large firms will go beyond minimum 
compliance to meet the request of important stakeholders, especially religious 
donations in the case of Mauritius.  
 
7.11.5 Robustness Test 
Additional tests were conducted to test the model’s robustness. In model 7, two 
alternative measures for firm size and profitability are used. The natural logarithm of 
Sales (SIZE1) is used instead of the natural logarithm of total assets for firm size 
(SIZE). For profitability, using Van der Waerden’s formula, return on equity (PROF) 
is replaced by return on assets (PROF1). The results for model 7 does not differ 
qualitatively from the results in model 6. The only change is in the significance of 
board diversity (BDDIV) which becomes significant at the 1% level. It can, therefore, 
be concluded that Model 6 is robust and can be used for predicting voluntary CSR. 
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7.12 Summary of Results 
The study examines the influence of ownership structure, board practices and 
other factors on reporting and voluntary CSR practices in Mauritius. Table 7.12 
provides a summary of the results. 
Table 7.12: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypotheses Accepted/Rejected 
1: There is an increase in the extent of CSR reporting 
following CSR legislation 
Accepted 
2a: There is a negative association between the 
proportion of director ownership and the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
Accepted 
2b: Firms with a higher proportion of director 
ownership are less likely to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
Accepted 
3a: There is a negative association between the 
proportion of shares held by block holders and the 
extent of CSR reporting. 
Rejected 
3b: Firms with a higher level of block ownership are 
less likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices in 
addition to mandatory CSR practices. 
Rejected 
4: There is a positive association between the presence 
of government ownership and the extent of CSR 
reporting. 
Rejected 
5a: There is a positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors and the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
Rejected 
5b: Firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory requirements. 
Rejected 
6a: There is a positive association between board size 
and the extent of CSR reporting 
Accepted 
6b: Firms with a larger board size are more likely to 
engage in voluntary CSR practices in addition to 
mandatory requirements. 
Rejected 
7a: There is a positive association between the 
proportion of board gender diversity and the extent of 
CSR reporting. 
Accepted 
7b: The presence of a female board member increases 
the likelihood for a firm to engage in voluntary CSR 
practices in addition to mandatory requirements. 
Accepted 
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8a: There is a positive association between the 
proportion of business-educated directors and the 
extent of CSR reporting. 
Rejected 
8b: The presence of a director holding a social 
qualification increases the likelihood for a firm to be 
involved in voluntary CSR practices in addition to 
mandatory requirements. 
Accepted 
9a: There is a positive association between companies 
channelling their CSR funds to a foundation and the 
extent of CSR reporting. 
Accepted 
9b: Firms channelling their CSR funds to a foundation 
are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR practices 
in addition to mandatory CSR requirements. 
Accepted 
10: There is a positive association between employee 
volunteering and the extent of CSR reporting. 
Accepted 
 
7.13 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presents the results of hypotheses testing of the study’s research 
questions. Before conducting multivariate analysis, descriptive statistics of 
independent variables were analysed together with the correlation matrix to identify 
issues related to normality and multicollinearity of variables. Three analytical models 
were tested using multiple regression. The first, (model 1) assessed the effect of 
regulation on CSR reporting. The second, (model 2) tested the influence of corporate 
governance practices on CSR reporting and the third (model 6) evaluated the 
determinants of voluntary practices in Mauritius. The results were then discussed in 
general. Robustness tests were carried out to ensure the results are reliable.  
The role of regulation is significant in explaining CSR reporting, thus 
highlighting its essence in developing countries to make firms more socially and 
environmentally responsible. As regards the influence of corporate governance 
practices on CSR reporting over the eight-year period (2007-2014), director ownership 
and government ownership are the two attributes which influence CSR reporting, 
though negatively. The negative relationship between government ownership and CSR 
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is contrary to the prediction of the researcher which can be placed on account of the 
low government stake in companies and lack of competition. Regarding board 
practices, board independence is significant but affects CSR negatively. Local 
conditions such as smallness of the country or friend/ family connections can account 
for this unlikely relationship. Board size and board gender diversity both contribute 
positively towards CSR, as expected. Both employee volunteering and foundations are 
found to be major drivers of CSR in the Mauritian context.  
Empirical evidence shows that only three variables influence voluntary CSR 
practices. Director ownership is significant and negative showing the lack of interest 
of owner-managed firms in CSR possibly due to the absence of strong stakeholders. 
Foundations are more likely to be involved in voluntary CSR due to the long-term 
nature of those projects. Director education positively influences engagement in 
voluntary CSR showing that minority views are not always neglected. The next chapter 
presents the conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This study presents an empirical investigation of the determinants of CSR 
reporting in Mauritius. In so doing, it analyses practices, trends and patterns of 
reporting of CSR over an eight-year period (2007-2014). Regulatory regime changes 
which affected CSR practices and reporting occurred during the period under 
examination.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 provides a summary 
of the contents of preceding chapters. This is followed by a summary of the findings 
of this study in section 8.3. The implications of the research findings are discussed in 
section 8.4. The limitations are discussed in section 8.5 and finally, section 8.6 
provides an overview of further avenues for research.  
 
8.2 Content of Preceding Chapters 
Chapter 1 provides the scene for conducting this research. The research 
questions and the justification for conducting this research are covered. Research 
questions were converted into testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are classified into 
three categories: ownership structure, board practices and other factors. The 
significance of this study and its contribution to the literature is also discussed. The 
structure of the thesis finishes the chapter. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Mauritian economy and explains the role 
of key institutions in Mauritius. Mauritius is a small island in the Indian Ocean with a 
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population of around 1.3 million inhabitants. Mauritius has successfully diversified its 
economy from a monocrop (sugar) in the 1960’s to Manufacturing and Tourism in the 
1970’s. The Mauritian economy is now diversified with other pillars such as sea food 
processing and financial services.  The Companies Act 2001 and the Financial 
Reporting Act 2004 guide financial reporting. Mauritius was the first country to 
impose a CSR levy on all profitable companies and are required to contribute 2% of 
profit towards CSR activities. A concentrated structure of family ownership and few 
businesses controlling the market are the main characteristics of the Mauritian business 
environment. External control mechanisms such as hostile takeovers are rare. 
Corporate control is, therefore, insider oriented. The board structure is akin to Anglo-
American countries and is one-tiered. This chapter also covers the role of key 
institutions such as Financial Services Commission, Mauritius Institute of Public 
Accountants and the Financial Reporting Council. 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework. To understand the various 
perspectives on CSR, the chapter outlines various theories which can be classified into 
socio-political theories and economic theories. The chapter explains the similarities 
and differences between socio-political and so-called systems-based theories. It also 
shows how the legitimacy, stakeholder and neo-institutional theories are consistent 
with each other and where they differ. This study is in two main parts, the first which 
examines the influence of corporate governance practices on CSR reporting and the 
second which investigates voluntary CSR in a mandatory CSR environment. 
Legitimacy and neo-institutional theory are combined to explain determinants of 
reporting in Mauritius while legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are used in 
conjunction to explain voluntary CSR in a mandatory CSR environment.  
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Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the determinants of CSR reporting. It draws 
from studies on CSR reporting and related environmental and sustainability reporting. 
It starts with the definition of CSR and its reporting and then explains the motivations 
for CSR reporting. A number of theories have been used to explain reporting such as 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and neo-institutional theory. Studies using the 
aforementioned theories are reviewed. Research on themes of disclosure are discussed 
underlining which themes are most/least favoured. Studies on determinants of 
reporting which includes: corporate characteristics; corporate governance practices 
and other factors are also discussed. Additionally, research on regulation and SIDS 
countries are discussed. The contribution of this study to the academic literature is also 
highlighted. 
. Chapter 5 develops hypotheses based on research questions set in chapter 1. 
Three sets of hypotheses are developed. The first predicts an increase in CSR reporting 
following regulation on CSR. The second set argues that corporate governance 
practices and other factors such as employee volunteering and the existence of a 
foundation to channel CSR funds are associated with CSR reporting. The first two sets 
of hypotheses are devised using neo-institutional theory and legitimacy theory. The 
third set argues that corporate governance practices and the existence of a foundation 
are potential determinants of voluntary CSR practices. Legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories are used to support the latter. 
The research design is covered in chapter 6. It starts with an overview of 
research paradigms. Justification for using a longitudinal research design with a 
quantitative approach is provided. The process of constructing the CSR index which 
is the measuring tool for the dependent variable of this study is outlined in detail. 
Consistent with other studies, the CSR index is made up of four categories: 
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environment, human resource, products and consumers, and community. Three 
analytical models are then developed. The first model tests the influence of regulation 
on CSR reporting. The second seeks to identify the influence of corporate governance 
practices on CSR reporting and the third examines voluntary CSR in a mandatory CSR 
environment. All variables used in these two models and their operationalisation are 
explained.  
The results are extensively discussed in chapter 7 
. 
8.3 Summary of Findings  
8.3.1 Extent of CSR Reporting and CSR Themes 
 A large majority of firms (88%) were involved in CSR in 2007 and 
reached 100% by 2013. This result compares very favourably to other developing 
countries. Human resource disclosure has been the most prominent theme of disclosure 
over the years. However, the environment is the only theme which has progressively 
increased in disclosure. Products and Consumers is found to be the least favoured 
theme of disclosure among all companies. Community disclosure is also very popular 
and 95% of firms disclosed in 2013.  
 
8.3.2 Effect of Regulation on CSR Reporting 
Following the regulatory regime changes, an increase in CSRI is noted. A 
change in the pattern of disclosure is noted with an increasing tendency towards 
community which replicates the focus of the regulatory regime change. Multiple 
regression with REG as test variable confirms that CSR reporting has significantly 
increased following regulation regime change.  
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8.3.3 Corporate Governance practices/Other Factors and CSR 
Reporting 
With respect to the driving forces of CSR reporting, the study reveals that 
director ownership has a significant negative influence on firm disclosure practices. 
Block ownership is negatively related to disclosure but the relationship is not 
significant. The relationship between Government ownership and disclosure is 
negative and significant, which is contrary to what was predicted. Regarding board 
characteristics, a larger board size is found to lead to higher disclosures. Board 
independence significantly influences disclosure but is negative which is in contrast to 
the hypothesised prediction. Board gender diversity has a positive influence on 
disclosure and is significant. No influence of director education on disclosure is found. 
Firms which use a foundation to channel their CSR funds disclose more often. 
Similarly, firms practising employee volunteering are found to disclose more often. In 
both cases the relationship is significant.  
As regards control variables, the regulation regime changes positively 
influences CSR disclosure. Profitability is an influential factor in determining 
disclosure. In line with the literature, firm size is significantly and positively associated 
with disclosure. The results show mixed findings in relation to the influence of industry 
on disclosure. Only ‘Commerce’ shows a significant influence on reporting, with 
‘Banks and Insurance’ and ‘Others’ having no significant influence on reporting.  
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8.3.4 Determinants of Voluntary CSR Practices 
The guidelines impose a number of restrictions on CSR practices. For instance, 
firms cannot use funds for staff welfare activities and religious donations. Firms 
willing to undertake activities not allowed by the guidelines, must contribute more 
than the CSR levy. Regarding the determinants of voluntary CSR practices, the results 
reveal that board size does not influence a firm to go beyond the 2% levy amount on 
CSR and the same applies for board independence. Boards of directors having a female 
presence (board gender diversity) are more likely to over-invest in CSR. The presence 
of a director with a social qualification has a significant positive influence on voluntary 
CSR practices. Block ownership has a negative influence on voluntary CSR but is not 
significant. Firms with higher director ownership level are less likely to be involved in 
voluntary CSR, which is in line with the literature. Firms which contribute their funds 
to a foundation are more likely to exceed the mandatory CSR threshold. As far as firm 
characteristics are concerned, manufacturing firms are more likely to be involved in 
voluntary CSR. Profitability is surprisingly not a significant determinant of voluntary 
CSR. Larger firms are more likely to be involved in voluntary CSR mainly due to their 
higher social visibility. 
 
8.4 Implications of the Findings  
This study has several implications for policy and practice. The significant 
increase in disclosures following the introduction of the levy and mandatory CSR 
disclosure, shows the importance of regulation in compelling firms to practice and thus 
disclose CSR. In a country where the ownership of large firms is concentrated in a 
handful of individuals, where family-owned and managed firms are preponderant, the 
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market does not offer sufficient incentives for firms to voluntarily practice and disclose 
CSR. Moreover, the absence of external control mechanisms such as takeovers and 
with market concentration among a few conglomerates, there is a case for mandatory 
CSR practice and disclosure in Mauritius. 
From a regulator’s perspective, the negative association between independent 
directors and reporting, calls for a revision of the provisions of the Code regarding the 
appointment of independent directors. The actual provision states that there must be a 
minimum of two independent directors on a board. It is claimed that the choice of 
independent directors rests on powerful CEOs which compromise their role as 
monitors (Jain and Jamali, 2016). To this end, it is proposed that the selection of 
independent directors be made more transparent. A committee chaired by a non-
executive chairman could screen potential candidates and make recommendations 
towards the selection of independent directors. Furthermore, the training of 
independent directors is important to empower them to play a constructive role. To 
this end, the Mauritius Institute of Directors (MIoD) can provide training to potential 
directors. At the same time the MIoD can form a pool of potential trained directors for 
companies to choose from, should they require an independent director.  
The negative association between board independence and reporting has 
implications for foreign investors which have CSR high on their agenda. Compared to 
Anglo-American countries where independent directors are found to positively 
influence firms to practice and disclose more CSR, this does not seem to be applicable 
in the context of Mauritius.  
The negative relationship between government ownership and reporting, is not 
the right signal to the investment community. The state should lead by example and 
promote transparency by disclosing more CSR. Government-owned firms may be 
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more concerned about their operating activities and neglect the accountability 
associated with government ownership. The government should consider choosing the 
right mix of directors in terms of qualifications and experience to enable these 
companies to operate effectively and efficiently and while being accountable to the 
public at the same time.  
Agency problems are rife in modern organisations. Shareholders are always 
wary of the true intentions of managers. While there is no indication that over-
investment in CSR is detrimental to the company, it certainly imposes an additional 
cost on the company. This cost is borne by shareholders. The negative significant 
association between director ownership and voluntary CSR, implies that, as 
managerial ownership increases the likelihood of over-spending on CSR decreases. 
Thus, owner-managers do not over-invest in CSR to strengthen their career prospects. 
From a shareholder’s perspective, it implies that shareholders can trust managers. This 
finding is reassuring for small shareholders of owner-managed firms where the risk of 
majority shareholders expropriating minority shareholders is high (Bhasa, 2004). 
One of the major criticisms levelled against CSR is that it consumes financial 
and human resources which lead to lower profits. Furthermore, it distracts the attention 
of the company from its mainstream activities. Faced with a choice of either paying 
the levy as a tax or spending it on CSR activities, a rational person may choose the 
easy way, that is pay it as a tax. However, results of this study show otherwise. An 
increase in all categories of CSR over 2007-2014 is evidenced. Almost all 
subcategories have shown an increase post 2009, which confirms that companies have 
continued their CSR engagement rather than paying the levy as a tax. This choice is 
motivated by legitimacy reasons. Regulatory regime change has altered the way CSR 
is practised but stakeholders’ expectations have remained the same. Falling behind 
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society’s expectations will create a legitimacy gap which companies want to avoid. 
Firms prefer to practise CSR activities rather than hand the funds to tax authorities. 
 
8.5 Limitations of this Study 
This study has several limitations.  First, it considers only the annual report as 
the major source for companies to communicate CSR information to stakeholders. 
Whilst company financials and corporate governance information used to test 
hypotheses are primarily found in the annual report, there are a number of media 
channels that are available for companies to communicate CSR; websites, newsletters, 
newspapers and billboards among others. This study has purposely ignored other 
sources apart from the annual report. Generalisation to other small and unlisted 
Mauritian companies should be made with care. The study focuses on the Mauritian 
context which limits comparison with other countries. 
This study considers a number of corporate governance and firm characteristics 
in predicting CSR reporting. The choice of variables considered is based on previous 
studies and the Mauritian context. For example, this study purposely does not consider 
the role of CEO duality as such a practice is condemned by the NCCG. Likewise, audit 
committees and CSR committees are not considered as this is an established practice 
among companies listed on the SEM. Family ownership and representation on the 
board is a common feature of the Mauritian business environment. However, due to 
unavailability of this information in the annual report, this study has been unable to 
examine this effect. A comprehensive list of determinants of CSR reporting is also 
difficult to build. Furthermore, only a limited number of determinants could be 
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examined, given the small number of observations (287) used. Nevertheless, this study 
gives some preliminary evidence of the influence of CG practices on CSR reporting. 
Though the FRA (2004) indirectly requires firms to disclose their CSR 
activities, the lack of reporting guidelines means that firms may voluntarily not 
disclose all their CSR activities. There are some firms which have no CSR information 
to disclose. The study is unable to distinguish between those firms which have no 
information to disclose and those which purposely decide not to disclose or selectively 
disclose CSR information. This can affect the results of this study but in the absence 
of any means to check if this is occurring, this study assumes that firms have disclosed 
all CSR information. 
 
8.6 Future Research 
This study investigated changes in the level of CSR reporting in the wake of 
regulatory regime changes. The results were taken from annual report data. Firms have 
been accused of using CSR disclosure to manage impressions and reporting plans, 
rather than actions (Hopwood, 2009). Again from a user perspective, future research 
can investigate the type of information disclosed by firms and assess its usefulness for 
consumers of CSR information. 
CSR undoubtedly involves a cost but its benefits remain unclear. Future studies 
can address the economic consequences of CSR. These studies could examine the 
linkages between CSR and one or more outcomes such as the cost of capital, financial 
performance, reputation and market value. This will shed light on whether the market 
rewards firms which go beyond the mandatory CSR threshold. If the answer is yes, 
then in what way does over spending on CSR benefit companies? 
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Future studies can explore other possible determinants of CSR reporting. Since 
this study finds limited influence of board practices on CSR reporting and further to 
the claim made by Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016) that directors in Mauritian firms 
tend to have long tenures; future research might consider investigating how individual 
characteristics of directors such as experience, skills and tenure impacts on reporting. 
Family ownership and representation on the board is common in firms listed on the 
SEM. However, due to the non-availability of this information in annual reports, this 
aspect has been ignored. Future research could find ways to obtain this information, 
possibly from company secretaries and investigate its effect on CSR reporting. 
During the period covered by this study (2007 to 2014) the CSR levy was 
introduced and reporting CSR became mandatory. Guidelines imposed restrictions on 
the practice of CSR activities. In 2015, the government removed all guidelines for 
using CSR funds but kept the CSR levy in place. Thus, future research can extend the 
period of study post-2014 to investigate the changes (if any) in practices following this 
change. 
In a multi-cultural/multi-ethnic society, the societal values may not reflect the 
values of a whole nation. This is because each group may want to maintain its own 
values (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Given the multi-cultural setting of Mauritius, it will 
be interesting to evaluate the impact of ownership structure based on cultural 
background such as: European descendants vs Non-European descendants; Indian 
background (Hindu and Muslims) vs Non-Indian background (Africans, Chinese and 
Europeans), on CSR reporting. Similarly, the impact of gender ownership on CSR 
reporting can also be evaluated. 
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